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ABSTRACT 
 
Ayako Mizumura, Ph.D. 
Department of Sociology, Summer 2009 
University of Kansas 
 
Reflecting [on] the Orientalist Gaze: A Feminist Analysis of Japanes Women-
U.S. GIs Intimacy in Postwar Japan and Contemporary Okinawa 
 
 
This project explores experiences of two generations of Japanese women, “war 
brides,” who married American GIs and moved to the U.S. in the post-World War II 
era, and “military wives,” who married GIs within the past twenty years and who 
currently live in Okinawa.  My purpose is to examine, reflect on, and challenge the 
Orientalist gaze, which I define as Eurocentric with male-centered perce tions, 
interpretations, and representations of Asian women.  In the context of U.S. global 
militarization, I argue that American servicemen stationed in Japan, Korea and other 
Asian nations participate in reproducing and perpetuating Orientalist stereotypes of 
Asian women, while women’s voices often are not heard.  I use a feminist strategy 
and reverse the positions of those who gaze and those who are objects of the gaze to 
make Japanese women’s viewpoints and personal experiences central to my analysis.  
Reversing the subject-object orientations enables Japanese women to express their 
subjective views of American men under their gaze and to represent themselves in 
their own voices.  Methods for this research include in-depth-interviews, 
ethnographic fieldwork, and archival research in the U.S. and Japan, which I 
conducted between 2002 and 2005.  My study shows that Japanese women have 
agency as critical analysts of American men and reveals that their perceptions of 
American GIs become more diverse and complicated as their gendered, racialized, 
and sexualized experiences interact with their GI partners’ race, class and militarized 
masculinity.  This study also demonstrates that shifts in economic power dynamics 
between the U.S. and Japan and globalization of hip-hop culture contributed to 
reshaping women’s perceptions of American GIs in contemporary Okinawa, while 
these younger generations of women still share specific images of American men 
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I used the Japanese convention where family names are followed by given nams 
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I used parentheses to provide English translations of some Japanese terms when the 
given sentence is not disrupted.  e.g., naicha (mainlanders)   
I used brackets to provide additional words or information in order to clarify 
interviewees’ narratives when necessary.   I also used brackets when describing 
unspoken expressions made by interviewees such as laugher in their direct quotations.  
e.g., [laughter] 
 
In order to protect interviewees’ confidentiality, I used pseudonyms for all war bride 
interviewees in the U.S. and for military wives and girlfriends in Okinawa.  In 
Okinawa, I talked with various people such as U.S. servicemen, shop owners, taxi 
drivers, bartenders, and bar hostesses.  I used pseudonyms for these interviewees as 
well.  Whenever it is imperative, I modified interviewees’ personal information to 
eliminate any hints that potentially might reveal their identities.   
 
I translated the majority of Japanese texts (e.g., narratives, Japanese articles, etc.) into 
English unless English translations were available.  Translations of Japanese l guage 
particularly informants’ narratives into English were not easy tasks.  There are 
variations in speech styles and dialects among interviewees according to differences 
in gender, generations, social backgrounds, and regions where they are from. 
Translations from one language to another resulted in loss of distinctive and unique 
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation explores cross-national intimate relationships between 
Japanese women and American servicemen that developed on and around U.S. 
military bases in Japan.  Specifically, this study focuses on the experiences of two 
generations of Japanese women: “war brides” in the U.S. and “military wives” in 
Okinawa, Japan.  I define Japanese “war brides” as older generations of Japanese 
women who married American GIs in Japan and moved to the U.S. in the post-World 
War II era, specifically between 1950s and 1960s.  “Military wives” refers to younger 
generations of Japanese and Okinawan women who married GIs within the past 
twenty years and who currently live in Okinawa.1  
My purpose is to examine, reflect on, and challenge the Orientalist gaze by 
analyzing Japanese women’s personal experiences with and perceptions of American 
men in the context of persistent U.S. militarization in Asian since the end of World 
War II.  While the gaze itself is defined as the process of a “one-way” subjective 
vision of the object to be looked at and examined by the subject (Kaplan 1997: xviii), 
I define the Orientalist gaze as traditional Orientalist images and stereotypes of Asian 
women based on Eurocentric and male-centered perceptions, interpretations, and 
representations.  Chan (1988) claims that Asian women’s sexual stereotypes are 
rooted in European colonial power over Asian people, where women became not only  
                                                
1 Although Okinawans are Japanese citizens, they have a history and culture distinct from Japanese 
living in mainland Japan.  Because Okinawan people have a strong sense of Okinawanness, they tend 
to identify themselves as Okinawan rather than Japanese.  They distinguish themselves from the rest of 
the Japanese by referring themselves to as uchinanchū (Okinawan) and to Japanese as n icha 
(mainlander).  In this dissertation, I use Okinawan to refer to Okinawan people.  However, I also use 
Okinawan and Japanese interchangeably when I refer to Okinawa in certain contexts. 
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the cheapest economic commodities but also became sexual commodities for 
European men.  Yuh (2002) argues that the belief that Asian women have exotic 
sexual allure and docile hyperfemininity constitutes a whole body of Orientalist 
stereotypes.  
While European colonizers, travelers, and missionaries contributed to the 
production of the Orientalist images of Asian women earlier, in the context of U.S. 
global militarization, I argue that U.S. servicemen stationed in Japan, Korea and other 
Asian nations participate in producing, spreading, and reproducing Orientalist 
stereotypes of Asian women.  For example, U.S. Navy reservist Bill Hume created 
Baby-san, a Japanese female cartoon character, who was perceived as “emotionally 
volatile and childlike…beautiful sex kitten, the fantasy of a heterosexual 
Euroamerican man” (Shibusawa 2006:34-41).  Hume’s Baby-san appeared in a semi-
pornographic cartoon series for the Far East edition of the Navy Times and became 
immensely popular among American GIs in early postwar Japan and Korea 
(Shibusawa 2006).  American soldiers stationed overseas contributed to the 
perpetuation of Orientalist stereotypes of Asian women as sexual objects by 
representing them in Western media such as cartoons, novels, and movies. 
The depiction of Japanese women as fantasized sexual objects is one 
dimension of Orientalist visions of Asian women constructed around the Orientalist 
gaze.  I use the concept of Orientalism formulated by Edward Said (1979) as a 
departing point for my investigation of the Orientalist gaze on Japanese women, in 
which I examine, reflect on, and challenge in this study.  Most scholars who work on 
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issues concerning Orientalism in relation to colonialism, imperialism, and post-
colonialism since the publication of Said’s (1979) Orientalism have focused on 
European representation and experience of the Orient, particularly of the near East 
(Middle East).2   In this study, I extend Said’s analytical concept of Orientalism to 
U.S.-Japan relationships within specific historical, cultural, and social contexts of the 
postwar period, characterized by U.S. military occupation of Japan in early postwar 
period and its continuing presence today, particularly in present-day Okinawa.   
Japan occupies an ambiguous position in its power relations with the West, 
especially with the U.S.  On the one hand, Japan is one of the few non-Western 
countries that was never officially colonized by Western imperial power.  Notably, 
Japan itself exercised imperial and colonial power over other Asian countries in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Johnson 2000; Koikari 2005).  Japan’s defeat in 
World War II drastically reconfigured the political and economic alignments in Asia 
and its relations to the West, particularly to the U.S.  While Japan was a military 
colony under American occupation, it simultaneously served as an American ally 
supporting the U.S. empire building that sought a new postwar international order at 
the dawn of the Cold War and thereafter (Johnson 2000).3  
Keeping Japan’s dual roles in postwar power relations to the U.S. in mind, this 
study situates the Orientalist gaze in American imperialism in a broad sense; but,  
                                                
2 Europe refers primarily to the French and British colonial powers (to lesser extent, the Germans, 
Russians, Spanish, Portuguese, Italians, and Swiss) that dominated the Orient until the end of World 
War II (Said 1979).    
3 For Japan-U.S. postwar relations in early post war, see Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and 
Consequences of American Empire (2000:3-33); John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the 
Wake of World War II (1999); Yukiko Koshiro, Trans-pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of 
Japan (1999). 
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more specifically, within the contexts of U.S. occupation in early postwar Japan and 
the persistent U.S. presence in Japan, particularly in Okinawa as a result of U.S. 
global militarism.  Said’s concept of Orientalism is useful for understanding the 
mechanism of how images of the “Oriental other” were produced and represented 
through the gaze of American occupiers.  As I discuss more thoroughly in Chapter 2, 
Americans constructed racialized representations of Japan and Japanese people as 
“the other” based on hierarchical binary distinctions between the West and East as 
well as occupiers and occupied.   
 
Orientalism: A Point of Departure 
In Orientalism, Edward Said (1979:3) argues that the relationship between the 
Occident and the Orient is a relationship of power in which the former dominates the 
latter, and in which Western culture gained strength and identity by setting itself 
against the Orient as “the other.”4  According to Said, the Orient was created or 
Orientalized by the West through a series of oppositions that placed the Orient in a 
subordinate position, which, in turn, defined the West as superior.  In Said’s view, 
Orientalism is the discourse of power, domination, and complex hegemony 
constructed on the basis of Western superiority over Oriental backwardness.  The 
Oriental degeneracy and inequality with the West are associated with the biological 
basis of racial inequality, which divided races into advanced (the West) and backward 
(the East) (Said 1979:206).   
                                                
4 The geographical scope of the Orient is not limited to adjacent areas to Europe but it also includes 
Europe’s old colonies established from the late eight enth century to the end of World War II.    
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Influenced by Michel Foucault’s formulation of power, knowledge, and 
discourse, Said argues that Western knowledge about the Orient is not “innocent” or 
“objective,” but profoundly connected to an operation of power that processes the 
information to become “fact” or “truth.”  To Foucault (1980), power and knowledge 
are interdependent: 
The exercise of power itself creates and causes to emerge new objects of 
knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information…  The exercise of 
power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly 
induces effects of power…  It is not possible for power to be exercised 
without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power (Pp. 
52-53).  
 
In other words, production of knowledge takes place when there are imbalances of 
power relations between groups of people or between institutions and states (Mills 
2003:69).   Foucault also views the mechanism of power/knowledge relations as an 
institutionalized process through which knowledge is created and maintained as truth 
by those in positions of authority.   
The complex mechanism in the creation and maintenance of “truth” about the 
Orient depends not simply on domination, but also on the operation of hegemony and 
development of consent through various institutional practices (Lewis 1996).  This 
mechanism works not necessarily by force, but instead “through a wide range of 
strategies which support and affirm it and which exclude and counter alternative 
versions of events” (Mills 2003:76).  Loomba (2005:29) stresses that “ideology is 
crucial in creating consent” and that it is “the medium through which certain ideas ar  
transmitted and more important, held to be true.”  Thus, ideology, joined hand-in-
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hand with power, played a role in creating knowledge about the Orient and 
legitimizing it to maintain hegemonic power, while the object’s knowledge was 
marginalized and silenced, or subjugated.    
 
Orientalism: Critiques and Redefinitions 
Despite the influence of Orientalism on colonial and postcolonial studies, it 
has been critiqued by a wide variety of critics, scholars, and feminists (Bhabha 1983; 
Carrier 1995; Clifford 1988; Lewis 1996; Lowe 1991; Porter 1983; al-‘Azm 2000; 
Yoshihara 2003).  One of the criticisms that Said’s Orientalism frequently receives is 
that it is a static portrayal of “hegemonic Western discourse” which promotes and 
reinforces a binary opposition between the dominant West and the subordinate East, 
timelessly.   
While the Orient is stereotypically characterized as irrational, exotic, erotic, 
despotic and heathen, the West is often represented as rational, familiar, moral, just, 
and Christian.  Stereotyping “invariably presupposes and confirms a totalizing and 
unified imperialist discourse” designed to affirm the positional superiority f he 
West over the inferiority of the East (Gandhi 1998:77).  Lewis (1996:16) argues that 
“not only do these Orientalist stereotypes misrepresent the Orient, they also 
misrepresent the Occident—obscuring in their flattering vision of European 
superiority, the tensions along the lines of gender, class and ethnicity that ruptured the 
domestic scene.”   
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Moreover, scholars in colonial studies are particularly critical of Orientalism 
for its focus on the pervasive and unchallenged nature of hegemonic power and 
discourse, which are “possessed entirely by the colonizer” (Bhabha 1983:200; Porter 
1983; Spivak 1988).  Porter (1983), for instance, emphasizes the profound 
heterogeneity in Orientalism as a discourse created by instability and ambivalence.  
He argues that Said failed to view hegemony as an historical process and as an 
“evolving sphere of superstructural conflict in which power relations are continually 
reasserted, challenged, modified” (1983:180-181).  Lowe (1991) problematizes 
construction of the hierarchical binary oppositions such as male/female and 
Orient/Occident and the like by stating they are essentialist descriptions, which ignore 
the dynamic intersection of race, ethnicity, gender, class, and nationality th t alter the 
generalized assumption about the dichotomous power relations. 
Bhabha (1983) and Spivak (1988) are concerned with the subjectivities and 
identities of the colonized, whose voices have been silenced in colonial discourse and 
official narratives.  Working from a post-structuralist point of view, Bhabha and 
Spivak reject fixed identities of the oppressed or subaltern by arguing that human 
subjectivities and identities are fragmentary and unstable.  The colonial subjectivities 
formation is a process that involves negotiation and resistance in the dynamic of 
power relations, which are beyond one-way power relations between the colonizer 
and colonized (Bhabha 1983).  Spivak argues it is crucial to look at the internal 
dynamics of power relations among heterogeneous subjects, including rural peasants, 
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urban poor, and local elite in terms of their power relations relative to each other as 
well as to the colonizer (Leitch et al. 2001).  
 Orientalism is more heterogeneous than the uniform and unchanging images 
of the faceless body of the Orient constructed by the West.  It is precisely this 
heterogeneity that facilitates tension, contradiction, and fragmentatio  in power 
relations, which in turn opens up a space for the marginalized to resist the oppress r.  
Moreover, this space permits the marginalized not only to reinforce subjectivity and 
self-representation, but also allows objectified women to shift their position  o active 
observers of the West.  To understand this heterogeneity, we must acknowledge that 
Orientalism is structured not only around racism, but also around patriarchal power 
relations in Western hegemonic discourse.  Indeed, gender is particularly important, 
since Orientalism itself is an andocentric discourse that feminizes the colonial subject.  
As I discuss below, Oriental women become the most marginalized objects of 
Orientalism in situations when they are doubly Orentalized by Eurocentric male 
practices and local Asian patriarchy.   
 
Situating Orientalism in Japan: Japanese Women as Doubly Orientalized 
When Orientalism constructs the Orient as the monolithic other, the Orient is 
also feminized because Orientalism is a male project where the colonizer is defined as 
male (superior) and the colonized as female (inferior), which justifies the subjugation 
of the latter by the former.  Said (1979) argues that  
Orientalism itself, furthermore, was an exclusively male domain like so many
professional guilds with sexist blinders.  This is especially evident in the 
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writing of travelers and novelists: women are usually the creatures of a male 
power-fantasy.  They express unlimited sensuality, they are more or less 
stupid, and above all they are willing (P. 207). 
 
Orientalism is a male conception of the world where women and female bodies are 
symbolized as conquered lands by the Orientalist.   
Similarly, European and American representations of Asians as the “other” 
have reinforced the images of Asian women as accessible foreign territories to be 
conquered and consumed, while Asian males are constructed as feminized and 
without masculine power.  According to Okihiro (2000), images of Asian females as 
being sexually available were reinforced by stereotypes of Asian men as weak and 
effeminate, thus unable to protect “their women.”  These stereotypes and imges 
combined to justify the subordination and control of Orientals and their resources by 
Westerners.   
In Japan’s case, the image of effeminate Japanese men was constructed 
around the unequal power relations between U.S. and Japan as a consequence of the 
U.S. victory over Japan in World War II.  Dower (1999:138) argues that the defeated 
Japan, although it was once a “masculine” threat to the West, was transformed into “a 
compliant, feminine body on which the white victors could impose their will.”  The 
images of Japanese women were constructed in the context of the racialized, 
sexualized, and feminized Orient, where their male counterparts represent the 
defeated country.  
Ueno (2005), a Japanese sociologist, argues that Oriental women have been 
“doubly feminized” by the Orientalist discourse, and by their own patriarchy, since 
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the Orientalist discourse constructs the Orient as inferior, which in turn femi izes 
Oriental men.  According to Ueno,   
Women, of course, are no more creatures of a male power-fantasy than the 
Orient is that of a European power-fantasy.  Both of them were created by 
Western male discourse as “the other.”  Women are to men as the Orient is to 
the Occident; and difference attributed to them as a distinctive feature defins 
their “otherness”….  If we consider that Oriental men have been feminized, 
Oriental women have been doubly feminized.  This double feminization 
complicates the situation of Oriental women when they struggle against their 
own men, for their feminity has already been appropriated by men themselves 
(Pp. 225-226). 
  
When doubly Orientalized women were situated in the context of early postwar 
Japan, they were portrayed not only as sexualized objects by the U.S. victors.  They 
were also perceived “as the products of a defeated and somewhat backward postwar 
nation who are then hopelessly measured against the presumed superiority of the 
West” (Creef 2000:451).   
In a 1952 Saturday Evening Post article entitled “They are Bringing Home 
Japanese Wives,” Smith and Worden (1952) depicts Japanese women who married 
U.S. servicemen in Japan as  
Country girls not only are innocent of slip [sic] technique but imagine that 
they are being American by having their sleek black hair frizzled into dulled 
mops in ‘Hollywood’ beauty salons only Japanese side streets.  They mix 
unbelievable hues in their outer clothing and have no idea of what to do with a 
girdle, although they buy them…perhaps to hang on the wall of her home as a 
decoration (P. 79).5 
 
Throughout the article, the Japanese woman was presented as a “chrysanthemum-
bud” preparing for acculturation into “civilized” Western domestic life to serve and 
                                                
5 Janet Wentworth Smith and William L. Worden, “They’re Bringing Home Japanese Wives,” 
Saturday Evening Post, January 19, 1952. 
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satisfy her American husband despite difficulty.  Storrs (2000) also claims that U.S. 
cultural frames produced and reproduced stereotypes of Asian and Asian American 
females as docile, petite, submissive, and sexually desirable or erotic objects, 
representing a patriarchal image of attractive, feminine women.  As Uchida 
(1998:162) notes, Asian women are objectified as monolithic “Oriental women” 
through the process of Orientalization by Western men who deny the women status a  
subjects.  
In the context of the U.S. military occupation of Japan, women’s bodies and 
sexualities were Orientalized by Western conquerors and used as sites to demonstrate 
and enhance their masculine power.  As sexualized objects, countless Japanese 
women became victims of sexual exploitation by American occupation troops 
(Tanaka 2002; Thiesmeyer 1999).  Enloe (1997:195) argues that militarized 
masculinities rest on soldiers’ morale and discipline, both of which depend on the 
exploitable sexuality of local women. She asks: “Without myths of Asian or Latina 
women’s compliant sexuality, would many American men be able to sustain their 
own identities, their visions of themselves as manly enough to act as soldiers?” 6  Just 
as the Orient helped to define Western superiority, the Oriental female body helped 
U.S. soldiers maintain American masculine identities.  
While Japanese women have been objectified and sexualized by Western men, 
they also have been simultaneously gendered and sexualized by the Japanese local 
                                                
6 Militarized masculinities refer to masculinities not only constructed in the boot camp and the 
battlefield, but also in the “smoky bar and sparsely furnished rented room” of the “rest and recreation” 
district (Enloe 1997:194-195). 
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patriarchy.  Tamanoi (1999) argues that the discourse of Japanese nationalism used 
women’s bodies, sexualities, thoughts, and emotions to create a homogenized 
womanhood through which “women become a metaphor of what they represent, 
rather than what they are” (Eisenstein 2000: 43).  The local gender ideology of 
Japanese womanhood assigned women symbolic roles as gatekeepers of moral and 
racial purity for the nation.  Similar to other societies, Japanese women who did n t 
fit this image were criminalized for their inability to sustain the pure Japanese blood 
(Tamanoi 1999).   
During early post-World War II Japan, Japanese women who violated the 
gender ideology and fraternized with American soldiers faced severe social 
constraints and even overt hostility from Japanese patriarchal society (Williams 
1991:141).  Women associated with U.S. servicemen were widely conceived as 
prostitutes or traitors to their country for choosing American over Japanese men 
(Hayashi 2002; Kim 1977; Spickard 1989; Takatsu 2002).  Indeed, the term “war 
bride” or Sensō (War) Hanayome (Brides) has been associated with sexual 
stereotypes such as prostitutes and bar girls, who often are derogatorily termed
panpan (Hayashi 2002; Storrs 2000; Takatsu 2002; Williams 1991).  
 Some Japanese, including the Issei in the U.S., still view war brides with 
contempt for violating the Japanese social norm of in-group marriage (Glenn 1986).7  
Other stereotypes of war brides portray them as passive, sexualized objects that 
                                                
7 Issei (i means one or first; sei means generation) refers to the first generation of Japanese immigrants 
who began to come to the U.S. in the late 19th century as migrant labors and settled mostly in Hawaii 
and California.  
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simply followed GIs to the U.S. in the hope of a better life (Hayashi 2002).  This 
suggests that Japanese war brides are sexualized and objectified by Western men and 
local patriarchies, thus doubly Orientalized.  
 
Challenging Orientalism: Occidentalism as a Counter-Discourse? 
Orientalization of Japanese women is not a completed project of the past.  The 
continuing American military presence in present-day Japan creates similar ituations 
where U.S. GIs objectified young women around the U.S. military bases.  However, 
the images of Orientalized women are not static or hegemonic constructions by the 
West.  Indeed, many feminist scholars have problematized the objectification and 
simplistic representations of Asian women by the dominant masculine West (Chin 
2000; Houston 1980; Lai 1998; Lewis 1996; Lu 1997; Mazumdar 1989; Shah 1997; 
Tien 2000; Uchida 1998; Yanagisako 1995; Yoshihara 2003).  Uchida (1998), for 
example, examines the historical process of Orientalization of Asian women where 
Oriental is not only a geographical and cultural term, but also sexual.  Uchida 
(1998:161) argues that the difference is signified in the Oriental “represented in terms 
of gender with the Orient being associated with female and the West with male is in 
essence the dimension of power.”  Lewis (1996) and Yoshihara (2003) question the 
absence of Western women as agents who play the role in the textual production of 
Orientalist discourse.  For example, Yoshihara (2003) focuses on white American 
women’s roles in the construction of American Orientalism in Japan and China 
instead of focusing solely on dominant male power.   
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Some scholars such as Richard Fox and Partha Chatterjee argue that the 
affirmative use of Orientalist stereotypes, such as authentic cultural and spiritual 
identities in opposition to Western civilization, played a strategic role during anti-
colonial nationalist movements in India (Gandhi 1998:78).  Others (Carrier 1995; 
Creighton 1995; Chen 1995) take a critical look at Said’s Orientalism and argue that 
it focuses exclusively on Western constructions of the “Oriental Other” while 
neglecting images of the West constructed by the Orient.  Creighton (1995) explains 
how Orientalism and Occidentalism are closely related, two-way processes: 
The social construction of gaijin (foreigners) denies the individual uniqueness 
of Westerners, transforming all Caucasians into an essentialized category that 
reduces the complex variations among them.8  Just as Western orientalism 
created self-Occidentalism through an implied contrast with a simplified 
West, Japanese renderings of gaijin are occidentalism that stand opposed to 
Japanese orientalisms about themselves…Among the essentialized self-
orientalisms created are Japanese assertions of uniqueness and cultural 
homogeneity (P. 137). 
 
Buruma and Margalit (2002:4) define Occidentalism as “a cluster of images and ideas 
of the West in the minds of its haters” that views urban civilization as decadent nd 
rooted in Anglo-American materialism.  
In the Occidentalist view, Western materialism associated with pleasure, 
wealth, arrogance, and greed is sharply contrasted to the spiritual purity of the East 
(Buruma and Margalit 2002).  Chen argues that Occidentalism is used in post-Maoist 
China as a discourse of both oppression and liberation evoked by competing groups 
pursuing different ends (1995:3).  On the one hand, Chinese authorities used 
                                                
8 Gaijin (gai means outside, jin means person) refers primarily to white foreigners.  Other non-white 
foreigners are distinguished from gaijin and usually called “gaikokujin” (gaikoku means foreign 
country) while blacks are often referred as “kokujin” (koku means black) (Creighton 1995).     
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Occidentalism as a discipline to enhance nationalism within totalitarin Chinese 
society by constructing an essentialized Western Other (1995:3).9  On the other hand, 
Chen claims that Occidentalism is a form of anti-official discourse used against the 
oppressive domestic political regime by constructing the Western Other as a 
metaphor for political liberation (1995:5).  Though Chen illustrates interesting poi ts 
about the dual nature of Chinese Occidentalism, both discourses are dominated by 
males, just as Orientalism rests primarily on Western masculine power.   
While the Occidentalist approach obviously challenges the Orientalist 
representation of the Orient as “the Other,” it is dangerous to essentialize the 
Occident in the same way as Orientalism did.  Also, the Occidentalist approach fails 
to bring in women as “allies,” which suggests that Occidentalism is also gendered.  
What seems to be shared by Orientalism and Occidentalism is andocentric discourse 
that neglects the gendered process that destabilizes a presumably uniform discourse.    
 
Reversing the Gaze: A Feminist Analysis of the Orientalist Gaze 
My approach to the Orientalist stereotypes and representation of Asian women 
is to reverse the positions of gazers and those who are objects of the gaze.  This 
approach follows the examples of feminist scholars who have disputed simplistic and 
stereotypical representations of Asian women (Chin 2000; Houston 1980; Lai 1998; 
Lewis 1996; Mazumdar 1989; Shah 1997; Tien 2000; Uchida 1998; Yoshihara,  
                                                
9 Chen coined the term “official-Occidentalism,” used by the Chinese government, while she termed 
“anti-official Occidentalism” as a counter discourse of the official-Occidentalism, used by opponent 
groups of the totalitarian government, including the intelligentsia (1995). 
 
                                                                                                                                16
2003).   While I challenge Western creation of monolithic images of Asian women, I 
do not intend to construct a uniform representation of American men through the eyes 
of Japanese women associated with U.S. GIs.  Instead, the process of reversing the 
gaze or subject-object orientation destabilizes the Occidental-self and creates a space 
for women to express their diverse opinions and views of American men and 
masculinities, which rarely become the objects of the investigation by non-white 
other.  As Kaplan claims, “white subjectivities can also be destabilized when exposed 
to the gaze of the Other” (1997: xix), which, in turn, challenges the Orientalist gze.   
Making Japanese women’s viewpoints and experiences the basis of analysis of 
the Orientalist gaze, I focus on women’s agency and subjectivities.  I argue that 
women can become critical analysts of the multivalent power relations between West 
and East, America and Japan, American men and Japanese women, and Japanese men 
and Japanese women in the context of the U.S. military occupation and global 
militarization.  These seemingly rigid and dichotomous power relations are 
intersected and obscured by tensions, alliance, and resistance along lines of gender, 
race, sexuality, class, ethnicity, nationality, and more.  Reversing the gaze is one way 
to deconstruct binary opposition constructions and provide a new understanding of 
Japanese women beyond the Orientalist gaze.  I also demonstrate that macro-level 
changes, such as shifts in power relations between U.S. and Japan over the past half-
century, have reshaped GI-Japanese intimacy.  Japanese women’s improved 
socioeconomic status in Japan contributed to changes not only in Western 
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constructions of the Orient and Oriental women, but also in Japanese women’s views 
of the American men.   
 
Chapter Summary 
Chapter 1 addresses methodological issues, the feminist methodology on 
theorizing and practicing qualitative research, and interpreting and presenting da a to 
the analysis of reversing the gaze.  This chapter also discusses the research m thods 
and data collection process, including the selection of research sites and the process 
of recruiting and interviewing informants.  In Chapter 2, I provide historical 
background of post-World War II Japan that creates the context for racial and sexual 
liaisons between Japanese women and American soldiers.  I discuss the gendered, 
racialized, and sexualized aspects of the U.S. occupation that shaped Japanese 
women’s and men’s lives differently.  Chapter 3 continues to reveal the diversity of 
personal experiences among women associated with GIs in postwar Japan.  Using 
narratives of war bride interviewees, this chapter explores patterns of relationships 
with American men and discusses their views of America and American GIs.  In 
Chapter 4, I address the role of Okinawa in U.S. global militarism that contributes to 
the ongoing racial and sexual boundary crossing by Okinawan women and American 
GIs.  At length, I illustrate historical shifts in economic, political, racial, and sexual 
landscapes of base towns that provide intimate sites (e.g., night clubs and bars) 
facilitating GI-Japanese intimacy in contemporary Okinawa.  In Chapter 5, I use 
narratives of women associated with American servicemen in Okinawa and explore 
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Western men and masculinity as seen through the Japanese women’s gaze.  I analyze 
how Japanese women’s perceptions and understandings of Americans within the 
context of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa have shaped their relationships with 
GIs.  I also examine racial dynamics of contemporary GI-Japanese intimacy, 
particularly as a consequence of the global phenomenon of hip-hop culture and its 
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Chapter 1 
Feminist Approach to Research: Methodology and Method 
This research employs a feminist methodology on theorizing and practicing 
qualitative research.  Feminist methodology refers to an approach to social research 
that takes a critical stance toward traditional paradigms and theories produced and 
controlled within male-centered frameworks (Fox and Murry 2001; Hesse-Biber, 
Leavy, and Yaiser 2004; Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002; Smith 1987).  Feminist 
scholars challenge the andocentric knowledge production that disregards women’s 
personal experience as a research subject and source of knowledge (Hesse-Biber et al. 
2004).  
I follow the examples of feminist scholars who brought a range of women’s 
experiences and lives into the center of their research as subjects of critical inquiry 
(Cook and Fonow 1986; Gorelick 1996; Reinhartz 1992; Smith 1987).  For example, 
Dorothy Smith (1987) calls for looking at women’s everyday lives as a starting poit 
for feminist research and including women’s personal experiences and perspectives in 
the knowledge building process.  Feminist researchers stress the importance f 
women’s experiences and voices in uncovering their gendered lives and relations, a 
perspective that was excluded in traditional social science research (Berger 2004; 
Gorelick 1996; Smith 1987).  I use women’s personal experiences and their 
viewpoints as valuable sources of knowledge to challenge Eurocentric and patriarch l 
models of the knowledge-building that objectified and sexualized Asian women as 
Oriental “other.”  
 
                                                                                                                                20
In feminist scholarship, gender has been treated as the dominant organizing 
principle for understanding women’s lives and oppressions (Amott and Matthaei 
1996; Ferree 1990).  However, because of the centrality of gender, other social 
categories such as race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, and nationality have been taken for 
granted in feminist research (Baca Zinn 1996; Chow 1996; Collins 2000).  The 
intersectional approach offers a framework for integrated analysis to understand how 
gender and dominant categories such as race, sexuality, class, and nationality are 
mutually constituted relationships organized around difference (Baca Zinn and Dill 
1994; Chow 1996; Collins 2000; Glenn 1999).  Many contemporary feminist scholars 
have employed this intersectional approach to analyze how systems of inequality 
interact and shape women’s lives differently in specific historical settings and social 
relations (Baca Zinn 1996; Brewer 1997; Collins 1999; Espiritu 1997; Glenn 1999; 
Gonzalez 1993; hooks 1990; King 1988; Smith 1987; West and Fenstermaker 1995).  
The feminist concept of  “intersectionality” and “simultaneity” provides a 
useful framework for the current study.  Japanese women’s relationships with 
American GIs develop within the specific context of U.S. military globalization 
where Japanese women are simultaneously gendered, sexualized, and racialized by 
the U.S. occupiers.  Women’s experiences become more diverse and complicated 
when their gendered and racialized experiences interact with other attributes such as 
their GI partners’ race, class, and rank in the military.  Heterogeneity among Japanese 
women who have diverse social locations and life experiences challenges the 
homogeneous images of Asian women constructed by the Orientalist gaze.  
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While my feminist strategy of reversing the gaze intends to create a space for 
women to talk about their subjective views and understanding of American men, my 
concern is how my positionality as a researcher influences the research process.  
Hesse-Biber and Yaiser (2004) argue that: 
Reflexivity can help a researcher both publicly and privately acknowledge 
that she is not the essential woman…  [Reflexivity] is the process through 
which a researcher recognizes, examines, and understands how her social 
background, positionality, and assumptions affect the practice of research.  
The researcher is as much as a product of society and its structures and 
institutions as the participants she is studying (P. 115).  
  
The practice of research, such as collecting, interpreting, and representing the data, 
depends on the researcher’s knowledge and perspective and social relations based on 
race, ethnicity, gender, and class, and more (Andersen 1997; Collins 2000; Hesse-
Biber and Yaiser 2004; Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002).    
The concept of reflexivity is useful in recognizing and examining the power 
dynamics between the researcher and participants and “to take responsibility for how 
we exercise the social power that we have” in the research process (Sprague 
2001:535).  Judith Stacy (1988:23) explains the contradiction between feminist 
fieldwork practice and exploitative and manipulative aspects of ethnographic 
products where women’s personal stories that they share with the researcher 
ultimately become data to be processed at an “ethnographic mill.”  As Fox and Murry 
(2001:380) point out, “feminists acknowledge that their orientations, actions, 
interpretations, biases, and interests will become integral to the research process and 
its outcomes, and they seek to understand how it happens as it is happening during the 
process of their research.”  Feminist perspectives make me aware of the impact of my 
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positionality on all aspects of the research process and also of my responsibility for 
the process and outcome. 
Confidentiality is another important issue in this research.  Bentz (1997:121) 
notes that protecting anonymity of individuals in small communities where the 
researcher’s activities and contacts are common knowledge is extremely challenging.  
Many of my informants, in the U.S. and Okinawa respectively, are connected through 
their social and personal networks and they contact with one another on a regular 
basis.  Since some questions deal with sensitive and private issues, my informants’ 
responses would potentially embarrass them if the source of information were 
revealed.  As Bentz (1997) points out, “informants, especially when they have formed 
a personal relationship with the researcher, may provide information they would not 
want published” (p. 123).  Although I will not use gossip or personal information that 
is not relevant to my research topic, it is important to reassure that their narratives 
will maintain the anonymity of these women and will not negatively affect their 
relationships with other informants or their family, especially their husbands.  




This study uses qualitative research methods to collect data.  Sources for this 
project include in-depth-interviews, ethnographic observations, and archival 
documents I collected in the U.S. and Japan.  A qualitative approach to data 
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collection is relevant because many aspects of my research questions and issues focus 
on intimate relationships, personal memories and experiences, and gender and family 
relations.  Qualitative methods such as interviews and ethnographic observation allow 
me to gain access or to glimpse women’s feelings, emotions, and life experience that 
quantitative methods would not offer (Franklin 1996:253). 
  I collected interview data from two groups of Japanese women: Japanese 
“war brides” who met American servicemen in the early post World War II period 
and moved to the U.S. between the 1950s and the 1960s, and younger generations of 
Japanese and Okinawan “military wives” who met their American GI partners around 
U.S. military bases in Okinawa from the late 1980s until the present time.10  I 
interviewed 20 Japanese war brides in the U.S. between 2002 and 2004, and in 2004 
to 2005, traveled to Okinawa where I interviewed 70 women, including 48 Japanese 
military wives, and conducted ethnographic fieldwork.  In Okinawa, I also conducted 
informal, unrecorded interviews with young GIs. 
 
Recruiting Japanese War Brides in the U.S. 
I recruited Japanese war bride interviewees within the Midwestern states, 
primarily in Kansas, where I have lived since starting the graduate program in 
Sociology at the University of Kansas in 1996.  My pre-existing social networks, 
familiarity with the local areas and situations, and relative proximity to war bride 
                                                
10 Because of the restriction to the marriage between Japanese women and American GIs coupled with 
the discriminatory immigration law against Asians, it was not until 1953 under the MaCarran-Walter 
Act that a large scale of war bride immigration started.  The peak years of marriage cases between 
Japanese women and GIs are from 1952 to the early 1960s (Kim 1977). 
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interviewees convinced me to select Kansas as the primary research site in the U.S.  
Using my personal connections, I became acquainted with some war brides who were 
willing to participate in the study.  There are small but intimate friendship-based 
social networks among war brides, which often cross the city limits, country lines, or 
even the state lines.  Once I was introduced to their circles and gained their trust, a 
snowball sampling method through word-of-mouth communication allowed me to 
identify and contact prospective interviewees.   
The Japanese war brides I interviewed originally came to Kansas and other 
Midwestern states with their GI husbands during the 1950s through the 1970s.  Some 
women have been living in the same community ever since they arrived in the U.S., 
while others moved to the current residence after experiencing multiple relocations 
from one military station to another in the U.S. and overseas.  Although Japanese war 
brides tended to live in dispersed pattern, Chico Herbison, a former professor of 
African American Studies at University of Kansas, who conducted research on 
Japanese war brides in Kansas, noted that over 100 Japanese war brides lived in a 
small city at the peak time.11  While many Japanese war brides settled in Kansas, 
Herbison also mentioned that an almost equal number of war brides gradually left 
Kansas and moved elsewhere due to their husband’s military orders or personal 
reasons (Herbison and Schultz 1990).   
There is no official record of the Japanese women who came to Kansas as 
spouses of U.S. servicemen since the end of World War II.  The most relevant 
                                                
11 Personal conversations with Chico Herbison, at University of Kansas. 
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statistics are those that counted the number of Japanese immigrants, including both 
male and female, who lived in Kansas: There were 127 Japanese immigrants in the 
1950s, 519 in the 1950s and 1,584 in the1970s (Herbison and Schultz 1990).  The 
lack of official records makes it difficult to estimate population trends of war brides 
or their distribution patterns in Kansas and other Midwestern states.  Despite 
uncertainties about demographics and current living situations of Japanese war brides 
in the Midwestern states, my informal conversations with people who have close 
relationships with war brides and also with some of my war bride friends convinced 
me that there still is a significant number of Japanese war brides who remain in 
Midwestern states today.   
To begin with, I needed an intermediary who is not only part of the war bride 
network, but also is willing to bring me into her circle as her friend.  I contacted  war 
bride friend, whom I have known for several years.  Once I was introduced to some of 
her friends and gained their trust, I was able to schedule interviews with each woman 
individually.  Some of these war bride interviewees referred me to their own friends, 
which enabled me to expand my research network in a relatively short period.  
Although the snowball method was effective at identifying Japanese war brides
within their social networks, there was no guarantee that all the women I contacted 
would agree to be interviewed.  Since I had no idea how many interviewees I could 
recruit using this method alone, I needed another way to identify more women who 
were not likely to respond to my snowball network.  
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Experimentally, I used Kansas phone books and listed Japanese female names 
(e.g., Sachiko) with American surnames (e.g., Smith).  Some of these women could 
be Japanese war brides who were listed as heads of households as a result of divorce 
or death of their American husbands.  I made phone calls to all prospective 
interviewees on the list.  When I could not reach them by phone, I mailed them letters 
explaining the research along with a self-addressed, stamped postcard asking for their
responses.  Among these women I contacted, more than a dozen of them were war 
brides and some of them agreed to meet with me for interviews.  Using a combination 
of the snowball method with my other personal connections and the phone book 
strategy, I estimated there were at least 50 war brides in Kansas alone and more in 
other Midwestern states I could contact and possibly interview.  With some optimism, 
I set a goal of interviewing 30 war brides.   
After I started reaching out to potential interviewees, I began receiving more 
rejection than acceptances.  Recruiting war bride interviewees was more difficult than 
identifying the war bride population in the Midwestern states.  The rejection rae was 
higher than I anticipated an experience I discuss more freely at the end of this chapter.  
Despite both expected and unexpected obstacles, I interviewed 20 Japanese war 
brides in the U.S.  Since Japanese war brides are scattered among different citi s and 
communities in various Midwestern states, I traveled frequently to meet, recruit, 
interview, and revisit informants, especially during the spring and summer of 2004 
until departing for Okinawa in late 2004.  
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Recruiting Okinawan and Japanese Military Wives in Okinawa 
Okinawa was my research site in Japan for ethnographic fieldwork and in-
depth interviews with younger generations of Japanese women who are married to or 
courting American GIs.  Formally referred to as the Ryūkyū Islands, Okinawa is 
located at the southernmost tip of Japan in the Pacific Ocean where its capital, Naha, 
is closer to Shanghai, China and Taipei in Taiwan than to Tokyo (See Figure1.1).   
Figure 1.1.  Map of Japan and Okinawa, 2004 
 
Source: Courtesy of Okinawa Prefecture, Military Base Affairs Division.   
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I chose Okinawa as a research site in Japan because of the pervasiveness of U.S. 
military bases and their long-term impact on Okinawa and its people (see Chapter 4).  
Within the scope of this project, the high population density of U.S. bases in 
Okinawa’s relatively small geographic area increases opportunities for Okinawan 
women and GIs to meet and interact, which in turn facilitates intimate relationships 
between them.  Based on these favorable conditions for my research, I expected that 
Okinawa would provide greater visibility as well as higher accessibility to my target 
population compared with the rest of Japan.    
From late October 2004 to April 2005, I traveled to Okinawa and lived in a 
base town located in central Okinawa, where U.S. military bases are concentrated.  
Living in a base town provided a unique environment as these military bases and 
American GIs are part of the local landscape and part of everyday life.  The base 
town offers various local shops and services, including small but numerous 
entertainment businesses, such as bars and nightclubs catering to GIs.  Since the base 
town also attracts local Okinawans, tourists from mainland Japan, and immigrant 
workers from outside Okinawa, particularly from the Philippines, it was a rich 
ethnographic site for observing cultural, ethnic/racial, sexual, and economic activities.  
Most important, the base town played a pivotal role in facilitating interracial and 
sexual encounters for GIs and young Japanese women in Okinawa.   
 In Okinawa, I focused on recruiting a younger generation of women, primarily 
in their 20s and 30s, who had married American GIs during the past two decades, 
mostly between 1990s and 2005.  Recruiting interviewees in Okinawa initially 
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appeared more challenging than recruiting war bride interviewees in the U.S.  In 
Kansas, I was in an advantageous position because I was familiar with the geography 
and local situations; more importantly, I had pre-existing networks that allowed me to 
use a snowball sampling method to recruit interviewees.  In contrast, I had never 
visited Okinawa until my research trip.  Prior to my departure, my information ab ut 
Okinawa came mostly from books, the Internet, and a few Okinawan friends I met in
the U.S.  Due to unfamiliarity with the new environment, including its climate, 
geography, culture, and living situations, I spent considerable time adjusting to new
situations and establishing social networks with new people.   
An Okinawan friend, who had finished her studies in the U.S. and returned to 
Okinawa, came to the airport on my arrival day.  She brought me an English 
newsletter circulated among U.S. military personnel and their families stationed in 
Okinawa.  My friend pointed to a small personal advertisement seeking new members 
for an informal social circle of women married to U.S. servicemen.  My networking 
began when I contacted the woman who placed the advertisement in the newsletter.  
When I explained my research project, she, a young military wife, expressed her 
interest and pleasantly invited me to an upcoming event for members.  
Once I was connected to the right person and gained access to her social 
group, I was able to reach out to a dozen military wives who could be potential 
interviewees.  As in the U.S., some military wives referred me to their friends who 
were married to GIs.  Some military wives were also members of other social groups 
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where Okinawan and Japanese military wives often were members.12  Some were 
formal organizations; others tended to be informal.  As I obtained the opportunity to 
visit these circles and organizations, I reached more potential interviewees, including 
women who were divorced or separated from their GI husbands.  I attended group 
activities and meetings such as luncheons, workshops, and study groups.  Most of 
these social occasions were informal, small group settings, with friendly atmospheres 
where conversation came easily.  Many of women I interviewed were members of 
one or two of these social circles and organizations.  
Whenever appropriate, I also approached young Japanese and Okinawan 
women I encountered at base town nightspots, such as bars, night clubs, and live 
music houses frequented by American GIs.13  Some women I spoke to were military 
wives and girlfriends.  Others were drawn to the base town to experience an 
atmosphere created by American style bars, clubs (e.g., hip hop), and the presence of 
“real” Americans.  There were also women who came to the base town specifically in 
search of potential GI boyfriends.  Most of the women I approached at various 
nightspots were unwilling to have conversations with me, especially when they found 
out my purpose.  However, there were a few women who agreed to participate in my 
project and promised to meet with me at later dates.  Using personal connectis and 
networks I established in Okinawa and recruiting people by becoming a part of the 
                                                
12 To protect privacy and anonymity of the informants, I avoid providing the descriptions of their 
organizational features.    
13 Historically, there is a connection between the base town and rock music in Okinawa.  Many 
Okinawan rock musicians emerged during the Vietnam War era in response to the demands from 
American GIs stationed in Okinawa.  Today, there are still some live music houses in base towns that 
continue to attract GI audience.   
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local scene, I interviewed nearly 70 Japanese and Okinawan women by the beginning 
of April 2005.  
 
Interviews 
For the interviews conducted in the U.S. and Okinawa, I used semi-structured 
and open-ended questions.  In-depth interviewing each woman individually enabled 
me to gather detailed, intimate information that cannot be obtained through large-
scale survey methods (Cook and Fonow 1986).  Moreover, a relatively open-ended, 
less structured interview technique allowed access to women’s ideas, thoughts, 
emotions, and memories in their own words and from their subjective experiences 
(Reinharz 1992:19).  This strategy worked well for war brides and military wives 
since our conversations often evolved into intimate, sensitive, and emotional 
memories and experiences that involved subtlety, nuance, and unvoiced expressions, 
which I would not have detected if I had used survey methods.  
Most interviews, both in the U.S. and in Okinawa, were face-to-face 
conversations.  A few interviews were done by telephone when circumstances kept 
me from meeting informants.  The majority of interviewees agreed to have our 
conversations tape-recorded for transcription.  Interviews usually lasted for one to
two hours, depending on the informant’s schedule.  I conducted interviews primarily 
in Japanese; few war bride informants chose to speak in English.  For military wives 
and girlfriends in Okinawa, all interviews were conducted in Japanese.  All interviews 
with war brides took place in their homes, whereas quite a few women I interviewed 
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in Okinawa preferred to meet in public places such as coffee shops or restaurants, or 
in my office.14  On several occasions, interviews took place at on-base military 
housing.  In such cases, informants helped me obtain a visitor’s permit at a base 
checkpoint.15  
 
Ethnographic Fieldwork in Okinawa 
During my stay in Okinawa, I became friends with Yukie, a young woman 
who owns a cozy bar in the base town.  With her permission, I used her shop as an 
observation and socialization site.  Whenever possible, I initiated conversations with 
her patrons, the majority of whom were young enlisted American servicemen.  At the
early stage of my fieldwork, Yukie introduced me to her regular GI customers who 
were, according to her, trouble-free and well-behaved at her bar.  As I frequent d 
Yukie’s bar, these patrons gradually accepted me as a regular and most agreed to 
meet with me in private settings for interviews.   
As a participant observer, I also engaged in conversations with many locals 
including: Okinawan shopkeepers in the base town, Okinawan and Japanese 
employees working on the military bases, taxi drivers authorized to drive insid  
military bases, a local police officer responsible for the base town and nearby area, an 
African American attorney assisting Japanese women with legal issues involving their 
                                                
14 Throughout my stay in Okinawa, I was able to use an office space by courtesy of generous people in 
a local community who supported my research project.  The office was located in an old part of the 
base town where local retail stores, bars, and restaurants formed a shopping arcade for local Okinawan.     
15 Military ID holders, including their spouses, could bring their friends and families to the military 
bases at their own responsibility.  As a rule, ID holders must accompany their guests all the time until 
they leave the base.  However, the rule was not enfrced as strictly as it was stated.  In some occasions, 
I was able to stay on the base freely without my escort once I passed through the base checkpoint. 
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GI husbands or boyfriends, staff of the Okinawan women’s center (Tiruru), and a co-
founder of the Amerasian school in Okinawa.  These people provided viewpoints and 
information about current economic situations of the base town, political issues 
regarding U.S. military bases in Okinawa, their perceptions of U.S. GIs, and GI-
Japanese intimacy.   
 
War Bride Interviewees in the U.S. 
Of the twenty Japanese war brides I interviewed in the U.S., three of them 
were from Okinawa, and the other seventeen were from different regions of mainland 
Japan.  The ages of twenty war bride informants ranged from 68 to 82 years, with an
average age of 73 years at the time of research (see Table 1.1).  All interviewes 
experienced the post-war U.S. occupation during their teenage or early adult years.  
Nearly two-thirds of the informants met their future American husbands in the 1950s 
in Japan and moved to the U.S. shortly after marrying.  The rest of the women 
married in the 1960s and later came to the U.S. with their husbands.   
Table 1.1   Age of war bride interviewees at the time of research, 2002-2004 
Age N = 20 % 
Younger than 70 years  4 20 
70-74 years 8 40 
78 years or older 8 40 
 20 100 
 
Most war bride informants were in their late 20s or early 30s, which is 
considered past marriageable age when they married their future husbands; only a few 
married while in their early 20s (see Table 1.2).  The prolonged war and its aftermath, 
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created an unfavorable sex ratio between young Japanese women and men, since 
many men of marriageable were away, disabled, or deceased.  Indeed, some war 
brides mentioned difficulties in meeting potential Japanese marriage partners.  Later 
marriages among war brides might have affected traditional gendered age 
comparability where women tend to be younger than their husbands.  While over a 
half of war brides were younger than their GI husbands, the other half of women was 
older than their husbands.  
Table 1.2   Age of war bride interviewees at the time of marriage 
Age N = 20 % 
Younger than 25 years  5 25 
25-30 years 8 40 
31years or older 7 35 
 20 100 
 
The racial identities of war brides’ husbands were overwhelmingly white; 
only two women married men of color.  To the best of my knowledge, at least four to 
five more identifiable war brides who married non-white servicemen currently live in 
Kansas.  My war bride friend contacted some of these women, but none agreed to be 
interviewed.  At the time of interviews, nearly two-thirds of the informants lived with 
their husbands; others remained in single ever since their husbands’ deaths.  A few 
women had divorced their husbands and later married American veterans in the U.S. 
(see Table 1.3).  The majority of Japanese war brides in this study worked outside 
their homes before and after they came to the U.S.  However, only a few women were 
still employed at the time of interviews.  The rest of the informants had a generally 
relaxed lifestyle and spent their spare time doing a variety of social, community, and 
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family activities with their friends and family.  Since most war bride informants have 
leisure and flexibility in their daily schedules, this allowed me to spend ample time 
with each informant and develop a degree of friendship.   
Table 1.3   Marital status of war bride interviewees at the time of research, 2002-
2004 
Marital status N = 20 % 
Marrieda 11 55 
Single (Widowed) 7 35 
Single (Divorced ) 2 10 
 20 100 
Note: a Married includes two women who remarried after divorce. 
 
When I visited war bride informants for interviews, they warmly welcomed 
me.  Even though it was the first time for me to meet most of these women, they 
treated me as if we knew each other well.  Conversations over tea, sweets, and 
Japanese snacks, which they served, made the tape-recorded interview more informal 
and relaxed.  Some informants even prepared lunch or dinner for me.  They were 
willing to talk with me so long as time permitted and often encouraged me to visit 
them again.  During interviews, some women were more reserved and gave minimal 
responses to my questions.  Others were open, expressive, and eager to share personal 
experiences that involved sensitive emotional issues associated with war, death, 
family, marriage, separation, divorce, and relationships with American men in the
past.  
Some stories were heartwarming and amusing, so we shared many laughs.  
Others were too painful and emotional to listen to without sharing tears with my 
informants.  Each woman had a different story and different way to narrate it.  Some 
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women who were in my parents’ age group, remembered events that occurred more 
than a half-century ago, and they particularly impressed me.  These women narrated 
their stories in chronological order, which turned their narratives into summaries of 
their life stories or short biographies.  
 
Military Wife and Girlfriend Interviewees in Okinawa 
I interviewed 68 women in Okinawa, including 48 women who married to or 
previously married to U.S. servicemen stationed in Okinawa.  For the purpose of this 
dissertation, I selected 43 women who met the study’s three major criteria: age 
(between 20s and 30s), the time when their relationships with their husbands 
developed (between late 1980s and 2005), and marital status (currently or previously 
married to GIs).  Among the 43 military wives selected, 38 had intact marriage 
relationships at the time of research while another 5 women were single mothers 
raising bi-racial child(ren) after separation or divorce from their GI husbands.  Two-
thirds of military wives whose relationships were intact were full time housewives 
and relied primarily on their husbands’ incomes for costs of living.  All the single 
mothers worked outside their homes to earn a living; none were receiving child 
support from their children’s fathers regularly at the time of interviews.  
Approximately two-thirds of the 43 interviewees are native Okinawans; the rest of the 
women are identified as “mainlanders” who were born and grew up in various regions 
of mainland Japan.  
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The majority of the 43 military wife informants were in their 30s, ranging in 
age from 24 to 39, with an average age of 31 years at the time of research (see Table 
1.4).  There were age discrepancies between Japanese women and their GI husbands.  
In my sample, as Table 1.5 shows, more than half the military wives were older than 
their husbands.  Sixty percent of military wives married enlisted Marines, which is 
characteristic of a GI-Japanese marriage pattern in Okinawa where enlisted marines 
represent the largest military personnel by far (see Table 2.2 in Chapter 3).  Most 
Marines in Okinawa are young, between the age of 18 and 22 whose first overseas 
experience happened to be Okinawa and are stationed in Okinawa for a short period 
(Akibayashi and Takazato 2009:262).  Not coincidentally, two-thirds of the wives of 
Marines in Okinawa are older than their husbands.  
Table 1.4   Age of war bride interviewees and their GI husbands at the time of 
research, 2004-2005 
Age Military Wives 
 
N = 43 
GI Husbands 
 
N = 43 
Younger than 25 years  1 2 7 16  
25-29 years 7 16 14 33 
30-34 years  26 61 12 28 
35 years or older 9 21 10     23 
 43 100 % 43 100 % 
 
 
Another distinctive feature of GI-Japanese marriage in Okinawa is that wives 
tend to have higher educational attainments than do their GI husbands.  As Table 1.5 
shows, 80% of the women have education beyond high school including technical 
colleges, 2 year colleges, 4 year colleges, and graduate school.  There were also many 
informants who spent time traveling abroad prior to their marriages, particiting in 
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home-stay programs, or attending schools, particularly in the U.S.  Compared with 
the high educational backgrounds among their wives, GIs’ educational attainments 
were minimal.  Although almost all GI husbands completed high school, fewer than 
20% of the husbands completed education above high school (see Table 1.5).  






N = 43 
GI Husbands 
 
N = 43 
4 year college or higher  10 23 5a 12 
2 year college 24 56 2a 5 
High school 9 21 35 81 
Less than High school 0 0 1 2 
 43 100 % 43 100 % 
Note: aAmong seven GI husbands who attained 4 year college (N=5) and 2 year college (N=2) 
education, three of them used GI Bill to attend college education, which indicates that they had only 
high school degree at the time of enlistment.  
 
Racial identities of GI husbands were more diverse than those of war bride 
informants; whites (53%), however, still are the largest racial group.16  One major 
change was that non-white GIs, especially African Americans (28%), have high 
marriage rates, followed by Hispanic (14%) and Asian Americans (5%) (see Table 
1.6).  As I discuss in Chapter 5, shifts in racial compositions among GI husbands may 
be attributed partly to changes in consumption patterns and tastes among Japanese 
young people, especially those who began embracing a newly arrived American 
culture associated with hip-hop music in the late 1980s.   
 
                                                
16 For those women who were single at the time of the interview due to divorce or separation, I counted 
the race of their previous partner.       
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Table 1.6   Racial identity of Military Wives’ husbands, 2002-2004 
Race N = 43 % 
White 23 53 
Black 12 28 
Hispanic 6 14 
Asian 2 5 
 43 100 
 
In addition to 43 military wives, I used another 18 women’s interview data as 
supplemental sources.  Among these 18 women, 10 (“military girlfriends”) were 
involved in romantic relationships with GI boyfriends at the time of interviews; 8 
women (“ex-military girlfriends”) did not have military partners, but all of women 
had been engaged in relationships with GIs in the past.  Military girlfriends ha  
become involved in relationships with GIs recently, mostly within the past two years.  
These women were at varying stages of commitment in their relationships: some 
planned to marry their GI boyfriends and others had just begun dating GIs.  Most of 
the ex-military girlfriends, by contrast, were either actively seeking GI boyfriends or 
waiting for opportunities to meet GIs.  Since GI-Japanese intimacy is an ongoing 
process in Okinawa, including these women’s personal experiences and the views of 
GIs enhances narratives of military wives. 
 
Archival Data 
Historical and contemporary documentation of issues related to the U.S. 
military in Okinawa are collected at public and university libraries, city hall archives, 
and women’s resource centers (Tiruru).  These institutions hold many local 
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publications contributed by Okinawan scholars, writers, and social organizations, 
which provide insiders’ viewpoints.  Also many featured documents and articles 
focusing on various aspects of U.S. militarization in Okinawa and in a global context 
address broad and gender-specific issues that are often overlooked by mainstream 
scholarship and media on mainland Japan.  I also visited museums and historical sites 
that not only provided visual and written information about Okinawa’s rich cultures 
and histories, but also on the tragic history of Okinawa, including the Japanese 
colonization, the Battle of Okinawa, and the U.S. continuing military occupation.  
There are many English publications available for American readers in 
Okinawa.  These publications such as entertainment guidebooks, military newsletters 
and brochures, military marriage handbooks, and yellow pages, provide a varietyof 
information for American military community.  These publications helped me look 
into various aspects of military life in Okinawa.  The military operated media such as 
a daily newspaper, Pacific Stars & Stripes, and military radio and TV provided 
various information from the perspectives of the U.S. military, which helped me 
monitor military events and activities that might affect my research.   
After completing data collection in Okinawa, I went to mainland Japan and 
stayed one month before returning to the U.S.  During my stay, I conducted library 
and archival research, mostly at the National Diet Library (NDL) in Tokyo.  
Microfilm copies of GHQ/SCAPS (General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for 
the Allied Powers) records contain historical information on Japan and Japanese 
people from the perspectives of U.S. occupiers during the immediate postwar 
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occupation period.17  These records consist of approximately 340,000 microfilmed 
versions of documents ranging from top-secret letters, newspaper articles, and survey 
results, to personal memos issued during the occupation period.   
Information from Japanese publications including historical documents, 
literatures, scholarly journals, and statistical data to investigate postwar relations 
between Japan, the U.S. and Okinawa was important.  I also studied Japanese popular 
magazines and newspapers of the early postwar period.  These sources aided 
understanding societal reactions to the American presence in Japan, specifically to 
interracial dating and marriage between GIs and Japanese women, from the Japan se 
people’s viewpoint.  Most materials I collected in Okinawa and on the mainland were 
written in Japanese language by native Japanese or Okinawan authors.  These 
materials increased access to a variety of historical and contemporary d cuments that 
are not available in English or in the U.S.  Japanese and English publications made it
possible for me to convey both insider and outsider perspectives.   
 
Data Analysis 
Qualitative researchers often use inductive strategies for analyzing data and 
coding as an analytic tool to locate key themes, patterns, ideas, and concepts within 
data (Charmaz 2004; Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2004).  This inductive approach requires 
                                                
17 GHQ /SCAP records (RG331) consist of a variety of documents from important official documents, 
newspaper articles, to memos issued during the occupation period under supervision of General 
Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.  These documents are stored in over 10,000 
boxes in the National Archives in the U.S.   Microfilmed versions are created for the purpose of 
making GHQ /SCAP records accessible at National Diet Library in Japan.  There are approximately 
340,000 microfilmed pieces of GHQ /SCAP documents.  
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the researcher to study data thoroughly, until themes and concepts emerge (Hesse-
Biber and Leavy 2004).  I used an inductive strategy to organize and analyze my 
interview data.  The method shaped interpretation of the data through examining 
stories and experiences from informants’ point of view (Charmaz 2004).   
To analyze interview data, I began by transcribing all interview material using 
the same languages of the interviews.  The majority of the interviewees used 
Japanese.  For these interviews, I used Japanese language to transcribe and analyze 
data, without translating into English.  Using the original language throughout the 
data analysis process prevented me from losing subtle, implicit, and cultural 
meanings informants expressed in their narratives.  Certain phrases and words, 
especially culturally grounded expressions, often cannot be translated into English, 
which made the writing process in English challenging.  I focused on conveying the 
meanings of what informants’ narratives intended to express as much as possible 
rather than on translating their narratives literally.  After transcription, I created 
descriptive codes for the exact words of my informants followed by the next step of 
coding, which allowed me to develop a set of analytical categories based on my 
insights and interpretation (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2004:412; Ramazanoağlu and 
Holland 2002).  This process of developing more abstract and conceptual categories 
enables researchers “to synthesize, to explain, and to understand [their] data and to 
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Limitations: Recruiting Interviewees in the U.S. and Okinawa 
With two groups of women in my research, I had different experiences and 
challenges for each group.  For the war bride interviewees, similar to those scholars 
who did research on Asian war brides in the U.S., this research was based on “small 
scale, location-specific, unrepresentative samples” (Saenz, Hwang, and Aguirre 
1994).  Difficulties of identifying and recruiting war brides, who are scattered 
throughout the country, give researchers little choice.  Similar to others (Glenn 1986; 
Herbison and Schultz 1990; Schnepp and Yui 1955; Strauss 1972), I relied mainly on 
personal networking and expected to recruit participants within a specific locality.  
However, word-of-mouth along with my personal network enabled me to reach 
women living in different parts of Kansas and other Midwestern states.  This helped 
me avoid relying exclusively on a small group of war brides living in the same 
community, which in turn reduced the likelihood that informants would be identified 
easily by other participants.  Nonetheless, confidentiality remains a major issue in this 
study.    
As I mentioned earlier, I initially set a goal of recruiting 30 interviewe s for 
each group of women, war brides and military wives.  However, the rejection rate 
among war brides was higher than I anticipated.  Other researchers who interviewed 
war brides also noted the difficulty of recruiting potential subjects  (seeCr f 2000; 
Herbison and Schultz 1990).  I received more rejections than acceptances from war 
brides when I contacted them directly or through my intermediary.  Some war brides
simply said they were too busy to meet me.  Others gave no explanations; but were 
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reticent and indicated they were not interested in the project.  Women who initially 
agreed to participate in the study but later changed their minds were also notable.18  
Some of these women changed their minds after they talked about this project to their 
husbands or friends and started conceiving of me as a potential troublemaker to their 
private lives.  Others simply stopped answering or returning my phone calls.    
There were also war brides who reacted suspiciously toward me because they 
assumed I would exploit their personal stories for my benefit.  These women tended 
to link interviews to commercialized book publication and interpreted my research as 
potentially harmful to individual war brides who shared their stories and to the war 
bride community.  They assumed my research would misrepresent their stori s and 
reinforce negative perceptions of war brides.  Some women’s negative reactions to 
my research were attributed to a Japanese TV documentary featuring life experiences 
of war brides living in the U.S.19  Many informants knew the documentary, but none 
of them liked it.   
One told me that her circle of war bride friends was quite upset about the way 
they were portrayed in the film by the Japanese media.  Other informants observed 
that war brides were depicted as pitiful victims of their marriages to American 
soldiers.  One informant commented: “They [Japanese documentary producers] 
picked someone who lived in poverty and misery in a trailer house for interview as a 
representative of us.  She could not speak either Japanese or English fluently.”  These 
                                                
18 There were 26 women who initially agreed to participate in the study.  However, 6 of them later 
changed their minds and decided to withdraw from the study. 
19 The documentary entitled “Umi O Wattata Hanayometachi” (Brides who crossed the Pacific Ocean) 
was in part shot in Kansas and broadcasted by the Tokyo Television in 1985 (Wiliams1992).   
 
                                                                                                                                45
women blamed the documentary for reinforcing negative images and stereotypes f 
war brides among the general public in Japan.  The film also influenced war brides’
perceptions of “professionals” who investigate, interpret, and report “findings” about 
war brides in their own ways, which might explain some women’s reluctance to 
participate in my research.20  Considering the stigma attached to women associated 
with American servicemen in postwar Japan (see Chapter 2), the high rejection rate 
among war brides convinced me that they continue to bear an emotional burden of 
their past memories, even after more than a half century.   
Unlike situations with war bride informants in the U.S., I had few rejections 
and ambiguous responses from military wives I contacted in Okinawa.  Most women 
I met on various occasions expressed genuine interest in my project and said they 
wanted to learn about other military wives’ situations through participating.  Once I 
established a network, reaching my goal of recruiting 30 military wives was much 
easier than recruiting 20 war bride interviewees in the U.S.  The process of collecting 
data was successful, but there were several issues I had to negotiate and make 
decisions for the best results.  
My original research plan in Okinawa was to collect all data, including 30 
interviews and historical and contemporary documents on issues of gender, sexuality, 
intimacy, and the U.S. military, in three months.  Time passed quickly in the field; at 
                                                
20 Herbison told me that recruiting war bride participants living in Kansas for a documentary film 
“Quiet Passages” was also affected by the same Japanese TV documentary.  Because he and his 
production crews were unable to find sufficient number of war bride participants in the film, they 
filmed a group interviews with war brides’ children (personal conversations with Herbison at 
University of Kansas).    
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one point, I had to make a decision whether to withdraw from the field and return to 
the U.S.  This was not an easy decision.  By the end of the third month in Okinawa, I  
had become familiar with my new environment and was reaching wider social 
networks.  I extended my stay in Okinawa for another two months to benefit from 
friendships and networks I had established.  Although the changes in my original 
schedule affected future plans, the result was positive: I could interview nearly 70 
women before leaving the field.  However, this also created problems. 
For one thing, I had an overwhelming number of tape-recorded interviews to 
be transcribed, categorized, and analyzed.  Each interview lasted between 60 minutes 
and 120 minutes.  Transcribing all the tape-recorded interviews took much longer 
than I anticipated.  Furthermore, the large sample size created a discrepan y in the 
number of participants between contemporary military wives (N = 43) and war brides 
(N = 20).  Instead of reducing the sample of contemporary women to half its size, I 
decided to use all interview data.  This prevented me from making decisions as to 
whom to include and whom to leave out of in the study.  The substantial numbers of 
younger generation of interviewees enabled me to see a general trend of GI-Japanese 
intimacy in present day Okinawa.   
Extended fieldwork in Okinawa also enabled me to interview more women 
who had different patterns of relationships with GIs and use these women’s interview 
data as supplemental sources.  These women included single mothers of bi-racial
children fathered by GI husbands or boyfriends and women who had out-of-wedlock 
children; women who were in courting relationships with GIs; and women who were 
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actively looking for GI partners.  Inclusion of these stories added more diverse voices
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Chapter 2 
 
Racialized, Gendered and Sexualized Experience: 
U.S. Occupation and Early Postwar Japan 
 
Prologue 
On August 15, 1945, the Japanese people heard their “divine monarch” 
Emperor Hirohito’s voice for the first time, announcing Japan’s surrender to the 
Allied powers through a radio broadcast (Bailey 1996; Behr 1990).21  By the time of 
Japan’s surrender, hundreds of American air raids, which started in the early 1940s, 
and two atomic bombs had caused huge civilian casualties, homelessness, and the 
devastation of millions of homes and buildings in targeted cities (Allinson 1997; 
Bailey 1996).22  With Japan’s unconditional surrender, Allied occupation of Japan 
began, lasting until 1952 in mainland Japan and until 1972 in Okinawa.23  
Although the Allied occupation force was composed not only of the U.S. but 
also of ten more nations, the U.S. dominated the occupation from the start.24  By late 
1945, some 430,000 U.S. troops were stationed in Japan, overshadowing other Allied 
military presence.25  The U.S. also controlled most of the important positions in the 
core administrative organ, Supreme Commander for the Allied Power (SCAP), also 
                                                
21 Though it was controversial, the U.S. occupation authority decided to preserve the Imperial system 
and retain Hirohito as a “puppet leader of Japan” rther than prosecuting him as a war criminal (Sakai 
2006:181).  Under the new Japanese Constitution, the Emperor was defined as a “symbol of the state 
and of the unity of the people” with only ceremonial powers (Behr 1990:362). 
22 For a detailed postwar history of Japan, including cultural and socioeconomic conditions, also see 
Arai (1988), Dower (1999), Gordon (1993), and Takema  (1988, 2002). 
23 The U.S. administrated the occupation of Japan differently between mainland Japan and Okinawa.  
See Appendix: History of Okinawa. 
24 The Allied powers were originally composed of 11 nations, including the Allied Four Power 
Commission (the U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China), which was established 
for occupied Germany, and India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the 
Philippines (Takemae 2002:98).   
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referred to as General Headquarters (GHQ) (Allinson 1997; Takemae 2002).26  With 
an overwhelming U.S. military presence and monopoly on power in occupied Japan, 
the Allied occupation became synonymous with U.S. occupation.  
 
Occupation of Japan as the “White Man’s Burden” 
Some historians called the occupation of Japan the “White Man’s Burden,” 
since it was white conquers, specifically American victors, who dictated the political 
and economic agendas aimed at demilitarizing and democratizing the conquered 
“Oriental” people of Japan (see Dower 1999; Koshiro 1999; Perry 1980).  According 
to Hamer (2008), the “White Man’s Burden” is understood as the responsibility of 
white races to guide non-Western, “backward” people toward a more civilized way of 
life.  Non-western peoples were referred to as “children” who were waiting to be 
developed and civilized by white “adults” (Hamer 2008).27    
Similarly, U.S. occupiers used an adult-child analogy in which the Japanese 
people as a whole were perceived as a “boy” of twelve in “his” development, while 
the Anglo-Saxon was an adult male (Bailey 1996).  To American occupiers, one of 
their responsibilities as adults was to evangelize the American way of life to the 
Japanese from a European colonial idealist goal of a “civilizing” them (Perry 
                                                                                                                                          
25 While the Soviet Union contributed 70,000 troops and the British Commonwealth (Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand, and India) with 40,000 troops, the remaining Allied nation, China, failed to 
contribute any military forces toward the Japanese occupation because of the outbreak of civil war at 
home (see Takemae 2002:93-94).   
26 American General, Douglas MacArthur, exercised sole p wer and command in every aspect of 
occupation policies as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power (Buhite 2008; Takemae 2002). 
27 See the Kipling Society web site (http://www.kipling.org.uk/) for Rudyard Kipling’s poem, The 
White Man’s Burden.  
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1980:xiii).28   Dower (1999:23) also notes that Japan exhibited exoticism as “a pagan, 
‘Oriental’ society,” which attracted a “messianic fervor by white mn” who were self-
righteously and enthusiastically engaged in a “Christian mission.”29    
  The ideological concept of “White Man’s Burden” highlighted the racialized 
process of Orientalization, which justified the inevitability of occupation of Japan by 
the superior white race.  Koshiro (1999:16) points out that the U.S. used the concept 
of white supremacy as the manipulative instrument to make the Japanese “accept a 
‘proper’ sense of relations between the white victor and the colored vanquished.”  
Defined by U.S. occupiers, this new power relationship made the Japanese people 
comply with occupation reforms and policies at home while legitimizing a new 
American (white) leadership in Asia, replacing the Japanese (non-white) former 
colonizer (Koshiro 1999).   
 
Castration of Japan and the Gendered Occupation 
With its emphasis on white supremacy, the “White Man’s Burden” reinforced 
the Orientalization of Japanese people, who were simultaneously racialized, 
gendered, and sexualized by the American victors in the context of the occupation.  
This Orientalization process shaped Japanese men’s and women’s postwar 
experiences differently, which has complicated the genderless and monolithic images 
                                                
28 Historically, the idea of the “White Man’s Burden,” centering on an assumption of superiority of 
Western civilization and the white race over a non-white populous, had been a crucial aspect of 
Western expansionism and colonization in the nineteenth century and before (Perry 1980).   
29 Dower (1999) notes that Americans’ crusading zeal civilizing the Japanese and carrying out its 
Christian mission there did not exist in occupied Germany because the Germans lacked racial and 
religious “exoticism” that the Japanese people exhibited.   
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of U.S. occupation of Japan.  Japan’s defeat meant the symbolic castration of 
Japanese men by their white conquerors, who not only viewed Oriental male 
chauvinism as a threat to global security but also as a feudalistic patriarchal oppressor 
of Japanese women.  Japanese women were represented as victims of a domestic
patriarchy who needed to be liberated “as recipients of American liberal feminist 
tutelage” (Yoneyama 2005:892), while these women were simultaneously perceived 
as sexual objects for the occupation troops.  
The demilitarization of Japan was, figuratively, a castration of Japanese m n 
both outside and inside Japan.  Japan lost its military power in Asia, while its wartime 
heavy industry, symbolizing masculine power, was forced to close (Allinson 1997).30  
In addition to their relinquishment of militarized masculine power and production, 
Japanese men also lost sovereignty in their traditionally male domains of political, 
administrative, and economic spheres, which contributed to the reconstruction of the 
traditional gender relationships.  Koikari (2005) argues that a crucial aspect of 
Japan’s democratization was to liberate oppressed Japanese women from “Oriental 
male chauvinism.”  The occupation gender reforms emphasized the legal aspect of 
equality between men and women, who lacked rights of access to education, 
employment, and political representation and participation (Allinson 1997; Nishi 
1985; Morosawa 1971; Nagahara and Yoneda 1996).31  
                                                
30 A forced closure of Japan’s heavy industry affected Japan’s economic recovery and also imposed the 
economic isolation from international markets (Allinson 1997). 
31 The new civil code abolished women’s subordination o patriarchy in the home and preferential 
treatment for men (e.g., inheritance practices).  It also regulated parental power over a child in private 
affairs such as marriage (see Allinson 1997; Nishi 1985; Morosawa 1971; Nagahara and Yoneda 
1996). It is remarkable to note that the occupation authority granted Japanese women suffrage while its 
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On one level, women gained more access to public life through paid 
employment, political participation, and new social networks outside the family. 
Theoretically, women’s new circumstances would help Japanese women improve 
their socioeconomic status in postwar Japan (Liddle and Nakajima 2000:160).  In 
reality, however, the devastation of the country forced a majority of women to focus 
on daily survival.  Although a shortage of food and other resources affected almost 
the entire population, children and women (especially young women, who lost their 
parents during the war, and widows with children) were most vulnerable to conditions 
in early post-war Japan (Tanaka 2002).    
 
The Arrival of Occupation Forces 
Prior to the arrival of Allied forces, Japan’s leading newspaper, Asahi Shinbun 
(Asahi Newspaper), published an article that provided Japanese women gender-
specific “instructions” on how to behave when encountering occupation troops.  
While Japanese people were discouraged from having direct contact with occupation 
troops, women were warned “not to lose pride as ‘Japanese women’ and always stay 
on the alert” (Asahi Shinbun 1945).  Women were also instructed “not to dress 
provocatively and never nurse their children in public” so as to avoid unwanted 
attention from occupation troops (Asahi Shinbun 1945).  Widespread rumors of 
anticipated gang rapes of Japanese women by occupation forces drove many wome 
and their children in large cities to flee to the countryside (Duus 1979).   
                                                                                                                                          
members continued to debate whether to grant suffrage to American women in the U.S. at that time 
(Koikari 2005). 
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Several of the Japanese women I interviewed shared their observations and 
personal experiences of the immediate postwar period, including the arrival of 
occupation troops.  Miyako was thirteen years old when the war ended.  Miyako said 
she was aware that Allied occupation forces were coming to her region because of the 
rumor of anticipated sexual assaults by occupation forces.  Her father told the family 
to lock all the doors and windows of the house and to stay inside quietly during the 
early occupation days.   
Miyako mentioned that her house was located in close proximity to the red-
light district, which worried her father about his daughters.  She saw Americans for 
the first time when they started appearing in her neighborhood:  
We lived just a few of blocks away from a red-light district.  I saw American 
soldiers, who were passing by on the street in jeeps or by foot right in front of 
my house….  They were going to the prostitution houses.  The street was very 
narrow, the seeing the American jeeps in traffic scared me.  This was the firs  
time that I had seen jeeps (automobiles).… 
 
Miyako noted that American GIs driving through her neighborhood gave chewing 
gum to Japanese children.  American GIs, throwing chewing gum, chocolate, or 
cigarettes to Japanese people from their jeeps, are commonly remembered postwar 
scenes by older generations of Japanese.  To some Japanese, this was remembered as 
a friendly gesture by Americans, who liked children, and gave away American 
sweets.  To other Japanese, it was symbolic of an occupation that made all Japanese 
people (from children to adults) into “beggars” without pride (Takami 1959).   
Like Miyako, Natsu witnessed the arrival of occupation forces in her home 
region in Japan.  She lived in one of the “fortunate” regions that escaped Allied air 
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raids during the war and her family did not have trouble finding food.  “I did not 
really feel that the war was actually going on,” said Natsu.  However, the arrival of 
occupation troops in her area convinced Natsu of Japan’s defeat and its consequence.  
Natsu clearly remembered a stream of American military tanks and trucks passing 
ceaselessly on a highway near her neighborhood.  She mentioned that the military 
procession to the U.S. camp caused loud noises lasting all day long.  
Natsu also told me that major buildings such as department stores, hospitals 
and hotels in her city were confiscated by Allied forces for their own use, which in 
her eyes meant “there were occupation soldiers everywhere in town!”  In her post-war 
recollection, Natsu had a vivid memory of the so-called “Black Cat,” an African 
American paratroop that came to her city: 
Well, they were all black [soldiers] and they were called “Black Cats.”  
Everybody wore a black-cat-patch on his uniform.  All of them were black….  
And, at the middle of the night, they came out to the town [from their camp].  
We could not see them well.  They were wicked because they threw stones at 
streetlights and broke them.  This made the town dark, so it was even more 
difficult to see them….  There was a rumor that women might be raped.  It 
became dark around 8:30pm in the summer, so we were told not to go outside 
after dark.  If it was absolutely necessary for us to go out at night, we had to 
walk together in a group of 3 or 4.32 
 
Because of the behavior of the Black Cats, especially in the early days of occupation, 
people in the city stereotypically viewed all black servicemen as “dangerous.”  
According to Natsu, this was a major reason why there were few Japanese women 
who married black GIs in her city.   
                                                
32 Natsu also mentioned that GIs came to a Japanese neighborhood with the hope of exchanging 
chocolates and chewing gums for a Japanese flag as  victor’s regalia.  Perry (1980) noted that 
souvenir hunting was a popular activity among American GIs and “GI shoppers,” who sought 
kimonos, swords, and battle flags, even in the early days after their initial landing.   
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Sawada Miki, a founder of the Elizabeth Summers Home in Japan, stated that 
the black soldiers in Natsu’s home city had “one of the worst” reputations among the 
black soldiers stationed in Japan, which made it difficult for “part-Negro children” to 
live without resentment from the local residents (Trumbull 1967:283).  As I discuss in 
Chapter 3, in addition the stereotype of black soldiers as being dangerous, white 
racism against black GIs in the military contributed to shaping Japanese perceptions 
of black GIs and their Japanese lovers.     
 
The Conquered Bodies and Sexuality: Institutionalization of Prostitution 
From the perspectives of Japanese authorities, a major issue was protection of 
Japanese women from anticipated mass rapes by U.S. occupation forces.  As many 
historians and scholars noted, Japanese fears and anxieties about American sold ers’
sexual behavior mirrored Japanese soldiers’ atrocities in the recent past.  Japanese 
soldiers committed countless brutal crimes against civilians, including gang rapes of 
local women in Japanese-occupied territories in Asian countries (Duus 1979; Hicks 
1995; Koshiro 1999; Tanaka 2002; Watanabe 1995).33  The Japanese Imperial Army 
institutionalized “military sexual slavery” involving “comfort women” (jūgun Ianfu) 
during World War II, forcing hundreds of Asian women into its system to “comfort” 
Japanese armies stationed overseas (Hicks 1995; Oh 2001; Watanabe 1995).   
Similar to Imperial Japan’s institutionalized sexual slavery, Japanese 
authorities in occupied Japan organized licensed sexual establishments, known as the 
                                                
33 The Rape of Nanjin in 1937 is particularly notorious among the military sexual violence and crimes 
that Japanese military committed during the wartime.   
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Rest and Amusement Association (RAA), for Allied occupation troops.  While the 
comfort women system was created to sustain Japanese soldiers’ morale and 
discipline and to protect Japanese soldiers from venereal diseases, the RAA was 
designed to protect Japan’s “respectable” women from militarized sexual thre ts by 
Western powers (Molasky 1999; Watanabe 1995).  Commodification of women’s 
bodies and sexualities began as an institutionalized national project financed d 
administrated by the Japanese government.  Lie (1997:251) argues that the Japanese 
state functioned as a “pimp” in the 1940s, for its role in controlling women’s bodies 
and sexualities.  Lie’s argument suggests that U.S. occupation authorities did not
completely dismantle Japan’s patriarchal apparatus.  Instead, Japanese women’s 
bodies became politicized, militarized sexual objects in new postwar power relations 
between Japan and the U.S.    
Former Japanese prostitutes, geishas, and bar hostesses, who served their 
“own” men prior to Japan’s surrender, were initially recruited in the name of 
“national security” (Takemae 2002).34  However, a shortage of these “professional” 
women caused authorities to target ordinary women, particularly poor women who 
might be willing to work for the RAA in exchange for food, shelter, and the promise 
of a high income.  A large signboard with the following text appeared in downtown 
Tokyo to recruit prospective female workers:  
To new Japanese women…as part of urgent national facilities to deal with the 
postwar, we are seeking the active cooperation of new Japanese women to 
                                                
34 Interestingly and ironically, a first group of Japanese women who volunteered to work at the RAA 
were granted “official thanks” for their patriotic sacrifice in front of the Imperial Palace (Takemae 
2002:68).   
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participate in the great task of comforting the occupation force…Female offic
clerks (my emphasis added), aged between eighteen and twenty-five.  
Housing, clothing, and food supplied (Dower 1999:126-127). 
 
A similar RAA’s advertisement was placed in a Japanese newspaper which was 
translated into English and even quoted in an article in the New York Times: “Wanted 
immediately--calling for 3000 geisha girls for entertaining occupation troops.  Girls 
with experience will be given superior treatment.  Those without experience also will 
do.  Conveniences will be offered in case travel is necessary.  After contract is signed, 
not only food, but also livelihood, is guaranteed.  High income” (United Press 1945). 
Japanese women who responded to the RAA’s call were mostly uprooted 
women, especially those who were severely affected by the war and its aftermath.  
The RAA’s subsistence offer (housing, clothing, and food) was undeniably attractive 
to women in dire economic conditions.  These women’s bodies and sexual labor were 
euphemistically defined as “female breakwaters” (or floodwalls) for their role in 
blocking the sexual desires of occupation troops before they reached “respectable” 
Japanese women (Duus 1979; Molasky 1999; Tanaka 2002).  This rationale suggests 
that the RAA was not only reflects a gendered and sexualized aspect of state control 
over Japanese women, but also a classist bias.  
The anonymous women used as “breakwaters” in postwar Japan were 
comparable to women whom Hegarty (2008) calls “patriotutes.”  According to 
Hegarty, “patriotutes” were wartime women in the U.S. who fulfilled their patriotic 
duty to their nation during World War II by providing services that would sustain 
military morale.  However, Hegarty also mentions that these women were stigmatized 
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as promiscuous and their sexualities were kept under control.35  Hegarty (2008:5) 
argues that “patriotutes” represents an unstable, dualistic female sexuality which was 
paradoxically “represented by both the sexually dangerous (female) individual and 
the sexually alluring (female) morale builder, who became conflated with each 
other.”   In both cases, “patriotic” women who responded to their nation’s call in 
wartime U.S. and in occupied Japan were institutionalized and manipulated by 
patriarchal states to fill designated sexual roles while also being stigmatized.   
For American occupiers, Japanese women’s sexual services at the RAA were, 
to borrowing Duus’ book title, Gifts from the Defeated (my translation).  As Kanzaki 
(1974) notes, in no other country other than Japan did the government command 
police to recruit hundreds of thousands of their women as prostitutes for occupation 
troops.  Within six months of the war’s end, the RAA alone employed more than 
2000 comfort women and “dancers,” working in approximately forty establishments, 
to provide “entertainment and amusement” for occupation forces (Tanaka 2002:155; 
Hicks 1994:161).36  In the early period of the occupation, occupation society was, as 
Perry (1980:187) claims, essentially “masculine” where “drinking, whoring, and 
souvenir hunting were among the most popular activities” for servicemen.  
                                                
35 According to Hegarty (2008:1), the term “patriotute” was originally coined by a physician, Otis 
Anderson at the U.S. Public Health Service, to describe “women who entertained the troops in order to 
maintain morale, stigmatized numerous young women who had responded to their nation’s call to 
support the war effort.”   
36 According to Tanaka (2002:155), the estimated the total number of prostitutes and comfort women 
who were employed by known facilities, including RAA-operated brothels and other establishments, 
was approximately 10,000 in the Tokyo area alone at the end of 1945. 
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Kanzaki (1974:137) portrays vividly RAA’s first comfort station, Komachien, 
which was flooded with American GIs as early as August 30, 1945, just two days 
after their landing: 
At the entrance gate of Komachien, many soldiers holding money in their 
hands were lining up in a long line and they were making a fuss in the 
incomprehensible language (English).  Komachien’s garden and entrance 
areas were filled with the soldiers who were impatiently waiting for thei
turns.  Alas…what a shameful “comfort” scene it was.  The quarters were 
partitioned merely by folding screens and even the hallways were used to 
handle a large number of GI clients.  There were no beds or futons and 
everything was exposed to the public gaze.  A sense of shame inherent to 
human beings was completely suppressed and animal-like intercourse was 
shamelessly performed before the gaze of others (my translation). 
 
Kanzaki (1974:138) further reports that each comfort woman took at least 15 and as 
many as 60 occupation clients per day when Komachien began providing services to 
occupation forces.   
In his Japan Diary, Gayn (1948), reported on the International Palace, the 
largest RAA-operated brothel in the Tokyo area.37  From his perspective as a U.S. 
journalist, Gayn described the International Palace as “one of the items of evidence in 
the damning record of Japan’s efforts to seduce the Army of Occupation away from 
its purpose” (p. 212).  He also depicted the brothel owner’s exploitive management of 
some 250 young Japanese women, who became enslaved by debts accumulated 
through personal purchases at the brothel store.  Partly because of his Orientalist bias, 
Gayn made no explicit comments on GIs’ sexual behavior, which dehumanized 
                                                
37 The International Palace was originally converted from a munitions factory that used to produce 
war materials during the war.  Gayn visited the Int rnational palace on May 21, 1946, shortly after the 
U.S. Army placed all prostitution facilities “off limits” to GIs because of the widely spread VD among 
them. 
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Japanese women.  Instead, Gayn blamed only the Japanese patriarchal officials who 
made their “own women” available.  Furthermore, Orientalist perceptions of Asian
women as exotic, sexually available and alluring justified the impulses of lonely, 
homesick young GIs who were susceptible to seduction by these underprivileged 
Japanese girls.    
In the context of U.S. militarized occupation, Japanese women were doubly 
Orientalized and utilized by local patriarchy and Western masculine power.  
Occupation authorities abolished all licensed brothels, including RAA comfort 
stations, based on Western humanitarian missions of “liberation” for Japanese women
from sexual slavery representing Japan’s feudalistic customs.  The closure of brothels 
was, in reality, due to concerns for the high rates of venereal disease (VD) among GIs 
(Tanaka 2002; Nagahara and Yoneda 1996).38  
While this was indeed liberation from enslaved prostitution, the U.S. also 
moved some 150,000 Japanese women out of their jobs (Tanaka 2002).  These 
women, who had been recruited for a “national patriotic mission,” were turned out 
into the streets without financial support or rehabilitation, either from the Japanese 
government or from occupation authorities.  Out of desperation, many of these former 
prostitutes went to the streets, which contributed to emergence of the new 
phenomenon of street prostitutes, derogatorily called panpan.   
 
                                                
38 The SCAP/GHQ issued the memorandum on January 21, 1946, which states “the maintenance of the 
prostitution is controversies of the ideal of democracy and…the development of individual freedom 
throughout the nation,” which emphasizes humanitarian cause of their decision (see “Abolition of 
Licensed Prostitution in Japan,” JNDL Collection, GHQ/SCAP records, Box No. 5250, Sheet No. 
CIE(A)-01643, Prostitution 1946/01-1949/08. 
 
                                                                                                                                61
Panpan: Street Prostitutes as a Postwar Phenomenon 
Unlike conventional Japanese prostitutes who were secluded in quarters 
within designated red-light districts, street prostitutes or panpan became visible to the 
public, especially in urban centers and around U.S. military bases.  Japanese women’s 
sexualities moved from the private arena to public spheres where they were identified 
easily by their striking appearances, associated with bright lipstick, colorful clothes, 
nail polish, high heels, permed hair, and behaviors such as smoking cigarettes (Dower 
1999; Tanaka 2002).  The Japanese people’s reactions to panpan were ambivalent 
and contradictory: “admiration and disdain, pity and envy, fear and desire” (Molasky 
1999:104).  While these women were often portrayed as tragic figures of the postwar 
period, of deserving public sympathy; they were also accused of promiscuity and 
having desires that threatened traditional Japanese male authority over sexuality and 
gender roles (Molasky 1999).   
I asked war bride interviewees about their postwar memories, emphasizing 
views of panpan.  Midori was 13 years old when the war ended.  During the war, 
Midori was one of millions of urban residents who evacuated to rural areas to escape 
from the massive air raids targeting large cities.39  Midori’s memories of the end of 
the war were associated with frequent air raids, sirens, underground shelters, and B-
29s dropping tons of bombs that turned schools, factories, and houses, including hers, 
                                                
39 Millions of urban residents evacuated to the countryside to escape from bombing raids that began to 
attack large cities such as Tokyo and Osaka in April 1942.  The mass exodus of city residents in Tokyo 
dropped its population from 7 million in 1940 to few r than 3 million in 1945 (see Allinson 1997:42-
43, 46-47).   
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to ashes.40  Food became extremely scarce in the immediate postwar period, 
according to Midori, her family’s diet was still much better than that of other 
Japanese people, especially war survivors in the cities.    
After the war, Midori resumed school in a city, where U.S. occupation forces 
confiscated a Japanese military airfield for their own use.  Since Midori’s school was 
located in that city, she often saw American GIs, and (as she hesitantly pronounced) 
“panpan girls,” on her way to school and back home: 
They [panpan] were sticking together like this (she leaned slightly toward 
me).  And, they looked really gaudy…they wore loud clothes, something the 
ordinary women wouldn’t wear at that time….  When my friends and I walked 
past them, we couldn’t help looking back at them over our shoulders [out of 
curiosity].  And then, they shouted at us in a rough language: “Hey you, what 
are you looking at?  You should thank us for saving you!”   
 
I asked Midori, “What did they mean when they said, ‘You should thank us for 
saving you’?” She replied directly, “Well, they meant we would have been raped if 
they [panpan] were not available [for American soldiers].”  Midori did not explicitly 
express negative views toward panpan.  However, women like Midori and other war 
brides who had “legitimate” relationships with GIs disassociated themselves from 
women who had “illegitimate” relationships.  Many war bride informants implicitly 
or explicitly said they were afraid of being perceived “mistakenly” as panpan.   
  Japanese people in postwar Japan tended to view almost all women who had 
connections with GIs as panpan.  This was the prime reason “war brides” were 
                                                
40 B29 targeted large cities such as Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and Kobe and dropped tons of bombings 
repeatedly since the first air raids attacked Tokyo in November 1944.  According to the statistics taken 
immediately after the war, the damages made by the air raids alone included 260,000 death tolls, 2.2 
million of complete destruction of houses, 90,000 of partial destruction of houses, and 9.2 million war 
victims (Arai 1988:27-29).   
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stigmatized by mainstream Japanese society, and to some extent, by the Japanese issei 
community in the U.S. (Enari 1991; Glenn 1986).  Midori told me she felt guilty and 
sorry for her younger sisters and brothers who had to bear curious and often 
contemptuous public scrutiny because of her relationship with an American GI.  “One 
day, my youngest sister came back home from school in tears because her classmate 
had called her a name and teased her by saying `Your older sister is a panpan!’” said 
Midori.   
Panpan was a pervasive postwar image not just for adults, but also for 
children.  The so-called panpan asobi or panpan role-playing became a popular 
activity, particularly among female children in postwar Japan (see the illustration, 
“panpan asobi” in Kōdansha 1987:217).  In this illustration, one child is pretending 
to be panpan and another to be a GI in a military hat stand arm-in-arm, while three 
other children watch the couple while giggling (Ibid.).  Panpan role-playing 
responded to the prevalence of street prostitution in early postwar Japan and even 
shaped children’s activities.  Nippon Fujin Shinbun (Japanese Women Newspaper) 
reported that a Japanese woman’s association decried the popularity of panpanrole-
playing among children and urged the immediate eradication of street prostituti n.41  
Uyemura, a member of the National Public Safety Commission, criticized the morals 
of U.S. soldiers patronizing Japanese street prostitutes.  He addressed the issue of 
children working as procurers between GI clients and panpan and argued that panpan 
                                                
41 See “Miss Smith Encouraged Women’s Association to Ro t Out Prostitution,” January 21, 1949 in 
JNDL Collection, GHQ/SCAP Records. 
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role-playing is a “juvenile experiment in the business of prostitution” (Associate 
Press 1952). 
  Since women associated with GIs in postwar Japan were likely to be 
perceived as panpan, many war bride informants noted they felt as if they were doing 
something wrong when they were together with GI boyfriends or husbands in public.  
Many of these women chose to conceal their association with American GIs from 
family and neighbors until it was imperative to share the secret.  As Miyako said, “At 
that time, it [dating an American] was something that you would not tell other people, 
you see?...  Even though I knew I was going to marry my husband, I was 
uncomfortable when I was seen with him by other Japanese….  I felt I was somewhat 
put down....”  Some informants avoided meeting their GI boyfriends outside the 
military posts as much as possible because they did not want to expose themselves to 
curious, often contemptuous scrutiny.    
Japanese people, especially Japanese men, were not silent on the issue of 
fraternization between Japanese women and American men.  Some Japanese male 
writers published observations of postwar daily scenes, including fraternizatio  
between American GIs and Japanese women (see Takami 1959; Yamada 1985, 2002, 
2004). Takami Junichi (1959), in his published diary, criticized hungry-looking 
Japanese crowds who were obsequious to Americans: he was contemptuous of young 
Japanese women who flirted with GIs in public and those women who appeared to 
invite the attention of GIs.  In his diary on October 18, 1945, Takami (1959:340) 
wrote:  
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What caught my attention was there were many young girls congregating 
[outside the General Headquarters].42  Some of them were encircling 
American GIs, and others were surrounded by GIs.  What is more is some 
women were seemingly waiting for GIs to talk to them.  But they did not seem
to be brave enough to get attention from GIs individually.  So, two or three 
women in a group would stroll together and deliberately pass by the American 
GIs.  These women, in their company uniforms, looked younger than in their 
20s.  I felt unpleasant.  Am I jealous?...  After all, these foolish and shameful 
women were equal to those bastards [who quickly converted their fawning 
from the Japanese Imperial Army to the occupation authorities], I thought…  
(my translation).  
 
Public display of fraternization between Japanese women and the American occupiers 
brought hostility and disdain, especially from Japanese men.  Dower (1999:135) 
argues that the public fraternization “constituted a piercing wound to national pride in 
general and masculine pride in particular.”  For Japanese men, pride was severely 
damaged not merely due to their loss of militarized masculinity, but especially to 
Japanese women’s “betrayal.”     
 
Victors versus Defeated 
While women’s “betrayal” was often condemned in the context of GI-
Japanese intimacy, Endo Takeo’s satirical cartoon entitled “Yūshi no Saikai” 
[Reunion of Soldiers] illustrates the contrasting images of an emaciated, disabled 
Japanese veteran and an American GI (Chikuma Shobō 1970:16).43  The Japanese 
                                                
42 The occupation forces confiscated remaining buildings that survived during air raids in Tokyo for 
their own use.  The former Japanese Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Building was replaced by General 
Headquarters (GHQ) and became a symbol of the U.S. occupation.  Takami (1959:340) noted strong 
presence of Americans around the GHQ: some were strolling the street and others were reading 
newspapers and magazines as they sat by the mote acr ss from the building.    
43 Endo Takeo’s “Yūshi no Saikai” (Reunion of Soldiers) originally appeared in Hakubyō Giga in 
1950.    
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veteran, wearing a white robe and worn-out military hat, with a donation box hanging 
from his neck, stands on the street.  In contrast, the burly GI, in his vulgar Hawaiian 
shirt, arm in arm with a Japanese woman in western attire and high heals, walks 
briskly.  This cartoon represents symbolically a redefined postwar power relationship 
between former enemies, while the Japanese woman is depicted as a collaborat r with 
the American victor.    
Takemae (2002) also illustrates contrasting images of the victors and the 
defeated in his historical account of the GHQ (General Headquarter) in occupied 
Japan:  
Off-duty GIs thronged the streets in freshly pressed olive-drab uniforms, their 
servicemen’s hats cocked jauntily to one side.  Road traffic was dominated by 
nearly empty khaki-coloured, white-striped staff sedans and was nearly all 
American, for only the occupier had access to ample petrol—most Japanese 
cars and buses ran on charcoal…  Officers sped through downtown 
thoroughfares in commandeered jeeps accompanied by fashionably dressed 
Japanese girlfriends trailing bright scarves, their insouciance a striking 
contrast to the gloomy faces of the hungry, ill-clad Japanese, many of them 
homeless, who looked on these centurions with a mixture of awe and envy  
(P. 74). 
 
While emphasizing the masculine and material powers of American victors, this 
comparison reflects a gendered aspect of defeat that reshaped power dynamics not 
only between victors and the conquered, but also among the conquered.  For example, 
the Japanese woman in the jeep symbolizes that women associated with American 
GIs were perceived as “privileged” people who had a head start on recovery from the 
war.  
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Japanese women’s greater access to material benefits explains why many 
Japanese people had mixed feelings of contempt, envy, fear, and desire toward 
women associated with GIs such as p npan:       
…Among ordinary people, no group trapped the material treasures of the 
conquerors as blatantly as the panpan.  They were the recipients of goods 
from the U.S. military exchange posts that in those impoverished days truly 
seemed like treasure houses from a magic land: crammed not only with basic 
foodstuffs, but with liquor and cigarettes, sweets and delicacies, voluptuously 
decadent feminine things such as lipstick and nylon stockings (Dower 
1999:136).   
 
This gender-specific alliance between American GIs and Japanese women left out 
Japanese men.  While these women enjoyed “privileges,” specifically material 
benefits, they were also sanctioned and marginalized by Japanese society and ts 
patriarchy.   
 
Panpan: Keepers of “Ethnosexual Boundaries”? 
MacDonald, a U.S. Lieutenant, made an interesting comparison of men’s 
reactions to women’s fraternization with American GIs in postwar Germany and 
Japan (Duus 1979).  According to MacDonald, people in Germany performed the 
persecution of German women who had sexual relationships with American GIs.  
These women were beaten and their heads were shaved, similar to French and 
Belgian women who were discovered to have had sexual relationships with Nazi.  
Referring to French women persecuted for their sexual collaboration with Nazis, 
Nagel (2003:141) argues that sexual behavior of “rule breakers” that violated national 
sexual boundaries can “strengthen hegemonic national sexual orders.”  
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Disciplining women sexual collaborators claimed and reinforced proper 
sexual conduct and “ethnosexual boundaries” (Nagel 2003).  Even though Japanese 
women who fraternized with GIs were not persecuted in the same way as German or 
French women collaborators, their sexualities were monitored, regulated, and 
sanctioned, officially and unofficially.  In collaboration with MPs (U.S. military 
police), Japanese police regularly conducted “round-ups” of panpan and took 
suspected streetwalkers to a hospital for involuntary VD tests and medical 
treatment.44  An Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper) article reported on a series of 
round-ups conducted by Japanese police and MPs.  According to the article, 
authorities arrested some 300 women, ranging from 16 to 38 years-old, who were in 
targeted areas of Tokyo on that night alone (Asahi Shinbun 1946).45   
The picture taken on June 12, 1946, depicts a group of arrested street women 
who are being taken to a Japanese police department for investigation (Kōdansha 
1989:270-71).46  The women are being forced to walk in a single-line, hand-cuffed, 
and tied to one another with a rope like criminals.  In another picture of a round-up, 
three Japanese police officers who have arrested a woman suspect, are literally 
“carrying” her as if handling an animal--one holds up her legs and the other two hold 
up her arms (see Kanzaki 1974).  The woman’s skirt is rolled up, leaving her thigh 
                                                
44 The practice of round-ups of street prostitutes started in January1946 and lasted until September 
1949.  It was estimated that there were approximately 40,000 panpan in six large cities alone and 
70,000 altogether were arrested throughout the country (Kōdansha 1989:270-71). 
45 The women arrested were mostly factory workers, dancers, and office clerks, but particularly war 
victims who lost their houses and were separated from amily.  “‘Women of the night’ 300 arrested,” 
Asahi shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), March 11, 1946.   
46 The caption associated with the picture is read as: Women are arrested for round-ups of ‘women of 
the night.’  The picture was taken on June 12, 1946.  See Kōdansha (1989:270-71). 
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and underwear completely exposed.  In both round-up incidents, women are 
criminalized and dehumanized by male authorities and become objects of public 
display as “sanction” for their promiscuity and “rule breaking.”  Among women 
picked up on the street for round-ups, many were wrongly arrested and found not 
guilty.47  
Japanese women’s bodies and sexualities were controlled and sanctioned not 
only by U.S. occupiers but also by Japanese patriarchal authorities.  Collaboration 
with MPs in carrying out “round-ups” enabled Japanese men to retain some degrees 
of patriarchal control over Japanese women.  As Molasky (1999:109) points out, 
pampan were vulnerable to “both official and unofficial persecution, and at any time 
they might be arrested by police, forcibly examined by (male) physicians which ere 
sometimes conducted in the presence of five or six MPs, beaten by pimps, or even 
murdered by customers.”48   
Similar to French collaborators in Nagel’s (2003) account, “round-ups” of 
panpan should be understood as punishment for “rule breakers,” reinforcing 
“ethnosexual boundaries” among Japanese people.  In this context, young women 
ranging from street prostitutes and camp followers to war brides associated with 
                                                
47 According to the interviews with two young women who were wrongly arrested by MPs and taken to 
a police station, nearly two-thirds of women rounded up on that night were, in actuality, wrongly 
arrested.  While these women who, after all, “did not seem to be prostitutes” were released, the rest of 
the women in question, including the two women, were taken to the hospital for DV tests. See “Round-
up of Women in Tokyo,” JNDL Collection, GHQ/SCAP Records, Box No. 5250, Sheet No. 
CIE(A)01644, prostitution.  1946/01-1949/08. 
  
48 “Round-up of Women in Tokyo.”  JNDL Collection, GHQ/SCAP Records. 
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American GIs, were viewed as “sexual collaborators” and were marginalized and 
stigmatized by Japanese people who remained within their national sexual orders. 
 
Internal Diversity among War Brides 
Although Japanese women associated with GIs were lumped together and 
often perceived as panpan, women who had “legitimate” relationships with American 
GIs, including war brides, rejected such labels.  As spouses of American GIs, war 
brides tended to distinguish themselves from panpan and other sex collaborators who 
were treated as dispensable objects by GIs.  Even among war brides, women with 
respectable social backgrounds tended to draw a line between themselves and others 
who worked at socially “disrespectable” jobs (e.g., bar hostess) prior to marriage.  To 
some war brides, their previous work experiences in postwar Japan were a delicate 
subject.  When I began interviews, I did not expect all war bride informants would 
tell me their true stories.  Considering the socioeconomic situations of postwar Japan, 
it was natural for war bride informants not to want to share certain memories if th y 
felt their recollections were unpleasant, painful, or shameful.   
I was surprised when a few women shared their post-war experience of being 
only-san (onrii-san) or “temporary wives” for American GIs.  These women were 
“paid to serve only one particular man” stationed in Japan (Tanaka 2002:165).  Like 
panpan, only-san is sentimentally remembered by many Japanese people to 
symbolize painful wounds of the postwar period.  However, unlike panpan, who were 
likely to take multiple customers on a one-night-stand basis, only-san performed 
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wifely duties for one GI until he returned to the U.S.  GIs who “hired” only-san 
usually lived with women in off-base housing, from where they commuted to military 
posts.  Even though keeping a woman in a private house required extra money, strong 
monetary values of U.S. dollars against the Japanese yen at that time made itpossible 
for U.S. soldiers to keep only-san while stationed in Japan.   
An article in Ebony (1953b) featuring black GIs’ lives in the Tokyo area 
during post-war Japan portrayed their living conditions as “one great big bowl of 
cherry blossoms” where “the soldiers can and do live like kings” with a personal maid 
or, at least, an “easy, plush life” (p. 36).  Just as only-san were perceived as 
temporary companions for GIs, their plush lifestyles in postwar Japan ended when 
they returned to the U.S.  However, some GIs ended up marrying only-san and 
brought them back to the U.S.: Aki was one of them.    
 
Only-san: Aki’s Story 
  Aki was 20 years old when the war ended.  Even though she lived in the 
countryside where the food supply was larger than in the cities, Aki told me that 
scarcity of food motivated her to work at the factory that produced rations for the 
starving Japanese population: 
There wasn’t much food to eat at that time….  We made a lot [of bread and 
other food items at the factory] and sent them to a distributing station.  Cooks 
[working at the factory] gave away some food for us [behind closed doors].  
So, as for food, I could eat enough.  I did not have to worry [laughter]. 
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Aki eventually quit the factory and worked as a live-in waitress at a small Japanese 
restaurant owned by a middle-aged widow, whom she called obachan.49   
Aki began to work at the Japanese restaurant in the early postwar when local 
restaurants and bars were designated “off limits” to occupation soldiers.50  Aki 
energetically explained her job experiences at the restaurant.  Japanese prostitutes 
who came to Aki’s restaurant regularly particularly fascinated her: 
One day, a lot of beautiful young girls came to the restaurant.  They were all 
Japanese, so they could come inside the [local] restaurant and eat there.  Wow, 
all of them were so beautiful, I thought.   I asked the obachan why they all 
wore nice dresses.  “They are [panpan] for the Americans,” said the obachan.  
Then she warned me, “Be careful.” 
 
Aki’s employer, the obachan, worried about the negative influence of these 
prostitutes on a country girl who still wore a traditional kimono and geta (a Japanese 
clog).  To someone like Aki, seeing young women dressed in Western clothes and 
wearing make-up was a shocking experience.   
Aki became friends with one of these prostitutes, nicknamed Nancy, who 
regularly came to her restaurant: “Nancy’s been working for long time [as a
prostitute].  She only took Yankees (GI clients).  So, she spoke English well, you 
see?”  Aki learned a few English words from Nancy so that she could take orders
when GI patrons came to her restaurant.  Aki said: 
Many Americans came to the restaurant at night for cheap Japanese beer.  
They weren’t allowed to get inside the restaurant, though.  The Japanese 
                                                
49 Obachan is an informal title for an aunt in Japanese. But in some instances, one could use obachan 
to refer to a middle-aged woman who is in close relationship.   
50 Certain places such as Japanese local trains, subways, hotels, ins, restaurants, bars, and theaters were 
designated as “off limits” to GIs by SCAP as a measure  to reduce the likelihood of fraternization 
between GIs and local women.   
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restaurants were “off limits” to Americans….  But it was alright to sell b er to 
Americans outside of the restaurant.  So they bought beer and drank outside of 
the restaurant….  It was alright.  
 
Working at the local restaurant gave Aki first hand “American experience” through 
interactions with GI customers and Japanese prostitutes.   
Aki eventually quit the local restaurant and became an only-san after she was 
convinced to do so by a friend who was serving an American GI as only-san: 
Well, the reason why I quit [the restaurant] was because I was tempted by my 
friend.  She was serving a [American] soldier as “only,” but they were not 
married.  She said to me, “there is a soldier who just got here a week ago from 
America.  He isn’t sly yet.  Why don’t you become his ‘only’?”  I said to her, 
“[if I leave the restaurant and follow a GI] my obachan will get mad at me.  
So, I can’t leave….”  My friend angrily asked me, “Will your obachan take 
care of you in the future?”  I said “I don’t think so.”  Then she said, “You 
see?…  Why don’t you leave [the restaurant] and come with me?”  After all, I 
was somewhat convinced by my friend and became an only for the newly 
arrived soldier. 
 
Aki’s friend persuaded her to become an only-san and encouraged her to capitalize a 
relationship with an American GI rather than working at the restaurant as a witress 
whose marriageable age had already passed.  Considering her socioeconomic 
situation and uncertainty about her future, it was tempting for an unmarried woman 
like Aki to take a chance with Americans, the most powerful and wealthiest men not 
only in Japan, but in the world.  Aki’s interaction with Japanese prostitutes who 
frequented her restaurant gave her a new perspective on the material benefits 
associated with American men.  Indeed, a GI patron who regularly came to Aki’s 
restaurant gave her enough money to buy new clothes, which she could not afford as 
a waitress.  Acquiring the conqueror’s language, English, if only at word and phrasal 
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levels, was an asset that enabled Aki to communicate and negotiate with American 
GIs. 
Femininity, youth, and language skills gave women like Aki advantages that 
were not available to their male Japanese counterparts.  Aki told me she served two 
GIs and then her future husband as an only-san.  According to Aki, she lived with her 
first GI patron for several years until he went back to the U.S., then served the second 
GI patron just for one year.  When the second patron left Japan, he introduced Aki to 
a fellow GI, who eventually became her husband.  When I asked Aki how she ended 
up marrying her third patron, she said: 
Before going back to America, my boyfriend talked about me to his friend 
(her future husband), who just arrived in Japan.  He asked his friend to take 
care of me.  His friend agreed.  That’s why he came to take care of me, and 
eventually married me….  Well, I did not care about his looks, though.  I had 
to think twice about marrying such an ugly soldier [laughter].  But, when I 
asked my friends’ opinions, they said the ugly man is better than a good 
looking guy because he would not have affairs [laughter].  
 
The circumstances under which her future husband agreed to “take over” Aki so 
easily were not clear.  Perhaps he did not think much about it when his friend 
“offered” him Aki, but simply “received” her as if she were a welcome gift for a 
newcomer to Japan.  For Aki’s part, she added, “I married him not because I loved 
him.  I decided to marry him because I wanted to see America…I told him so.”   
Aki was honest when she said her priority was to see America, the country of 
wealth and power.  For her, marriage to an American GI was the only means to 
realize her goal.  At the same time, as a woman in her 30s lacking education and 
occupational skills, Aki had few options for a decent life in postwar Japan.  Her 
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marriage to an American GI was, in some respects, a continuation of performing the 
only-san role in a new setting.  Even so, Aki’s marriage offered her a better life and 
more opportunity than she could have achieved in Japan.  Therefore, Aki’s reasoning 
to marry a GI could be more than just “I wanted to see America,” but her boldness 
and active voice to say so masked her vulnerable post-war circumstances behind her 
decision.   
Toward the end of the interview, Aki seemed uncomfortable and expressed 
regret about negative remarks she made about her deceased husband:  
I shouldn’t have said bad things about my husband…I shouldn’t.  He was a 
good person.  He was always good to me.  It was because of him…because I 
married him, I don’t have to worry about my life now.  I can do what I want to 
do here.  I go to Bingo every week with my friend, I eat what I want.  I am 
truly thankful to my husband.  
 
Aki realized that her deceased husband’s veteran status enabled her to receive 
military benefits (e.g., medical care, pension).  Even though the government pension 
she received every month might not be large amount, it provided enough money for 
her to maintain a decent lifestyle in the U.S.  Aki added that this was a primary eason 
she decided to remain a widow when her brother-in-law urged her to remarry or 
return to Japan.51  Aki’s decision to stay a widow may have been opportunistic; but, 
to her, it was another choice among a narrow range of options.   
 
 
                                                
51 Like many other war brides, when Aki decided to marry n American GI, she eliminated an option 
of returning to Japan no matter how difficult her life would become in the U.S.  This reflects strong 
societal prejudice not only against women married GIs but also their bi-racial children.    
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Only-san and Bar Hostess: Miwa’s Story 
Miwa also decided to become an o ly-san before marrying her first husband 
and moving to the U.S.52  Miwa was outspoken about her past in spite of bitter 
experiences during and after the war when her focus was survival.  Miwa’s parents 
had died during her early childhood, which separated her from her siblings.  Later,
Miwa was adopted by a woman who died shortly before the end of war.  Miwa 
struggled to find food and her adoptive mother took most of her own Japanese 
kimonos to farmers in exchange for rice.53  Rice was so scarce that Miwa had to make 
handfuls of rice into gruel, mixed with sweet potatoes and other rice substitutes.  
Miwa also sought food by gleaning and searching for edible greens in the fields.   
When her adoptive mother died, Miwa, who was only 13 years old, again 
became an orphan and had little choice in making a living.  Young women lacking 
occupational skills and education were disadvantaged, and Miwa had no a guardian.  
The world of mizushōbai, the entertainment business, was the easiest and quickest 
way to make cash to survive at that time.54  Most women entering the entertainment 
business in the immediate postwar had few if any other choices; and Miwa was no 
exception.   
                                                
52 Miwa’s previous husband was an American sailor, who s e met at her bar when she was working as 
a hostess in Japan.  Within six months after they moved to the U.S. in the early 1960s, they separated 
and were divorced three years later.  Miwa remarried another GI, who she met in the U.S. and they 
have stayed together since then.    
53 Because rations provided by the government were nev r enough, it was common practice for city 
residents to take a long train trip to the countryside and exchange their precious items, such as 
kimonos, for food.  Farmers were in a more advantaged position in this barter, which widened the 
economic discrepancy between those who had food (farmers) and those who didn’t (city dwellers) in 
early postwar Japan.   
54 Mizushōbai is the general term for the night entertainment business such as bars and nightclubs, but 
it the terms does not necessarily mean that females were performing sexual services at these 
establishments.     
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When occupation forces came to Japan, Miwa was working as a hostess at one 
of many bars in a port town that was filled with young American sailors.  I frankly 
asked Miwa about her work experience candidly; she said, without emotion, that 
It was simply business, it was just business for me....  These folks bought [a 
lot of] drinks.  They drank like water.  When they bought a drink for me, a 
half [of the price they paid] became my share….  I worked [at the bar] and 
[went back home and] slept, worked and slept and so forth….  I drank not 
because I wanted.  I drank because it was a way to make money.  I couldn’t 
afford to spend time thinking about things like what other people think about 
me.  I drank [at the bar] for the sake of money.  Making money for living…for 
paying the rent…that’s all. 
 
Women engaged in mizushōbai were often looked down upon because they were 
assumed to have “immoral” interactions with male customers.  Rather than accepting 
social degradation, Miwa viewed her labor at the bar as a means to make a living, just 
as other people took less stigmatizing jobs to survive.  For Miwa, the difference 
between being a bar hostess and a sales clerk at a PX (Post Exchange) was an 
inconsequential choice. 
Similar to Aki, Miwa served GIs as only-san before moving to the U.S.  Many 
women, including Miwa, became only-san based on verbal agreements without legal 
documents or guarantees of future prospects.  This short-term, informal contrct 
meant women were expected to commit to one relationship as faithful “house wives.” 
Women could be abandoned at any time, without an advance notice.  This clearly 
reflects gender power relations based the “unequal contract” that could be modified, 
revised, or cancelled by GI patrons without consent from only-san: Miwa said, 
I quit my bar hostess job once or twice [to serve my GI patrons]….  You may 
have heard of [the term] only-san…have you?  There were some women 
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(only-san) who eventually married their patrons and went to America.  But 
there were still hundreds of thousands of others who didn’t make it….  I lived 
with a GI patron [in an off-base house]…(long pause)…[One day] he said to 
me he was going back to his base [for a while].  I said “OK.”  But he did not 
come back.  So, I thought about it and decided to call him at his base barracks.  
Someone answered my call and said ‘He went back home.’  When I asked, 
“What do you mean, [by] home?” and the guy replied, “He went back to 
America.”…It was a heartbreaking experience. 
 
After being unexpectedly abandoned by her patron, Miwa returned to the bar to work 
as a hostess again until she met another GI patron for another only-san contract, only 
to experience another abrupt termination of the relationship.  
Although only-sans gained some economic security from patrons, this was 
generally temporary relief.  Monetary rewards for only-sans varied depending on the 
military ranks of their patrons and the types of relationships they had with GIs.55  
Miwa stated that the amount of money she received was no more than an allowance 
for maintaining the quasi-household, leaving no money to save for herself.  In fact, 
Miwa claimed she made better money working as a bar hostess than by serving as an 
only-san: “Well, the only good thing [about being only-san] was I did not have to 
hustle [for work].  All I had to do was to hang around him [for a living].”  For 
someone like Miwa, who struggled for many years, being an only-san meant some 
financial relief and “leisure time,” even if temporary.   
                                                
55 For variations of monetary rewards among only-san, see Kanzaki (1974) and a magazine article 
which feature interviews with Japanese women who ident fied themselves as only-san (Maru 1952:72-
73).  
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Ultimately, Miwa married an American sailor she met at the bar where she 
worked.  When I asked why she married the sailor, Miwa did not answer my question 
directly at first:  
There was nothing good about him when I look back….  Well, [unlike other 
GIs] he never bought anything for me [laughter], though he was a sailor with 
three stripes....   He never took me out anywhere to places like restaurants and 
movies, either.  But I somewhat liked him almost one-sidedly and pressured 
him to marry me, I think. 
 
Miwa added that “survival” was always on her mind, especially since losing her 
adoptive mother.  Even though she did not make her motives to marry the sailor 
explicit, Miwa implied that she married him for survival and for the chance of a better 
life in the U.S., as is a common reason among Japanese women.   
 Stigmatized images of women who were involved in the entertainment 
business (mizushōbai), particularly catering to American GIs in postwar Japan made 
many of these women silent about their past.  Like Aki, however, Miwa did not deny 
or conceal her experience as a bar hostess or as an only-san.  Miwa insisted her 
postwar experiences of serving American GIs were shared by hundreds of 
underprivileged Japanese women victimized by the war and its aftermath.  Miwa 
asserted that these women’s actions were not “deviant” or “immoral” to be ashamed 
of.  Instead, she blamed social and economic consequences of the war that forced 
underprivileged women to take “unrespectable” work to live independently, support 
their families, and survive. 
Miwa was outspoken and challenged stigmatized images of bar hostesses and 
only-san who were accused of  “promiscuity” in postwar Japan by affirming that her 
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relationship with American GIs was a socially acceptable means to survive.   Miwa 
used her narratives to portray herself as a victim at times, but also to empower herself 
as a survivor with dignity and pride that postwar Japanese society sought to deny.  
Miwa also criticized other war brides who denied connections to mizushōbai, which 
was often a gateway to meeting GI lovers or future husbands.  Miwa denounced 
women who pretended that they met their husbands through “respectful” occupations 
such as sales clerking at PX. 
As I have shown in this chapter, the occupation of Japan demonstrated clear 
power relations between the victors and defeated.  While Japanese men were 
castrated through the process of demilitarization, the conquered women’s sexualities 
and bodies became the spoils of the war for occupation forces as a reward and a 
symbol of their masculine powers.   While rape of local women by the conquerors 
functioned as a warfare technique “to dominate and humiliate enemy men by sexually 
conquering their women” (Nagel 2003:181), Japan’s postwar RAAs were sites of 
institutionalized mass rapes of Japanese women by American victors.  Japanese 
women’s bodies were objectified and consumed by American victors with assistance 
from local patriarchy and, thus, Japanese women were doubly Orientalized. 
I used some war bride informants’ narratives to illustrate U.S. occupation and 
postwar socioeconomic conditions through young Japanese women’s observations 
and experiences.  Two women’s stories as only-san provided both vulnerability and 
strength.  While only-sans enjoyed some material benefits because of their 
associations with GIs, they had to accept a “contract” with GI patrons who had power 
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over the relationships.  Only-sans could be discarded, given away, or exchanged at 
any time by GI patrons.  As were other women who took “disrespectable” jobs, only-
sans were victims of the war and its consequence.  At the same time, socially defined 
disrespectable jobs were indeed, from Miwa’s viewpoint, socially acceptable means 
to survive.  Labels such as panpan, only-san, and war bride are all socially 
constructed in the context of U.S. occupation and, thus, they could be modified, 
redefined, or destroyed.  However, since the stigma attached to these labels is 
powerful, they continue to exert a negative social impact on women, including on the 
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Chapter 3  
 
Reversing the Gaze: U.S. GIs from Perspectives of Japanese Women 
 
 
In the early stage of the occupation of Japan, at least for the first few months 
of the occupation, American Army officers believed fraternization would never 
become a problem for GIs in Japan unlike the situation in Germany.56  To most 
Americans, Japanese people were still “Japs,” “a warped and despicable race, forever 
responsible for untold suffering to thousands of our people” (Croket 1949).  
Americans’ fierce hatred against atrocious creatures combined with backwardness 
and inferiority of Oriental race seemed fraternizations impossible.  Language barriers, 
cultural differences, the reserved nature of the Japanese women, and propaganda 
against fraternizations were also believed to be obstacles to GI-Japanese intimacy 
(Kluckhohn 1945). 
Contrary to the initial assertion, American GIs strolling with Japanese women 
on the street and parks became common sights not only in Tokyo but elsewhere by 
the end of 1945.  For example, Frances Baker (1949), an American artist drew the 
“scenes of the occupation that are familiar to all who have played a part in it” by both 
American and Japanese in the humorous manner.  One of his pieces in Japanese print 
style illustrates a “rendezvous” scene between GIs and Japanese women under a 
moonlit sky.  Two American GIs, one in civilian clothes and the other in a seaman’s 
uniform were walking along the river with their arms around Japanese women, while 
                                                
56 See “Japs Warn Girls on Winking at GIs” (UP), September 17, 1945 in JNDL Collection, 
GHQ/SCAP Records; Kluckhohn (1945).  
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another GI in khakis was sitting on the river bank intimately with a Japanese woman 
in a kimono.  The caption of the picture reads: “Newcomers learn that pretty faces are 
not confined to certain races” (Baker 1949).  The daily scenes of fraternization 
between GIs and Japanese women in public, whether their relationships were 
commercialized, short-term companionship, or enduring ones, disturbed Japanese 
public and also U.S. military commanders and officials.  
Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, Commanding General of the 8th 
Army, for example, issued an order in March 1946 regarding a “ban against public 
display of affection” by U.S. Army soldiers toward Japanese women.57  According to 
Lieutenant Eichelberger: 
…no ban on fraternization was completed, but…arm-in-arm strolling, public 
display of affection, and similar actions would be treated as disorderly 
conduct by Military Police.  Public displays of affection by men in uniform 
towards the women of any nation are in poor taste.  Particularly is that so in 
Japan among these who were so recently our enemies and where the people 
have never been accustomed to such demonstrations.” 58   
 
This military order did not necessarily prohibit fraternization.  Indeed, fraternization 
was never officially banned in Japan by the occupation authorities partly because 
banning all social contact with the Japanese people would be not only “useless” and 
                                                
57 For the sailors in Yokosuka Naval Bases, no-fraternization order was already in effect in November 
1945 in the order of the Commodore Kaasaing.  The large photographs of an American sailor who was 
a prisoner of the Japan were placed in all the building of his command.  The captions under each 
picture read “...the Japs did this to him.  They did the same and worse to thousands of other 
Americans…Remember this if you ever catch yourself g tting soft and being nice to a Jap” (Stars & 
Stripes 1945).   
58 The press release document entitled “General Eichelberger Bans ‘Public Display’ of Affection for 
Japanese Women by American Soldiers” has a date stamp of March 12, 1946 in JNDL Collection, 
GHQ/SCAP Records. 
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“unenforceable” but it also would violate the “inherent self-respect and personal 
rights of the American soldiers,” based on American rhetoric of individual freedom.59   
  Nonetheless, banning of public displays of affection was associated with 
various regulations.  As New York Times correspondent, Burton Crane describes, “it 
is hard to see how anybody wishing to fraternize could do so without violation a 
whole string of regulations” (1946).  According to Crane, Japanese public 
transportation and facilities such as trains (except for GI cars), Tokyo subways, 
Japanese hotels, inns, restaurants, and bars were designated as off-limits to American 
soldiers.  Japanese civilian areas enclosed by a fence were also off-limits to GIs.  
When a GI went out with a Japanese woman, he was not permitted to use an Army 
vehicle to transport her unless she was an “authorized civilian” such as an interpreter.  
Nor was a GI allowed to share Army food with a Japanese person even if he bought it 
personally from a post exchange.  All army barracks were off-limits to Japanese 
females except servants.   
 Despite various regulations and sanctions to interrupt fraternization between 
GIs and Japanese women, these rules alone did not enforce the military order and stop 
romantic relationships between GIs and Japanese women.  Indeed, hundreds of 
thousands of American GIs-Japanese women couples crossed racial and sexual 
boundaries in one way or another, and some were determined to marry.  Among 
them, only these couples who successfully overcame various barriers, both at 
personal and institutional levels, married and reached their new homes in America.  
                                                
59 The press release document (no title) issued by Pulic Relations Office of United States Army 
Forces Pacific/GHQ has a date stamp of March 12, 1946, in JNDL Collection, GHQ/SCAP Records. 
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However, unlike Caucasian war brides, who married American GIs in postwar 
Germany, Italy, Britain, and many other countries (see Shukert amd Scibetta 1988), 
Japanese women confronted institutional barriers particularly racialized immigration 
polices that kept American GIs from bring Japanese women back home (Spickard 
1989).  
  
Racialized Institutional Barriers and Orientalized Japanese Women 
In 1945, Congress passed Public Law 271, known as the War Brides Act, 
which permitted foreign spouses and children of American servicemen to immigrate 
to the U.S. without following “usual immigration quotas, visa requirements, and 
restrictions on ‘physical and mental defectives’” placed on regular immigrants 
(Spickard 1989:132).   This racialized act was created primarily in convenience for 
U.S. GIs stationed in Europe who wanted to bring their Caucasian war brides to their
homes (Ibid).  Japanese brides still suffered from the discriminatory immigration 
policy known as the Oriental Exclusion Act that had previously excluded virtually all 
Asian immigrants from entering the U.S. since 1924.60  
Based on the existing immigration laws as of 1949, migration to the U.S. was 
granted only to people who were classified as eligible for naturalization, which was 
limited to certain races of persons including: 
Persons of African nativity or descent, persons who are descendants of races 
indigenous to the continents of North and South America or adjacent islands,  
                                                
60 Under national origin provisions, Northern and Western European nationals were granted relatively 
large annual quotas including Germany of 26,000 and Grain Britain of 65,000.  For Asian countries, 
they were typically assigned quotas of 100 and mostly taken the slots by Whites born in Asia 
(Thornton 1992:66).  
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Filipino persons or persons of Filipino descent, Chinese persons or persons of 
Chinese descent, persons of races indigenous to India.  Aliens in order to be 
eligible for naturalization and citizenship must have a preponderance of the 
blood of races to which this privilege is extended by laws; that is, more than 
one half (1/2) of the blood of such races, or any combination thereof.61 
 
Eligibility for naturalization was extended to some Asians who were formally 
excluded under the provisions of the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924.  They were 
wartime allied-Asians such as Chinese and Filipina, thus they benefited from the War 
Brides Act (Fong 2002; Shukert and Scibetta 1988) while Japanese remained as 
“aliens ineligible for citizenship.” 62  While GI-war bride marriages was 
institutionalized process, Japanese women were doubly disadvantaged: they were 
racialized as non-Caucasian and politicized as the former enemy, which made it 
virtually impossible for American servicemen to bring Japanese wives and their 
offspring to the U.S. even when they were married in Japan.    
By 1947, there were growing numbers of American GIs who wished to marry 
Japanese women and take them back to the U.S., which pressured the U.S. Congress 
to amend the existing immigration laws to admit their racially ineligible spouse and 
minor children to the U.S. (Spickard 1989).  Under the Public Law 213 or the so-
called GI Brides Act, alien spouses of American GIs were permitted to enter the U.S. 
on a non-quota basis if they married between July 22 and August 21, 1947.63  Another 
legislation, the Public Law 717, also became effective in 1950 and temporarily 
                                                
61 “Digest of Immigration and Naturalization Laws Applicable to Marriage of Military Personnel, and 
Department of the Army and the Air Force Employees,” Circular No.51, 24 September, 1949 in JNDL 
Collection, GHQ/SCAP Records.  
62 Chinese and Filipino became eligible for naturalization in 1943 and 1946 respectively under new 
provisions of the Immigration Act of 1924 (Shukert and Scibetta 1988).  
63 “Permitting the Admission of Alien Spouses and Minor Children of Citizen Members of the United 
States Armed Forces,” Report No.1878, 26 June, 1950in JNDL Collection, GHQ/SCAP Records.  
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allowed Japanese spouses of American GIs to enter the U.S.64  Because these 
legislations provided only temporary admissions to Japanese brides, they created a 
marriage rush between American GIs and Japanese women.  For instance, S rs & 
Stripes (1951) reported that under the provisions of Public Law 717, 2,800 American-
Japanese marriages were performed during the six month period.65  Asahi Shinbun 
(1951) also reported that from as few as 20 or 30 to as many as 50 or 60 GI-Japanese 
couples came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ overseas travel division daily to 
apply for passage to the U.S. 
The amended immigration legislations made it possible for Japanese spouses 
of American GIs and their children to immigrate to the U.S. on a non-quota basis.  
However, it should be noted that they still were not granted U.S. citizenship.  It was
not until 1952 that Japanese became eligible for naturalization under the McCarran-
Walter Act that removed racial barriers from formally restricted countries for 
immigration and naturalization (Kitano, Yeung, Chai, and Hatanaka 1984; Spickard 
1989; Thornton 1992).66  As a consequence, the number of Japanese women who 
married American GIs and immigrated to the U.S. increased dramatically from 125 in 
1951 to 4,220 in1952.  According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s accounts,  
                                                
64 Public Law 1717, which permitted Japanese spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens, was 
originally in effect from August 19, 1950 to Februay 19, 1951.  However, the bill extending the Public 
law 717 for another half year was signed by President Truman primarily because many soldiers had 
been sent to Korea before caring out their intended plan to marry Japanese women (see “Marriage Law 
Extended Year,” Stars & Stripes, April (n.d.) 1949, in JNDL Collection, GHQ/SCAP Records.  
65 “Couples Swarm into Consulate to Marry before Law expires,” Stars& Stripes, March 10, 1951 +in 
JNDL Collection, GHQ/SCAP Records. 
66 While the MaCarran-Walter Act eliminated racial bars to immigration and naturalization, it retained 
the quota system based on the origins of countries.  Although only 2% of the total immigration quota 
was allotted to Asian countries, non-quota immigrant status granted to spouses and children of 
American servicemen contributed to the large number of spousal immigration to the U.S. (see 
Thornton 1992: 68).  
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approximately 25,000 Japanese women applied for travelling permission to foreign 
countries, namely to the U.S. between 1950 and 1957 in lieu of intermarriage to GIs 
(Sandē Mainichi 1957:4).67   
Even after Japanese war brides successfully arrived in the U.S, GI-Japanese 
couples confronted America’s antipathy against misogyny at home.  According to 
Weinberger (1966), in the U.S, there were 30 states, as of in 1945, which banned 
interracial marriage between whites and members of racial minority groups, 
particularly black Americans.68  Weinberger also noted that even though the anti-
miscegenation laws specifically targeted racially mixed marriages between white and 
black Americans, some states including Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, 
and Virginia prohibited marriage between white and Japanese under the racial 
categories of “Mongolia.”  White GIs who were from these five states were not able 
to take their Japanese wives to their home states until the anti-miscegenation laws 
was abolished in 1967.    
While early immigration legislations and anti-miscegenation laws werejust 
one dimension of institutional challenges to intermarriage between GIs and Japanese 
women, military “red tape” was another institutional barrier that discouraged 
intermarriage.  As it is mentioned in many existing literatures on war brides, many 
war bride informants reported that these marriage procedures included submission of  
                                                
67 According to the article, almost all women married American GIs followed by Australian and 
Canadian GIs.  The numbers of women married Australian and Canadian GIs were approximately 100 
altogether (Sandē Mainichi 1957:4).  For Japanese war brides of Australian soldiers, see Keiko Tamura 
(2001), Michi’s Memories: The history of a Japanese war bride. 
68 Among these 30 states, thirteen states lifted the ban by 1966, while another seventeen states held th 
miscegenation law until the anti-miscegenation law became illegal in 1967 (see Weinberger 1966).   
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various official documents, a physical exam, and political and social background 
check of prospective brides and their families.  The marriage application procedu es 
usually took several months, and it was not uncommon for the prospective GIs to be 
transferred to other regions or sent back to the U.S. before they formalized marriages.  
The physical exam and background check were designed to find every possible 
reason to reject prospective Japanese brides of GIs, especially to weed out prostit es, 
criminals and diseased from the list (Perry 1980). 
U.S. commanding officers also interfered in the personal affairs of soldiers.  A 
GI wishing to marry a Japanese woman had to obtain permission from his 
commanding officer; without permission, he had no other way to formalize his 
marriage, nor could he bring his prospective wife to the U.S.  In Spickard’s words, 
requests for such permission “usually meant refusal and a lecture on the virtues of 
Anglo-Saxon purity” (1989:133).  Military authorities also expected chaplains to 
discourage couples from crossing ethnosexual boundaries, especially white GIs and 
Japanese women.  The experiences of Yuriko, one of the earlier cohorts of Japanese 
brides admitted to the U.S. in 1952 under the provisions of Public Law 717, provide 
an example.  According to Yuriko, she and all Japanese brides-to-be were summoned 
in a group and lectured to by a chaplain:   
He told us…I mean, to everybody [who was wishing to marry Americans], 
we’d better not marry American soldiers because we wouldn’t be happy in 
America.  There were too many Japanese women who were wanting to marry 
American men back then, so I think the chaplain tried to stop us from 
marrying them.    
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Yuriko’s account was supported by U.S. Navy Chaplain Frederick W. Brink 
(1953), who wrote “So You Want to Marry a Japanese Girl!” to persuade soldiers to 
reconsider marrying Japanese women.69  Brink regarded American men’s “fever” for 
Japanese women as a temporary fitful passion based on sexual desire, warning young 
soldiers “But remember: happy as you might be with her sexuality, sex alone is a 
weak basis on which to build a marriage” (Brink 1953:6).  In Brink’s view, American 
men who wanted to marry Japanese women were attracted primarily to the w men’s 
bodies, sexualities, and youth as temporary sexual companions, rather than as lifelong 
partners to build American families.    
Brink (1953) also suggested that fundamental differences in social, moral, and 
religious customs between the U.S. and Japan would cause difficulties between 
American-Japanese couples: 
[G]enerally speaking, there is in Japan more acceptance of the girl who helps 
out the family budget by hiring out her body, and she has little if any feeling 
of having done anything morally out of the way in so doing.  It is only natural 
therefore, to assume that it would be difficult for a girl brought up by Japanese 
standards to fully understand and appreciate American standards (P.7).  
 
Brink implied that Japanese girlfriends were former prostitutes and concluded that it 
would be more appropriate for American soldiers to find respectable American girls 
at home who would meet “American standards.”  
 Interestingly, Brink never discouraged American GIs from companionship 
with Japanese girlfriends, so long as such relationships ended before the men returnd 
                                                
69 Brink’s article was printed in a pamphlet and distributed by Department of Chaplains and Service 
Personnel, Presbyterian Church U.S.A., Philadelphia. 
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to the U.S.  Brink’s perceptions of Japanese women were imbedded in Orientalist 
views of Asian women shaped by images of Madame Butterfly: “The Japanese peopl 
are familiar with that kind of sacrifice….  Your Japanese friend would probably be 
able to understand very well that despite your love for each other it would be wiser 
for you not to be married” (p.15).  His statement reflects Orientalist perception of 
Japanese women willing to accept their tragic fates of romance with American men 
and ready to sacrifice themselves for western lovers, which justified GIs’ affairs with 
local women.   
 
Meeting Future Husbands: Women Working on Military Bases 
Despite occupation authority policies that discouraged and tried to make 
intermarriages between American GIs and Japanese women difficult, Japanese 
women and American men engaged not only in short-term, commercialized 
relationships that were primarily physical and sexual, but also pursued enduring 
relationships based on love.  Since the U.S. occupation forces created a wide range of
service jobs on and around military bases that demanded a mostly female labor force, 
many Japanese women met their future husbands through jobs that catered to GIs.  A 
1954 survey conducted by the town hall office in Gotenba, Shizuoka prefecture 
suggested that most of the 111 Japanese women who married GIs and submitted 
marriage registrations to the town hall worked on military bases (Tanaka 1954:28-
30).  Many of these women had service jobs as PX employees, waitresses, 
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housemaids, and typists, which contradicted stereotypes of war brides as former ba  
hostesses and prostitutes (Tanaka 1954:28-30).   
Similarly, in my sample of twenty Japanese women, all but two women had 
legitimate service jobs catering to GIs when they met their future husbands.  Their job 
duties often involved direct interactions between GIs and Japanese female employees, 
which encouraged American GI’s to ask Japanese women working at PXs for dates 
(see Sakuda 1979:464-467).  In these and many other situations, Japanese women 
were under the surveillance of an Orientalist gaze that constructed women as sexual 
objects to be examined, evaluated, teased, and seduced by western men.  Although 
the Orientalist gaze included the power to objectify Japanese women, that power had 
limits.  Japanese women were not passive; they had their own lenses for responding 
with their own gazes, and for scrutinizing and evaluating American GIs.  Moreover, 
as I show later in this chapter, Japanese women’s assessments of American en 
frequently involved comparisons with Japanese men.  
 
Embracing “Americanization”  
In postwar Japan, American culture presented itself as a symbol of power, 
affluence, democracy and modern civilization that should influence Japanese values, 
lifestyles and social institutions (Honma 2001).  Honma (2001:70) argues that 
American popular culture texts such as “Hollywood movies, American magazines 
and comic strips like ‘Blondie!’ spread the image of an ‘American lifestyle’” and that 
these media accelerated American culture’s diffusion among Japanese peopl .  
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Blondie, which ran in a Japanese newspaper, played a pivotal role in the early postwar 
period, stimulating curiosity about and envy of the victors’ affluence among Japanese 
people (Amano 1995:232; Ono 1991; Iwamoto 2007; Gekkan Akurosu 1989; Yasuda 
1995).70   Ono (1991) argues that the standard middle-class American family depicted 
in Blondie also symbolized the affluence and American style “democracy” in family 
relations as opposed to feudalistic Japanese family relations in traditional Japanese 
households. 
According to Yasuda (1995), Japanese images of America were based on the 
power of mono, or “materials,” ranging from refrigerators, washers, and vacuum 
cleaners, to the American-style living rooms, bathrooms, and individual bedrooms 
that existed only dreams for the Japanese majority in the early postwar period.  While 
the majority of Japanese people could only imagine American middle-class lifestyles 
though exposure to various media sources, Japanese women working for the 
occupation forces encountered American affluence in their workplaces at PXs, 
restaurants, and through interactions with American GIs.  Among this group, the 
Japanese women who worked for American military families as housemaids stoo  out 
because of their firsthand experience of what they perceived as “real” American 
middle-class family life.  Four war bride informants in this study worked as 
housemaids at some points before marrying their husbands.   
 
                                                
70 Blondie by Dean Young and Denis Lebrun was the first popular American comic translated into 
Japanese.  It appeared on the Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper) from 1949 to 1951(Ono 1991). 
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For example, Tetsuko spoke of high demands for Japanese domestic workers 
to serve American GIs and their families in postwar Japan.  According to Tetsuko, 
finding a housemaid’s job was easy, even though she had no experience as a 
housemaid or knowledge of English.  When I asked Tetsuko why she decided to 
become a domestic worker, she said: 
I learned about this job from my friend who was working as a housemaid for 
an American family….  My friend talked about her work experience to me.  I 
became interested in applying for the housemaid job, after I heard her story.  
…Just like other Japanese girls who chose to work for the occupation forces, I 
think I too was yearning for something like this job that looked new and 
exciting.   
 
Tetsuko’s hopeful view of a housemaid’s job echoed the voices of many young 
Japanese women who rushed into employment offices to apply for jobs catering to 
occupation forces.  In addition to working as housemaids, Japanese women became 
waitresses, typists, housekeepers, telephone operators, clerks, and cooks (Atsuda 
[1948] 1997).71   
  Through an employment office, Tetsuko was assigned to work for a U.S. 
lieutenant who brought his family to Japan.  Everything about the job was new to 
Tetsuko when she started work in 1947, from boiling water, making coffee, ironing, 
vacuuming, and dishwashing, to setting a table for guests in an “American way”: 
I didn’t know anything.  I did not know English either.  So the lieutenant’s 
wife taught me many things with hand gestures.  In the kitchen, she showed 
me how to do dishes…put [dish] soap [in the sink], like this.  And…first, 
wash glasses, you see?  Next, wash silverwares, and then wash plates.  After 
finishing them, wash pans and pots.  Lastly, clean the sink…. 
                                                
71 Atsuda’s article was originally appeared in a monthly Japanese women’s magazine, Fujn published 
in March 1948.  A 1997 version of Fujin cited in this chapter is reprint from Fujin originally published 
between January 1948 and April 1948 by Sekai Hyōronsha, Tokyo Japan.  
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Tetsuko noted how impressive it was to learn the systematic, efficient ways of doing 
housework with the advanced methods available to American homemakers. These 
methods contrasted with those of the Japanese people, who cleaned their dishes 
simply with water, and with Tetsuko’s mother’s use of ashes to remove grease from 
dishes, pots and pans.  Through everyday experience working for U.S. families during 
the early postwar years, Tetsuko and other Japanese women recognized dramatic 
differences between the victors and the defeated in every aspect of their lives. 
Yoneko, an Okinawan war bride informant, first worked as a waitress at a 
mess hall for GIs when she was eighteen years old.  “It was pretty common for 
Okinawans to work on American bases,” Yoneko recalled.  “There weren’t enough 
jobs for us after the war.  I think almost half of the young Okinawans worked for the 
American military because of a lack of job opportunities.”  Yoneko quit the job three 
years; then, similar to Tetsuko and influenced by a friend, Yoneko applied for a 
housemaid’s job and began working as a live-in maid in 1955 for an American GI and 
his family who had recently arrived in Okinawa.  This was not only Yoneko’s first 
time to see “American housing” inside the military base’s fence, but also her first 
experience with American middle-class lifestyles: 
It was so different.  Each family member had his [/her] own room.  There 
were a flush toilet, shower, and running water in the house!  No Okinawan 
had [running] water in his/her house at that time.  There was a stove, 
electricity, washer, TV, and so on in the American household.  Okinawans did 
not have these things in their houses.   
 
Similar to Yoneko, many Okinawan women who worked as housemaids commented 
on America’s high standard of living.  These women were impressed by spacious 
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floor plans, multiple bedrooms, and electronic appliances located in living rooms and 
kitchens (Okinawashiritsu Kyōdo Hakubutsukan 1996:8).  Their reactions help 
explain why Japanese women working as housemaids found their jobs appealing for 
reasons other than economic survival. 
 These jobs also attracted diverse groups of women who wanted to learn 
American ways of life, which included learning English, the language of power.  
Other motives for applying for such jobs included anticipated material rewards in 
addition to regular paychecks from American employers: cigarettes, food, and 
clothing (Okinawashiritsu Kyōdo Hakubutsukan 1996:1).72  Many teachers in 
Okinawa gave up their careers and switched to service jobs catering to U.S. military 
personnel because of better salary and material rewards (Okinawashiritsu Kyōdo 
Hakubutsukan 1996:4).    
Sometimes, local women were hired to perform dual roles as housemaids and  
“companions” for GIs’ American wives, who were unfamiliar with Japanese language 
and culture.  Some Japanese housemaids eventually married the employers they 
served.  For instance, Yoneko’s American employer was a widower who brought his 
mother and a stepdaughter to Okinawa; he proposed marriage to Yoneko within one 
year of her starting work as a live-in maid.  Others women who worked as 
housemaids, but not as live-in-maids, recalled meeting their future husbands at on-
base entertainment facilities such as “service clubs” that offered GIs ance music 
                                                
72 Atsuda ([1948]1997), a reporter from Fujin (Japanese women’s magazine) visited the public 
employment office in Tokyo to write about employment situations for Japanese women.  Referring to 
the popularity of jobs catering to occupation forces among Japanese women, a Japanese official 
mentioned many women casually applied jobs in hope of gaining access to material benefits as a perk 
of working for the occupation forces.    
 
                                                                                                                                97
performed by live bands.73  Several of my informants, who lived in a dormitory for 
base-employees, remembered how a U.S. military shuttle bus stopped by the dorm on 
weekends to pick up Japanese women and take them to the service club.  Housemaid 
jobs offered a variety of ways for Japanese women to access American middle-class 
life experiences, and many opportunities for these women to meet American GIs 
outside of work.  Their encounters with GIs in casual settings often facilitated 
romantic relationships, some of which became enduring relationships.  
Japanese women working at PXs, officer’s clubs, NCO clubs, barbershops, 
and restaurants also had increased chances to meet GIs on a daily basis, ranging from 
low ranked enlisted men to officers.  One informant who worked at an officer’s club 
mentioned that many Japanese women working on her base had GI boyfriends.  She 
also said GI customers often brought gift items, such as chocolates and flowers, t  
young Japanese waitresses and/or sales clerks in hopes of winning attention hat 
would lead to dating. Even though the economic resources American GIs enjoyed 
were not the only factor that shaped Japanese women’s perceptions, material 
affluence was the most visible aspect of the U.S. occupation for Japanese people.  
Once they saw the “victor’s world” through jobs at PXs, restaurants, and private 
homes of American families, Japanese women found it almost impossible to ignore 
what American GIs could offer them, in contrast to the material resources of Japanese 
men.  
  
                                                
73 A “service club” refers to a “servicemen’s club,” which is more commonly used among war brides I 
interviewed.   The service club is designed to offer entertainments to lower-rank servicemen.   
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Feminized Japanese Men  
The majority of Japanese war brides who worked in postwar Japan mentioned 
that wages were one of the most appealing aspects of working for the occupation 
forces.  Some war bride informants told me they quit their local jobs and applied for 
U.S. military work once they realized that the latter paid much better than the form r.  
Almost all of these women said they earned twice or three times as much as what 
Japanese people, including Japanese men, usually earned from civilian jobs in 
postwar Japan.  This new economic opportunity for Japanese women challenged 
conventional Japanese gender relations in which men were traditionally expected to 
be providers and to support their family as breadwinners. 
One informant who benefited from these circumstances was Suzuko, a 
foreign-born Japanese woman who grew up overseas, where she spent most of her life 
before repatriating to Japan at the end of World War II.  After returning to Japan, 
Suzuko worked as a telephone operator on a military base where she met her future 
husband.74  I asked Suzuko what made her decide to marry an American rather than a 
Japanese man.  Suzuko did not explicitly answer my question.  Instead, she explained 
her views of Japanese men who, in her estimation, failed to retain male authority and 
responsibilities after losing the war.    
…I was disappointed by Japanese men, I think.  They appeared weak and 
incompetent after the war…..   Japanese men were somewhat inconspicuous.   
Economically speaking, Japanese men around me at that time earned much 
less money than I did, you see?….  Women working on the base and even 
those in the town, I mean prostitutes, could earn more money than men 
                                                
74 While in overseas, Suzuko acquired English language skills, which became highly valued and in 
demand in occupied Japan.  
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could….  I think Japanese men were a little bit envious of Japanese women 
like us working on the army post….  
 
For Suzuko, the Japanese men’s presence in postwar Japan was overshadowed 
not only by the American occupiers, but also by Japanese women who took advantage 
of new economic opportunities.  Suzuko also noted that Japanese men did not have as 
many choices of jobs as women did.  Male jobs working for the occupation forces 
were limited mostly to cooking, menial labor, and miscellaneous low profile tasks, 
while women were more visible in workplaces that often offered direct interactions 
with American GIs.  Suzuko and other war brides emphasized the large gap in the 
earnings between Japanese women and Japanese men, especially those men who had 
no connections to the American occupiers.  Thus, the economic opportunities created 
by occupation forces were gendered, which empowered some Japanese women 
through economic and/or sexual affiliations with U.S. personnel.  The gendered 
economy located in and around U.S. military bases also reshaped Japanese female 
workers’ perceptions of traditional gender relations, leading them to question 
expectations that men would be breadwinners and women homemakers.  
 
Japanese Patriarchy vs. American Democracy  
In postwar Japan, some Japanese women assumed that American marriage 
relationships were models of democratic relationships based on love and perceived 
gender equality, due to their portrayals in American television programs, movies, and  
comic strips (Amano 1995).  Japanese women yearned for western chivalry, or what
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Japanese commonly called “ladies-first,” as an expression of love, kindness, 
thoughtfulness, and respect for women by men.  Taking a critical approach, Amano 
contends that this chivalry was evident in affluent, middle-class western gender 
relationships.  Amano also argues that the American “ladies-first” ideology originally 
meant “protective attitudes of the dominants (men) toward their subordinates 
(women)” which rely on “asymmetrical gender roles” rather than gender equality 
(1995:p.xx).    
For western-minded Japanese women, however, “ladies-first” represented a 
form of liberation from Japanese patriarchy, which demanded women’s 
“submissiveness” and “patience” with their husbands in every aspect of their lives 
(Amano 1995:232-233).  Many war brides identified “ladies-first” and 
“gentlemanness” as unique attributes inherent to western men and absent from Asian 
men.  Moreover, some women openly criticized Japanese patriarchy as a harmful
cultural tradition that made Japanese men less attractive than American men.  Kinuyo 
was one of these women; she shared her gendered experience in postwar Japan, 
recalling her introduction to a patriarchal Japanese veteran.  
My uncle (her mother’s brother) brought a retired Japanese Army officer to 
my mother’s house hoping that the officer and I would be a good match.  The 
officersat down on the zabuton (Japanese cushion) first, then said “suware” 
(“sit down”) to me in an authoritative tone.   .…I said to the officer, “Excuse 
me?  What did you say to me?  Is that the way [you] treat a lady?...   I don’t 
want to talk to you.  You are not a gentleman.”  I despise men like him who 
order a lady what to do.…  The retired officer then said “damare!” (shut up!) 
to me.  That was like a language used in the Army.  He couldn’t get over the 
loss of his military status.  Even after the war, he still tried to use power from 
his past glory. 
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Kinuyo viewed the officer’s behavior as arrogant, militaristic, and 
chauvinistic.  She revolted against the traditional role that expected women to submit 
themselves to male authorities and accept domestic gender hierarchies.  “I n verhad 
interest in Japanese men beyond the level of friendship,” Kinuyo asserted.  By 
contrast, Keiko expressed favorable opinions about American men who treated a 
“lady” properly based on the principle of “ladies-first.”  Kinuyo said she was 
overjoyed when her GI husband helped her take off her jacket and pulled a chair out 
for her at a table in a restaurant, unlike Japanese men.  Kinuyo felt she was trated
respectably, in the manner that a “lady” deserves.  For most war bride informants, 
pulling out a chair, opening a door, and carrying a heavy bag for women represented 
elements of western “ladies-first,” which did not exist in Japanese patriarchal 
traditions.  
Mari, another war bride informant, expressed admiration of American men 
and their affluence in the early postwar era.  Mari experienced American family life 
through her former classmate from high school, Yuki, who married an American GI 
and lived in a house specifically remodeled for American residents in a Japanese 
neighborhood:75   
I visited Yuki’s house quite often and hang around at her house.  Back then, 
everybody was curious about an American-style life and hoping to catch a 
glimpse of it….  It was during the Christmas season….  We had an informal 
school reunion at her house.   Some of my classmates brought their younger 
                                                
75 Japanese landlords providing off-base housing to American families were required to “upgrade” 
their houses to meet specific criteria set by U.S. occupation authorities.  When I interviewed my 
informant, criteria they told me slightly differed.  But generally, Japanese houses should be equipped 
with a flushable toilet, shower, screen doors, and basic kitchen appliances such as an oven and 
refrigerator.  American electric appliances and furnit re were usually brought from a military 
warehouse to the designated Japanese houses. 
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sisters and brothers to show them a real American-style Christmas!   A big 
Christmas tree with a lot of beautiful ornaments, Christmas decorations, 
candies, and more…  Yuki prepared American festive dishes including a big 
turkey!…  My friend could get a variety of American goods from PX and 
commissary through her husband, you know?….  I think we Japanese were 
yearning for affluent American lifestyles at that time… 
   
Although Mari was aware that Yuki’s American middle-class lifestyles w re 
available only through her American husband, the American material power Yuki 
occasionally shared with her friends impressed Mari.  Christmas was such an 
occasion, demonstrating America’s affluence and intensifying the gulf between the 
victors and the defeated. 
  In addition to her respect for American affluence, Mari was particularly 
enthusiastic about what she regarded as the physical attractiveness of American men: 
“I thought they were attractive.  They looked gallant…they looked good in well-
pressed military uniforms and walking breezily.  There were no Japanese soldiers at 
that time, right?”  Mari cheerfully revealed that she fell in love with her husband 
when she first met him at Yuki’s house:  
I thought he (her husband) was the best looking guy among other GIs who 
came to Yuki’s house [laughter].…  My husband has changed a lot since our 
marriage [laughter].  But he was a beautiful handsome young man when he 
was young.  Honestly, it was his looks that triggered me most!” [laughter].   
 
In addition to good looks, Mari cited “ladies-first” as an attractive factor.  Similar to 
other war brides, Mari said that American men knew how to make women happy by 
performing their gender roles such as pulling out chairs and opening doors for 
women.  Although she had a long distance relationship with her Japanese boyfriend 
when she began seeing her future husband, Mari, in her words, “no longer found 
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Japanese men attractive.”  Mari’s story and those of similar women show that 
Japanese women who chose American GIs yearned for democratic gender relations.  
Their idealized gender relations were constructed around a western ideology of 
“ladies first,” in sharp contrast to the dominance and presumed superiority of 
Japanese man.  
 
Marriages as the Way of leaving Japan 
Many informants mentioned “gentlemanness” and “ladies-first” as positive 
personal qualities that made them choose American over Japanese men.  However, 
some women, like Sachi, found nothing attractive about her American husband and 
married him somewhat “accidentally.”  Sachi adamantly denied an economic motive 
for her marriage to a GI.  “In my time (the late 1950s), women who married 
Americans were out of their minds [laughter].  We had everything [materially] in 
Japan by that time, so there was no need to marry Americans just for that purpose.  
Only those silly and crazy women married Americans,” said Sachi as se laughed 
cynically at herself.    
Based on what she told me, however, Sachi was not a “silly” or “crazy” 
woman.  She was independent and started her own barbershop near a U.S. military 
base when she was only 19 years old.  Since Sachi was an only child, she was 
expected to marry a barber and succeed in her parents’ barbershop.  Sachi said her 
parents pressured her to look for her future husband, a barber, through omiai 
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(arranged marriage), which was still practiced widely in postwar Japan.76  Sachi 
resisted:  
I did not want to marry someone through omiai.  I did not believe in omiai.  
And, of course, all men I had to meet were barbers! [laughter].  During each 
date arranged by a matchmaker, I presented myself in such a way that he (er
omiai partner) would not think I was a right woman to be his wife [laughter].  
 
Young, adventurous, and independent, Sachi sought a life that did not yield to 
parental pressure to fulfill a family obligation.  Sachi said she had a secret d sire to 
leave Japan for America and to try something new.  At the time, marrying an 
American GI was one of the only means for Japanese women like Sachi to realize 
their dreams of going to the U.S.   
Even though she did not actively seek opportunities to meet American men, 
Sachi met her future husband when he started coming to her barbershop.  A reduction 
of U.S. troops after the occupation period resulted in the closure of the barbershop on 
the base where Sachi’s future husband was stationed.  Since Sachi’s barbershop was 
located near the base, GI customers soon appeared at her shop.  “There were few 
more barbershops in my area but many GIs came to my shop,” Sachi said.  “I had two 
young Japanese girls working at my shop, so they came to my shop to get attention 
from these girls, you see? [laughter].”  Sachi also became quite popular among GI 
customers, including her future husband.  When asked why she chose him over other 
GIs, Sachi laughed and replied, “Why did I marry him?  Well, it’s still quite mystery 
for me too [laughter]….I don’t think he was particularly a handsome guy compared to 
                                                
76 Under the western influence of individualism and democracy, the meaning of marriage was 
transforming from a family matter to a personal affair in postwar Japan.  Also, the postwar constitution 
defined marriage as a union based on the “mutual consent of both sexes,” which suggests that the 
individuals, not their parents, should have choice f suppose (Tanaka 1995:12).          
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others….I don’t know, but I somewhat married him.  I made a big mistake! 
[laughter].”  Other war brides had responses similar to Sachi’s.   
Sachi’s marriage ended in divorce and she was not successful in settling legal 
issues, such as child support and a divorce settlement.  Sachi was quite upset about 
what she considered her husband’s negligence, but she also blamed herself for 
underestimating his obvious “licentious behavior” early in their relationship:    
I think I spoiled my husband too much even before we married….  I mean, 
when he came by my shop, I gave him some money so he could go to bars….  
After we married, I somewhat allowed him to continue to live like a bachelor 
who had no family responsibility as a father and husband….  He went to bars 
frequently and spent all money.  I started working.  He knew we could live 
without his paycheck….  He rarely came back home.  
  
After moving to the U.S, Sachi became a virtual single-mother with a breadwinner’s 
role because her husband abandoned almost all of his family responsibilities.  Sachi’s
barber skills helped her find a job despite her minimal knowledge of English.  She 
earned more than twice her husband’s wages because “my pay was not by hour but by 
the number of GI’s head I shave.  The more I shave, the higher my pay became 
[laugher].”  Similar to Sachi, several other war bride informants brought marketable 
skills, such as hair styling, sewing, and a housecleaning, that enabled them to earn 
money.  
  Tetsuko, the wife of a veteran, also said she did not find her future husband 
particularly attractive when they first met.  Prior to meeting the American GI, 
Tetsuko was married to a Japanese man for love, but their marriage ended in divorce 
because of his infidelity.  Consequently, Tetsuko was labeled a “failed wife” in 
Japanese society for not being able to keep her husband’s attention on her and their 
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home.  Moreover, divorced women in early postwar Japan were devalued for having 
lost their virginity, which made attracting “decent” Japanese men difficult.   
After her divorce, Tetsuko moved to a U.S. military base dormitory to work as 
a housemaid for an American family, and soon met her future husband at a service 
club.  According to Tetsuko, she and many of her peers went to the service club on 
weekends, where most of the American patrons were low-ranking enlisted men: 
“Things were fairly cheap at the service club.  That’s why low-rank soldiers w nt to 
the club to drink and dance….  I met my husband at the club.  I knew my husband 
didn’t have much money….”  When they started dating, Tetsuko, and not her future 
husband, paid their expenses, even on their first date.  Despite his lack of finances, 
Tetsuko decided to marry the man.  I asked about the crucial factor in her decision: 
My husband was a gentleman, I mean, he did not touch me….  He did not 
even hold my hands.  After the date, he went back to his barracks and I went 
back to my dormitory.  No sexual relationship.  My friends in the dormitory 
teased me, “hey, don’t you two go to a hotel?”  When I said “no,” they 
couldn’t believe me because when you were dating a GI, it meant to have sex 
relationship….  But we didn’t.  I thought he was a gentleman.  I trusted 
him….  I think I just wanted to leave Japan…without thinking much about 
what my future would be like in America.…  My husband was born in 
Kentucky.  He had little school education.  I knew I would have a tough life if 
I married him.  I knew it.  But it did not matter to me.  I was married once and 
failed it.  I had nothing to lose. 
  
Tetsuko divorced her husband not long after they moved to the U.S. because 
he became abusive and disrespectful in many ways.  In addition to verbal abuse, 
Tetsuko’s husband “was always causing trouble in the military…and his rank went 
down.  He was a heavy drinker and spent all money…we became out of money.  He 
cheated me on money and woman.  He was having affairs.”  Similar to Sachi, Tetsuko 
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paid a high price for taking a chance on marrying an “available” GI in hopes of a 
better life in the U.S. 
 
Racial Dynamics of Marriage: Nisei GIs  
Not all Japanese war brides married Caucasian GIs, but little scholarly 
attention has been paid to women who married non-white GIs.  This is due largely to 
methodological problems, especially in locating a sizeable sample of the target 
population within a given research site.  No official demographic statistics on racial 
backgrounds of American GIs who married Japanese women during or after the 
occupation are available.  Nor did the U.S. military keep records of the race of 
servicemen when they submitted marriage applications (Ebony 1952).  However, 
multiple sources such as newspaper and magazine articles, documentation from 
archives, and literature on Japanese war brides, indicate that there were larg  numbers 
of marriages between Japanese women and non-Caucasian GIs, particularly Nisei GIs 
(American servicemen of Japanese ancestry), with many of these marriages taking 
place in the early postwar years. 
For example, Koshiro (1999) cites Associated Press reports that among 823 
American GIs-Japanese couples who married between July 23 and August 21, 1947, 
597 were Nisei, 211 were white, and 15 were black soldiers (p. 157).  An article in 
Pacific Stars & Stripes of February 21, 1951 reported that among 1,330 GI-Japanese 
couples who married during the six-month amnesty period under Public Law 717 
(from August 19, 1950 to February 18, 1951), one third were couples consisting of 
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Japanese women and Nisei soldiers.  Another source reported that among 8,381 GI-
Japanese couples who married between August 1950 and March 1952 in Tokyo, 73% 
of GI husbands were white, 15% were Nisei, and 12% were black (Kalischer 
1952:17).   
Kanzaki (1974) noted there were fewer barriers for non-Caucasian GIs, such 
as Nisei and black Americans compared to whites, who requested military approval 
for marrying Japanese women.  That Nisei GIs were often successful in obtaining 
marriage approval was likely due to their shared “Japanese blood,” which was not 
considered to constitute race mixing.  This may also explain why such marriages 
rarely received attention from the American mainstream press, in comparison to white 
GIs-Japanese marriages.  Shibusawa (2006:50) argues that American media may have 
considered marriages between Nisei GIs and Japanese women “unworthy of 
comment” because “most Americans interpreted race only within a binary 
white/black or white/nonwhite construct.”  Therefore, Nisei GIs’ marriages to 
Japanese women did not represent the “American racial tolerance” that American 
white servicemen demonstrated through commitment to their Japanese spouses (Ibid., 
p. 47).   
Whether or not Nisei GIs-Japanese romantic relations were publicized, Nisei 
GIs were popular among Japanese women in the early postwar period because of 
shared ancestry and cultural backgrounds.  The Nis i’s Japanese language skills, 
while limited to spoken Japanese, helped Nisei GIs communicate with Japanese 
people.  Their ethnic, cultural, and language compatibility with Japanese were 
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advantageous to developing intimate relationships with Japanese women faster and 
easier than their “American” counterparts did.  Notably, several Japanese popular 
magazines publicized the marriage of Miura Mitsuko, a Japanese actress, and a Nisei 
GI as an example of a happy Nisei GI-Japanese marriage (Yasutomi 2001; also see 
the picture in Sakuda’s Tōkyō Senryō, 1979:197).  This coverage likely was a positive 
influence on many Japanese women when they decided to marry Nisei GIs.77   
Although none of my war bride informants married Nisei GIs, Asako told me 
that she went out with several GIs, including some Nisei, when she worked at a U.S. 
camp in the early 1950s.78  The outbreak of the Korean War caused many American 
servicemen to be stationed in the camp, according to Asako, who loved dancing and 
frequently went to a servicemen’s club to dance.  Asako told me of the time she took 
the initiative and asked a Nisei GI from Hawaii to dance with her:  
…I’ve never done the same thing to ‘American’ (she meant “white”) GIs, 
though.  Of course not!…  Most Americans were merely interested in a casual 
relationship with Japanese women, you know?  They expected us to move on 
to a sexual relationship quickly…say after dating twice or three times, if not 
on the first date [laugher]….  But I first thought Nisei were somewhat 
[morally] different from the rest of the Americans because they looked just 
like Japanese.  Actually, I dated a Nisei GI a couple of times.   After the daes, 
I realized that Nisei were “Americans” after all.  
 
                                                
77 Mitsuko Miura, a Japanese actress married a Nisei GI in April 1946 but divorced in November 1951, 
three years after moving to her husband’s home in Los Angeles, the U.S. (Yasutomi 2000).  Another 
Japanese actress who married an American military officer and moved to the U.S. also divorced.  
Yasutomi (2000:196) points out that several Japanese magazines featured their stories and emphasized 
the declined images of the former actresses whose marriages with GIs ended in an empty dream. The 
media contributed to creation of negative images of intermarriage in connection to divorce and 
descent.  Also see Sandē Mainichi (1957:5). 
78 Nisei GIs-Japanese women married couples are most likelyto be found in California and Hawaii, 
where the large population of Japanese is i community exists.   
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Since Nisei looked Japanese, Japanese people expected Nis i GIs to behave 
accordingly (Perry 1980), but Nisei GIs identified themselves as “Americans” and 
behaved just as their fellow American GIs did.   
Perry (1980) notes that the gap between Nisei’s Japanese appearance and their 
American attitudes as occupiers created tension and sometimes resentment toward 
Nisei GIs among Japanese citizens.  According to Perry, the reality of Nisei GIs being 
“privileged to be among the victors” was particularly irritating to some Japanese 
(1986:174).  As for Asako, she was disappointed by “Americanized” NiseiGIs, but 
she also criticized their Japanese parents, or Issei, who retained traditional ways of 
living and expected their daughters-in-law to conform to the Japanese patriarchal 
family system and gender roles in their Hawaiian homes.79  Asako recalled: 
At first, I thought everything would be much easier if I married a Nisei GI 
(than a white or black GI) because his parents would be Japanese.  I mean, I 
would feel secure if I had my Japanese in-laws around…especially during a 
critical time, for example, when I had to stay at home alone waiting for my 
husband’s return from his deployment…. But in reality, I heard that they, I 
mean Nisei’s parents, were really traditional and hard on their Japanese 
daughter-in-law in Hawaii…they were even more traditional than Japanese in-
laws living in Japan.  That was what I heard.80   
 
 
Asako’s assertion about the Nisei’s parents was supported in part by Kimura’s 
(1957) earlier study on in-law and daughter-in-law relationships among war bridesin 
Hawaii.  Kimura found that Japanese war brides who married Nisei GIs were less 
                                                
79 Issei refers to the first generation Japanese who immigrated to the U.S. 
80 The marriage between Miura, the Japanese actress, and Nisei GI that I mentioned earlier ended in a 
divorce.  The Japanese media sensationalized Miura’s divorce as a case of failed marriage involving an 
American GI in general, but a Nisei GI in particular.  The media also reported that Miura decided to 
divorce mainly because she was not able to get along with her traditional-minded Japanese-in-law in 
Hawaii.  
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likely to consider their in-law relations as “congenial” as compared to their 
counterparts, who married non-Nisei GIs.  In some cases, in-law and daughter-in-law 
relationships involved “acute conflict,” which could lead Nisei GI-Japanese couples 
to divorce.81  According to Kimura, negative relationships were particularly acute 
between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law, which were attributable to gaps in 
their expectations for each other.  On the one hand, mothers-in-law often expected 
daughters-in-law to be “subordinate apprentices” in almost every aspect of life in 
Hawaii, while war brides tended to be independent.  On the other hand, some war 
brides were doubtful about the qualifications of mothers-in-law (e.g., education 
levels, language skills, knowledge of American cultures) as teachers to guide them to 
new lives in the U.S. (Kimura 1957).82   
Ironically, war brides were prepared to be “acculturated” into the American 
way of life, specifically into white middle-class domesticity, regardless of their 
husbands’ racial backgrounds.  Several war bride informants stated that they attended 
“bride schools” offered by the Red Cross, where American volunteers (mostly 
officers’ wives) taught them how to do American housework properly before their 
departure to the U.S.  Moreover, the U.S. occupation authority (GHQ/SCAP) made 
popular films and TV dramas for Japanese people, which primarily depicted white 
Americans and their middle-class lifestyles (Perry 1980).  Unsurprisingly, some 
                                                
81 Kimura (1957) noted that there were approximately 2,000 Japanese war brides residing Hawaii in 
the late 1950s and many of them were assumed to be wives of Nisei GIs.   
82 Kimura (1957) also noted that a war bride tended to look down her Japanese in-laws, especially 
when she discovered her socioeconomic class was better than her in-laws.’  Also a war bride was likely 
to have better education than her in-laws, which further negatively affected the in-law and daughter-in-
law relations.  From the in-laws’ perspectives, however, a war bride was too “Americanized” in her 
fashions and manners to fulfill her dutiful roles as a good daughter-in-law.  
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Japanese war brides became optimistic that they would enjoy such lifestyles onc  
they arrived in the U.S.        
 
Japanese Prejudice toward Black GIs and “Jim-Crowism”  
The Japanese public’s views of intimate liaisons between Japanese women 
and former enemies were resentful from the beginning of the occupation.  Japanese 
contempt for intermarriages was connected not only to memories of World War II, 
but also to fears of losing Japanese “racial purity” through racial mixing (Koshiro 
1999).  Hybridization with other racial groups, even the “superior” white race, was 
believed to produce offspring inferior to the “pure Japanese,” and consequently 
harmful to Japanese racial integrity and national harmony characterized by racial 
homogeneity (see Creighton 1997; Koshiro 1999; Lie 2001; Weiner 1997).  
Repressed animosity toward the white occupiers, along with the Japanese inferiority 
complex in relation to the white race, reinforced resentment against white-Japanese 
intimacy.83  
 Compared to skeptical views of intimate relationships between Japanese 
women and white GIs or Nisei GIs, Japanese perceptions of black-Japanese intimacy 
were even more hostile.  This was partly because of Japanese prejudice toward people 
with darker skin complexions as the Japanese adapted the white concept of race and a 
racial hierarchy, with the white race (e.g., Europeans, white Americans) at the top, the 
yellow race (e.g., Asians) in the middle, and blacks and aboriginal peoples (e.g., 
                                                
83 Koshiro noted that the Japanese bore the inferiority complex to whites (Europeans and white 
American) who stood above all colored people in a racial hierarchy (1999).  
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Africans, Australian aborigines) at the bottom (Leupp 2003).84 Moreover, the 
Japanese quickly learned about American white racism against black soldiers 
stationed in Japan, which they used to justify their own negative attitudes toward 
black GIs. 
 Billy Rowe (1945), a columnist for a leading African American newspaper 
the Pittsburgh Courier, reported that “Jim-crowism” was not practiced exclusively 
practiced within the U.S., but noted that also existed among the occupation troops in 
Japan.  One of the most visible areas of racial segregation between white and black 
soldiers involved Japanese women’s sexuality.  According to Rowe (1945), brothels, 
or what some called “Geisha houses” catering to occupation troops, were divided 
along the color line and offered sexual services to white and black soldiers separately.  
Rowe also reported that white soldiers patronized brothels reserved for black soldiers 
freely, while black soldiers were barred from white GIs’ sexual territories.  Violations 
of these territories became sources of tension and conflict between white and black 
soldiers that often escalated into street fights (Pittsburgh Courier 1945).  
Similar to situations in the Jim-crow Southern states, the U.S. armed forces in 
Japan failed to provide equal facilities and services for black soldiers.  Perry 
(1980:171) noted:    
White troops generally were well looked after, with their snack bars, 
swimming pools, barbershops, and clubs.  Black troops often lacked these 
amenities, and pent-up tensions would periodically explode into violence.  Off 
                                                
84 Japanese intellectuals and elites were influenced by the western concept of scientific race and social 
Darwinism as an explanation of advanced Western civilization and justification of the white 
superiority.  While the Japanese, as the yellow race, placed themselves bellow whites in the racial 
hierarchy, they viewed themselves as the most superior race among the non-white racial groups such as 
Chinese, Koreans, blacks, and others.     
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base, fueled with Saturday night booze, white and black would go after each 
other before crowds of interested Japanese bystanders. 
 
As the Japanese people gained knowledge of the racialized practice, they “looking 
down on the colored soldiers as inferior because they see them discriminated against 
by their fellow Americans” (Pittsburgh Courier 1945).  Moreover, Rowe (1945) 
claimed that prejudice and discrimination were the main weakness of “American 
democracy” which convinced the Japanese that democracy was not for all Americans, 
but was a privilege for “whites only.”  
Japanese media, especially popular magazines, also reinforced negative views 
of intermarriages between Japanese women and American GIs, but those involving 
black GIs were singled out as doomed unions.  A magazine feature article “Umi o 
Watatta Kokujin Hanayome no Higeki” (Tragedies of black GIs’ brides who crossed 
the sea) offered personal stories of three Japanese women who married black 
servicemen and moved to the U.S. in the early 1950s (Aoki 1953:24).85  These 
women’s stories all focused on their struggles and the hardships they endured in the 
U.S., due to poverty, racial discrimination, and unfaithful husbands.  Aoki contends, 
“the majority of Japanese women who married American GIs live unhappily 
today…but particularly, women who married black GIs, almost without exception, 
end up living miserable and tragic lives” (Ibid.).  Special issues of Eb ny magazines 
also portrayed Japanese women married to black GIs as “the loneliest brides in 
America” because of their difficulty in being accepted in “Negro communities” as 
outsiders and also by white communities as wives of Negroes (Ebony 1953a:17).  
                                                
85 Also see “Sanzen-nin no Hanayome,” Sandē Mainichi (July 28, 1957).  
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A survey conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Welfare in 1952 revealed a 
relatively high proportion of deserted children were born to black GIs and Japanese 
women.86  According to the survey, approximately 4,000 Amerasian children born out 
of wedlock had been abandoned by GI fathers or by both parents at the time of the 
survey (Kalischer 1952; Trumbull 1967).  Nearly 500 children were in orphanages, 
where 77.6% of them were Eurasians born to white GI-Japanese couples and 23.4% 
were Afroasians born to black GI-Japanese couples (Tsurumaru 1984:310).87  In 
1958, one orphanage reported that 30% of children were Afroasian, while 52% were 
Eurasian and 18% were “others” (Shūkan Yomiuri 1958).  One might assume that the 
problem of Amerasian children ended with the occupation, but fifteen years after the 
occupation was over, one source estimated there were more than 20,000 deserted 
Amerasian children in Japan, and that one-sixth of them were believed to be 
Afroasian children (Wagatsuma 1978:120).   
The records of deserted Afroasian children suggest that the marriage records 
alone could not provide a complete picture of the racial dynamics surrounding 
American GIs and Japanese women.  On the one hand, Amerasian children were 
stigmatized regardless of their fathers’ racial background.  They encountered eglect, 
prejudice, and discrimination by the people and governments of Japan and the U.S 
                                                
86 Foreign media tended to use “occupation babies” or “GI babies” while Japanese general public used 
the terms ainoko (child in between) or konketsuji (mixed-blood child) to refer to mixed race children.  
Since these terms contain derogatory connotation, they are no longer used.  Many scholars use the term 
Amerasian.  Some use Eurasian and Afroasian to distinguish between Japanese-white Amerasian and 
Japanese-black Amerasian (see Murphy-Shigematsu 2000).  
87 Japanese scholars, social workers, and media argued that the official statistics underestimated the 
actual numbers of illegitimate bi-racial children born to Japanese woman and GI parentages.  For 
example, the statistics overlooked the number of children who were aborted in Japanese obstetrician 
clinics (Trumbull 1967) while others were kept “hidden” by their mothers from the mainstream society 
(Tsurumaru 1984).   
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(Burkhardt 1983; Murphy-Shigematsu 1988, 2000; Wagatsuma 1978).  On the other 
hand, Afroasian children and their Japanese mothers faced greater social rejection 
from Japanese mainstream society than their Eurasian counterparts did (Burkhardt 
1983; Wagatsuma 1978).  The issue of deserted Amerasian children is not just a 
personal problem or legacy of U.S. occupation.  It is a political issue that persists in 
Japan and other Asian countries where U.S. military bases are located.   
 
A Japanese Wife of a Black GI: Konami’s Story 
Locating Japanese wives of black GIs in the Midwest was challenging, but 
persuading them to participate in the research was even more difficult.  Japanese 
women who married black GIs encountered more curiosity, ridicule, hostility, 
prejudice, and discrimination, both in Japan and in the U.S, than did Japanese women 
who married white GIs.  Such negative experiences made Japanese wives of black 
GIs more self-protective and distrustful, especially to strangers who appeared 
inquisitive about their personal life stories.    
Fortunately, I was able to get to know Konami, the wife of a black veteran, 
who willingly agreed to meet with me for interview.  Konami is an outgoing and 
energetic, and Similar to many of the war brides I met, she is friendly person who 
loves to talk.  When I first visited her house, Konami enthusiastically showed me 
around the house.  I saw familiar Japanese decorative objects, such as Japanese dolls 
in glass cases, Japanese paintings on her walls, and Japanese tableware in her 
cupboard, all similar to those I often saw in other informants’ homes.  There were 
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also many family pictures on display.  A monochrome snapshot of Konami and her 
husband taken in mid 1950s Japan caught my attention: Konami, dressed in western 
clothes, and her husband, in an army uniform, stood in front of an American car.   
The first thing Konami said about the picture was, “Look at the car!  It’s big, 
isn’t it?…  Our ‘first date’ was a train trip to the port town to pick up this car shipped 
from America.  He did not understand Japanese, so I went there with him as a guide.” 
Konami stressed that not all American soldiers were allowed to own cars but her 
husband’s rank in the military enabled him to have his car shipped from the U.S. to 
Japan.  She seemed proud of the car and said it stood out on the streets since there 
were few similar American cars in early 1950s Japan.  When I asked how she met r 
future husband, Konami said they met at a bar in the entertainment district near a U.S. 
military base.  Konami did not explain the details, but said almost all Americans she 
saw in that area were black GIs and her future husband was one who spoke to her.  
After some conversation, the GI invited Konami to move into a house he had just 
purchased.  Konami accepted his offer instantly and married the GI within a few 
months after she moved into his house.   
I asked Konami about her family reactions to her decision to cohabit with the 
black GI, then to marry him.  Konami responded:  
Well, of course, people said something bad about him because he was 
black.…  But how could my sister oppose this marriage?  My husband helped 
my sister’s family financially because they were in big trouble with their small 
business.  They greatly appreciated my husband’s generosity….  If my parents 
were alive, they might have opposed to the marriage because of his skin color.  
But I had neither of them, you see?...  In those days, my sisters and I…each of 
us was doing all the best we could in our own ways to get through the 
immediate postwar years….  
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As an unmarried young woman who did not have a guardian, Konami had no other 
place to go but depended on her sister’s family who was also struggling with postwar 
economic hardship.  Similar to the cases of Aki and Miwa (see Chapter 2), Konami’s 
decision to marry the black GI reflects her vulnerable positions in the early postwar 
Japanese society where women, particularly those who had no guardians, minimal 
education and/or virtually no occupational skills, suffered most.  Konami’s 
circumstance gave her few options including marriage to the American GI through 
which, Konami gained access to material benefits that most Japanese were desperate 
to have at that time.  To Konami, her husband’s race, blackness, was not as important 
issue as the immediate economic hardship she wanted to overcome.   
 While women who established intimate relationships with American GIs 
similarly were stigmatized by the Japanese society as sexual collaborators with the 
former enemy, unlike Aki and Miwa, Konami additionally endured the contemptuous 
gaze from the Japanese public placed on women associated with black soldiers.  
Japanese wives of black GIs also felt they were placed in inferior positions by their 
Japanese female counterparts who married white GIs.  The Japanese wife of a black 
GI interviewed in Ebony magazine said, “It seems that the Japanese girls who married 
white soldiers got very high hat when they came to America and drew a color line on 
us and our husbands” (1953a:17).   
Japanese women came to identify themselves according to their husbands’ 
race and followed both implicit and explicit racial rules practiced in America.  
According to the Ebony article (1953a), there was no race mixing between Japanese 
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wives of the two racial groups, which made it even harder for Japanese wives of black 
GIs to make friends outside their own circles.  Konami said she socialized mainly 
with Japanese women who married black GIs, but there was no informal interaction 
with women who married white GIs:   
After I moved to the U.S, I experienced, uh, racial discrimination by white 
folks….  When my husband and I lived in a black neighborhood, black kids 
called me “Chinese, Chinese!”  But when I was in Japan, I was discriminated 
against even by the Japanese, I mean, Japanese women who married whites, 
you see?  When I attended a bride school, these wives of white soldiers looked 
down on us with haughty attitude like “you folks are nigger’s woman.”  They 
were too proud to associate with us…. 
 
Konami also shared her memories when she lived in military housing in Japan.  There 
was a Japanese wife of a white GI who lived close to Konami’s house, but they never 
exchanged words.  Konami felt her Japanese neighbor kept a distance from her to 
avoid establishing a personal relationship with someone who married a black GI.  In 
Konami’s eyes, her Japanese neighbor appeared to be mimicking what her white 
husband would do to his black neighbor.  
While Japanese wives of white GIs tended to view their husbands’ whiteness 
as a status higher than black GIs, their half-white-offspring also provided a sense of 
superiority to their Japanese counterparts who had half-black children.  In a Japanese 
satirical cartoon, “Inferioritii konpurekkusu” (Inferiority complex), Ishikaw Kajio 
portrays a perceived racialized hierarchy between two Japanese women who are 
mothers of bi-racial children (see Mainichi Shinbunsha 1977).  In the cartoon, the 
mother of a Eurasian baby (an Amerasian child whose father is a Caucasian GI) and 
the mother of an Afroasian child (an Amerasian child whose father is a black GI) 
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meet on the street.  The woman who holds her Eurasian baby in her arms walks 
proudly, while the other woman hides her Afroasian child and casts an upward glance 
at the Eurasian baby, as though she envies the half-white baby.  As the title of the 
cartoon “Inferiority complex” suggests, women with the Afroasian children felt 
compelled to accept their designated inferior status, in comparison to women with 
Eurasian babies.   
Another piece by Ishikawa, “Kyō wa chokorēto bōi yo” (Today, I brought a 
chocolate boy) illustrates a Japanese-black GI couple walking on the street to a 
“hotel” and Japanese children mimicking the couple in their role play: Two children 
pretend to be a Japanese-black couple checking in a “hotel” where another child 
responds to the couple (see Mainichi Shinbunsha 1977).  The pretended play that 
Ishikawa illustrates reflects the postwar GI-Japanese intimacy, as seen through 
Japanese children’s eyes.  Just as children created p npan role-playing earlier, these 
children in Ishikawa’s cartoon imitated what they observed on the street where GI-
Japanese romantic relationships were not limited to white GI-Japanese couples.   
Even though the racial dynamics in postwar GI-Japanese intimacy is often 
overlooked, this study reveals that women’s experiences became complicated when 
their gendered and racialized experiences interacted with other attributes such as their 
GI partners’ race.  Heterogeneity among Japanese women who have diverse 
experiences in the postwar Japanese society and in their relationships with GIs 
challenges the homogeneous images of Asian women constructed by the Orientalist 
gaze.  Japanese women also became active analysts as they exposed American men 
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and Japanese men to their gaze for scrutiny, investigation, and evaluation, instead of 
allowing themselves to remain the objects of the Orientalist gaze.   
In the following chapters, I will focus on younger generations of Japanese ad 
Okinawan women who married American GIs and currently live in Okinawa.  While 
younger generations of military wives and war brides share particula perceptions of 
American men, these contemporary women’s experiences with GIs and their views of 
American men have become even more complicated and diverse.  Reconstruction of 
the social meanings of race, especially blackness, and shifts in economic power 
relations between the U.S. and Japan, reshaped GI-Japanese intimacy, which in turn 
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Chapter 4  
Situating GI-Japanese Intimacy in Contemporary Okinawa 
 
In preceding chapters, the personal narratives of my war bride interviewees 
vividly illuminate diverse experiences of Japanese women who married American 
GIs and moved to the U.S. under post-war social and economic circumstances.  
Although the term war bride is rare in today’s Japan, GI-Japanese intimacy is not a 
remnant of postwar power relations between conquerors and conquered.  Similar 
interracial liaisons exist in the context of U.S. global militarization, or what C lmers 
Johnson (2004:5) calls an American “militarized empire,” which shapes not only 
world politics and international relations, but also private spheres such as 
relationships between GIs stationed overseas and local women.  Contemporary GI-
Asian women intimacy is, therefore, a consequence of U.S. global militarization, 
which demands continuous relocation of U.S. military personnel to overseas duty 
stations since the U.S. involvement in World War II. 
According to the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) quarterly report, 
Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area (“Worldwide Manpower 
Report”), the U.S. military was distributed throughout almost 150 countries and 
regions including Asia and Pacific regions as of September 2005 (DoD 2005).  Japan, 
one of the major U.S. “allies” in Asia, has been hosting the U.S. military since its 
unconditional surrender in World War II.  As Table 2.1 shows, for the first two 
decades following the end of the World War II, Japanese women (war brides) 
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admitted to the U.S. as wives of American citizens outnumbered other Asian female 
immigrants to the U.S.  However, nationalities of Asian women married to U.S.   
Table 2.1 Asian Female Spouses of U.S. Citizens Admitted to the U.S., 1947-1975 
Year Japan Korea Philippines Vietnam Thailand 
1947-1950        757         -      -        -        - 
1950-1955     9,198        325      2,130        -        - 
1955-1960   20,760     1,662      5,292        -        - 
1960-1965   15,138     4,436      7,013        -        - 
1965-1970     9,849     7,205      9,606    1,199        880 
1970-1975   10,979   14,577    27,706    6,841   10,286   
    Total   66,681   28,205    51,747    8,040   11,166 
Source: U.S. Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, Annual Reports, 1947-1975, Table 6 
(Washington, D.C.).  This table was modified and reproduced from Table 1 Asian Women Immigrants 
Admitted to U.S. as Wives of American Citizens by Country of Origin and Year in Bok-Lim C. Kim 
(1977), “Asian Wives of U.S. Servicemen: Women in Shadows,” Amerasia, 4 (1): 91-115.  
 
citizens became more diversified when U.S. military operations in Asia exp nded and 
intensified due to the Cold War.  The stationing of U.S. troops in numerous parts of 
Asia fostered more GI-Asian women intimacy, which in turn contributed to shifts in 
migration patterns among Asian women married to U.S. citizens.   
As in “Worldwide Manpower Report” issued in September 2005, Japan 
hosted the largest active U.S. military population in East Asia and the Pacific reg on, 
followed by South Korea (DoD 2005).  When looking at distribution of U.S. forces in 
Japan, however, one finds that Okinawa, a single prefecture of Japan, accommodates 
more U.S. military personnel than the rest of prefectures all combined on the 
mainland.88  Okinawa, which makes up only 0.6% of Japan’s total land area (about 
the size of Los Angeles, California), hosts thirty-eight military bases (as of March 
                                                
88 A Japanese prefecture is the rough equivalent of a state in the U.S.  There are 47 prefectures and 
each prefecture elects its governor and representatives to serve the lower legislative assembly.  
Compared to the U.S. states, Japanese prefectures hav  more limited political power and autonomy.   
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2001) that account for 75% of the total land area used exclusively by the U.S. military 
in Japan today (See Figure 2.1).   
 
Figure 2.1 Distribution of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa, 2001  
 
 
Source: Reprint from Okinawa Prefectural Government, Executive Office of the Governor, Military 
Base Affairs Division, “Outline of the U.S. Facilities and Areas,” U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa.  
http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid=14&id=589&page=1   
 
These 38 military instillations represent the continuation of U.S. military 
occupation of Okinawa where new military personnel constantly move in, while 
others are being relocated to other duty stations.  According to Okinawa Prefectural 
Government, Military Base Affairs Division, in 2004, some 26,000 U.S. servicemen 
and women were stationed in Okinawa; the total number of Americans related to U.S. 
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military in Okinawa reached over 50,000 when Department of Defense (DoD) 
civilian employees and dependents were included (See Figure 2.2).89   
Table 2.2  U.S. Military Related Population in Okinawa, 2004 
 
Number of military personnel, civilian 






Military Personnel       26,282 
      Marine Corps           16,015 
       Air Force                   7,100 
       Navy                          2,250 
       Army                            917 
 
Civilian Employees         1,679 
(Direct and Indirect Hire) 
 
Dependents                    22,865 
 
Total                                                                  50,826 
Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government, Executive Office of the Governor, Military Base Affairs 
Division, U.S. Military and Self Defense Force Bases in Okinawa.    
 
As a critical strategic location for the U.S. military during the Vietnam War, 
(and more recently, wars in the Middle East), Okinawa has been transformed into a 
U.S. military colony with financial and political support from the Japanese central 
government.  The long-term impact of U.S. military presence on a relatively sma l 
island isolated from mainland Japan has shaped Okinawa’s experience in unique 
ways.  Pervasiveness of GI-Okinawan women intimacy, including intermarriages s 
one aspect of Okinawan uniqueness that the majority of Japanese on the mainland 
overlook.     
 
                                                
89 Civilian employees in Okinawa are classified into tw  categories: Department of Defense civilian 
employees who were directly hired in the U.S. by the DoD (direct hire); Others resided outside the 
U.S. at the time of hiring, thus locally hired (indrect hire).  Their benefits differ depending on the
hiring status, direct or indirect.  The first is offered full benefits by the DoD, while the latter’s benefits 
are limited. 
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Intermarriages in Okinawa 
In Okinawa, I often saw GI-Okinawan couples in places such as military 
bases, base towns, entertainment areas, and shopping centers.  Despite high visibilty 
of such interracial couples, unlike their predecessors or Japanese war brides, little 
research has been done on contemporary GI-Japanese/Okinawan intimate 
relationships.  GI-Japanese intimacy rarely receives public attention either, specially 
outside Okinawa.  It was not until the late 1989s that Okinawa became a center of 
curiosity when Japanese mainstream media started reporting on young women 
congregating at U.S. Naval ports, and at bars and clubs near U.S. military bases such 
as Yokosuka on the mainland.  The media tended to sensationalize behaviors of these 
young women derogatorily and tauntingly referred to as amejo.90   
Similar to the postwar-term panpan, amejo emphasizes promiscuous images 
of contemporary Japanese women who pursue only American men (GIs) in the 
vicinity of U.S. military bases.  Where panpan were stigmatized as collaborators of 
American GIs in pursuit of a better economic lives and simple survival, amejo are 
stereotypically perceived as GIs hunting for sexual desires and short-term erotic 
adventures (Kobayashi 2003; Takushi 2000).  Some of these women do frequent base 
towns in search of American GIs.  In my research sample, several of Okinawan and 
mainland informants revealed they frequented clubs and bars in base towns for such 
purposes and had multiple relationships with GIs prior to their marriages.  However, 
                                                
90 See Akiko Kudō, “Japanese women are so easy: Women sucked by GIs,” Shinchō 45, February 
1999; Mutsuyo Satō, “Heartrending stories of Okinawa ‘mejo,’” SPA!, August 27, 2002; Yumi 
Yamashita, “Special report from Okinawa: ‘Amejo’ pursuing black American GIs,” SAPIO, November 
1995; Ruika Katsuhira, “Japanese girls yearning for br thers in the U.S. military bases and turned 
themselves to ‘blacks,’” Bessatsu Takarajima, July 08, 1992. 
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since Japanese media dwell on images of promiscuous young women seeking short-
term associations with American GIs, the fact that many of the women perceived as 
amejo ultimately marry GIs is overlooked.   
According to 2004 Japanese government statistics on marriages by years and 
nationalities, 1,500 Japanese women married U.S. men in Japan (Kōsei Rōdō Shō 
[Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare] 2004).  Even though this number 
appears insignificant at first glance, approximately one-fifth of these marriages (275 
out of 1,500) took place in Okinawa alone.  Moreover, intermarriages of Okinawan 
women and U.S. servicemen account for 62% of all international marriage cases in 
Okinawa (Kōsei Rōdō Shō 2004).  On the mainland, however, this conventional 
intermarriage pattern, of women marrying Western men and moving to men’s home 
country, is no longer dominant.  As Japan’s economy became stronger in the 1970s, 
and the 1980s, increasing numbers of Japanese men brought home wives from other 
Asian countries (Sellek 2001).91  On mainland Japan, gender-reversed intermarriages 
have outnumbered conventional marriages over the past three decades, while the 
postwar intermarriage pattern of women marrying American GIs remains dominant in 
Okinawa (see Kōsei Rōdō Shō 2004).  Nonetheless, women associated with GIs in 
Okinawa tend to be labeled simply as amejo whether they are married or not. 
As in postwar Japan, contemporary Okinawan and Japanese men seem more 
hostile to women associated with GIs than do their female counterparts.  Prior to their 
                                                
91 The majority of intermarried Japanese men had wives from other Asian countries such as China, 
Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand but very few Japanese men married Caucasian women (see 
marriage statistics by nationalities: http://wwwdbtk.mhlw.go.jp/IPPAN/ippan/scm_k_Ichiran). The 
pattern of Japanese men marrying Asian women parallels with white men bringing Asian wives homes 
through a mail order bride agency or internet dating sites.    
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marriages, many military wives, and particularly Okinawan women I interviewed, 
mentioned they experienced awkward or uncomfortable situations when male friends 
or colleagues discovered they were dating or had had GI boyfriends.  Okinawan men 
tend to immediately perceive women associated with GIs as amejo, assuming that the 
women had sexual relationships with American men.  These women are no longer 
considered acceptable as intimate partners for Okinawan men because, as some 
interviewees told me, such men would not tolerate the women who were “consumed” 
by Americans.    
To American GIs seeking casual relationships with local Asian women, 
whether these women previously had sexual relationships with Japanese men or GIs 
was not the issue.  Instead, when I interviewed several GIs in the entertainment 
district, they talked about women they encountered in the base town in terms of the 
two groups, Okinawan (and Japanese) women and Filipinas.  These GIs usually view 
young Okinawan women  “available” for casual relationships, while such men are 
likely to perceive Filipinas as “professionals” to be purchased.  Despite such 
distinctions, these women around military bases are objectified and sexualized under 
the Orientalist gaze.  As I did for war brides, I use a feminist strategy of reversing the 
gaze to make a platform for women to speak out their experiences with and 
perceptions of American men.  Reversing the gaze emphasizes women-centered 
perspectives and their subjective viewpoints rooted in non-Western cultural and social 
worlds within the specific historical and social contexts.  Therefore, understanding a 
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significance of historical, cultural, and social landscapes of Okinawa helps locate and 
understand the trajectory of contemporary GI-Okinawan intimacies.   
 
How Okinawa Become U.S. Military Colony  
Okinawa, once was an independent kingdom known as the Ryukyu kingdom, 
has a culture and history distinct from that of mainland Japan.  However, the modern 
state of imperial Japan (Meiji government) invaded the Ryukyu Kingdom and 
annexed it to Japan as Japan’s last prefecture, or Okinawa in the late 1800s (Kerr 
2000; Taira 1997).  Although Okinawan people were forcefully converted to faithful 
“Japanese citizens” and fought against the U.S. for the Japanese Emperor, they 
developed different relationships and experiences with the U.S. from the rest of 
country in postwar Japan and thereafter.   
When U.S. occupation began in Japan, the U.S. differentiated treatment of its 
former enemy by putting Okinawa under separate U.S. military occupation from 
mainland Japan.  When Japan was granted official independence from the U.S. 
military rule in 1952, Okinawa was left out of liberation from U.S. occupation.92  I  
return for Japan’s independence, the U.S. gained the rights to retain Okinawa, which 
made Okinawa entered the second phase of American occupation.  Unlike 
conventional colonial rule, the U.S gained nothing economically from ruling 
                                                
92 Japan regained its sovereignty from the U.S. occupation one year after it signed the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty in 1951.  The Japanese government simul aneously signed the Japan-U.S. security treaty, 
which allowed continuing presence of U.S. military forces in Japan.  In return, the Japanese 
government expected the U.S. to protect Japan from the threat of Communism.  By having the U.S. 
handle military affair, Japan intended to focus on economic recovery and further economic 
development.    
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Okinawa.  Instead, a vast amount of land was confiscated from local Okinawans to 
construct and strengthen U.S. military bases during the Korean War and the Vietnam 
War (Johnson 2004; Sarantakes 2001).  
 It was essential for the U.S. to secure Okinawa because of Okinawa’s 
strategic importance in the Pacific at the height of the Cold War.  As an American 
military colony, Okinawa was administered directly by the Pentagon without being 
granted a legal status from the U. S.  Nor, did Okinawa retain their Japanese 
citizenship.  They became stateless people who belonged neither to the U. S. nor to 
Japan until 1972 when Okinawa was reverted to Japanese authority.  Even after 
Okinawa came under Japanese authority, the U.S. military bases in Okinawa 
remained undisturbed under the Japan-American Security Treaty.  
Ironically, the reversion of Okinawa to Japan was realized based on the 
agreement that Japan guaranteed the U.S. to retain its right to maintain its military
bases and use Okinawa as the strategic function (Taira 1997:161).  Therefore, as 
Johnson (2004) points out, “reversion was a convenient way to perpetuate the status 
quo while transferring responsibility for the Okinawa people to Japan” (p. 200).  
Consequently, the Japanese central government has become an official “host” of the 
U.S. forces on behalf of Okinawa based on the Japan –U.S. security treaty.  This 
arrangement leaves Okinawans not only a de facto colony of the U.S. military but 
also into out of decisions that affect them directly (Jonsoh 2000; Nagamoto 2000).  
Today, Okinawan people continue to shoulder the burden of the U.S. military 
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including 37 installations spread thought the islands under the Japan-U.S. security 
treaty. 
  In recent year, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Japanese defense 
minister Yoshinori Ohno, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and Japanese 
foreign minister Nobutaka Machimura met at the so-called “2 plus 2” ministerial-
level security meeting in Washington, D.C., and accepted the reduction of U.S. 
Marine personnel (Allen and Sumida 2005).  In the proposed plan, the 7,000 Marines 
in Okinawa will be moved to Guam over the next six years.  Transfer of Okinawa-
based Marine is part of the U.S. military realignment plan that intended to reduce the 
burden of U.S. military forces on Okinawa.  However, the “deal” of reduction of 
Marine forces in Okinawa is not separable from the relocation site of the U.S. 
Marines’ Air Station, Futenma, which has been a controversial issue.  Local residents, 
environmentalists, and anti-U.S. military base activists have protested against the 
relocation site which was agreed by the U.S. and the Japanese government (see Inoue 
2007; Spencer 2004).  Okinawa’s strong rejection to the relocation site demonstrates 
their continuing resistances against their “2nd class citizen status” and unequal 
positions where Okinawans have been excluded from the decision making process 
that affect them directly. 
 
The Impact of the U.S. Military on Okinawa and its People 
Because Okinawa has been a strategic position for the U.S. military, as I 
mentioned earlier, one element that distinguishes Okinawa’s experience from that of 
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mainland Japan is the overwhelming presence of U.S. military bases and its long-term 
impact on Okinawan people and their lands.  Unlike the majority of people living in 
mainland Japan, virtually every person in Okinawa has been affected, directly or 
indirectly, by the U.S. military bases.  For example, military bases along with large 
numbers of U.S. military personnel and their families have created demands for a 
variety of local labor (e.g., manual labor, service jobs) and businesses (e.g., taxi 
drivers, housing agencies).  While these military-related jobs and businesses have 
boosted the local economy and are integral to Okinawa’s economic life during the 
Occupation era (1945-1972), they also created economic dependence on the U.S. 
military.  After the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, the overall base-related economy 
declined.  However, Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (NDFAB 1999) 
reported that the U.S. military is still the largest single employer in Okinawa today.93   
Aside from economic factors, the long-term impact of the U.S. military 
presence on Okinawan people and the environment is enormous.  Okinawa has faced 
numerous military-related problems ranging from crime (e.g., rape, murder, theft, and 
vandalism), noise pollution, aircraft accidents, environmental damage (e.g., oil spills, 
red soil runoff, and forest fires), to exploitation of women in the sex industry (Hook 
and Siddle 2003; Pekin NGO Forum 1995; Takazato 2003; Okinawa Women Act 
Against Military Violence 1998).  According to the Okinawa police department, the 
total number of American GIs, civilian employees and dependents who have been 
                                                
93 ‘According to NDFAB (1999), the U.S. military is one of the top four major employers that provide 
a large number of jobs for people living in Okinawa: The U.S. bases (24 facilities) in Okinawa hire 
8,500 Japanese employees followed by ten city halls(8,000), three local banks (4,000), and Okinawa 
Electric company (1,500).   
 
 
                                                                                                                                133
arrested in criminal cases between 1972 and 2001 is nearly 5,000 (Okinawa 
Prefectural Government 2000).  These problems have become the sources of 
longstanding tensions between local Okinawans and the U.S. military.  However, 
these issues are rarely covered by the mainstream media on mainland Japan, nor are 
they treated as a national issue except for few incidents including the 1995 rape case 
of an Okinawan school girl. 
The notorious 1995 rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawan school girl 
committed by three U.S. military personnel intensified the tensions between 
Okinawans and U.S. military.  Public outrage sparked a mass political rally protesting 
against the U.S. military bases in Okinawa.  The incident is still a source of anguish 
and painful memory for many Japanese citizens, particularly for Okinawans (Ang t 
2003; Johnson 1999, 2000; Takushi 2000; Tanji 2003).  In addition to the 1995 rape 
case, there have been more than a dozen reported sexual assaults involving nearly two 
dozen American personnel over the past 10 years (Okinawa Prefectural Government 
2000).  As demonstrated by Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence 
(OWAAMV), Okinawan women play vital roles in activism and campaigns against 
the perpetuation of U.S. military bases in Okinawa and U.S. global militarization 
(Fukuma and Matsuoka 2002; OWAAMV 1998; Takazato 2003).  Despite the long-
lasting struggles, Okinawa continues to shoulder a disproportionate burden of U.S. 
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Military Bases in Okinawa 
As a mainland Japanese who grew up in a region where there are no military 
bases within a close proximity, it was not until I settled into my fieldwork site that I 
began to grasp the overpowering presence of the U.S. military.  Various military 
instillations surrounded by wire-net fences with signs reading “Unauthorized entry 
prohibited” symbolize the legal existence of U.S. Armed Force in Okinawa 
legitimatized by the Japanese government (see Figure 2.2 and 2.3).  These fences ar  
visible markers that draw legal boundaries between the U.S. and Japan (Okinawa).  
Checking posts located at the entrance/exist point of military bases function as 
“Immigration” where unauthorized visitors must be escorted by authorized military 
members to cross the border to the U.S. side.  
  
Figure 2.2 “Unauthorized Entry                Figure 2.3 Wire-net fences around  




Kadena Air Base, the largest airbase in the Pacific, is one of the major U.S. 
bases among other and located in the central part of Okinawa where military bases are 
concentrated (see Figure 2.4).  This vast scale multifunctional base accommodates 
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more than 20,000 people including U.S. military personnel, Department of Defense 
(DoD) civilian employees, their dependents, and Japanese employees.94  As were 
other overseas bases in U.S. foreign territories, Kadena Air Base in Okinawa was 
constructed according to American standards to offers “Little America” for members 
of the U.S. military who are away from their home.   Baker (2004) explains that 
“Little America”   
provides a safe and sanitized environment for American personnel and their 
families, where they could move from Panama to Okinawa to Great Britain to 
Libya and find the same recreation options, the same products in the stores, 
the same information on television and radio and in newspapers that they had 
become accustomed to in their previous station (P. 58).    
 
Figure 2.4 Kadena Air Base, 2004 
 
Source: Courtesy of Okinawa Prefectural Government, Executive Office of the Governor, Military 
Base Affairs Office. 
 
                                                
94 See Kadena Air Force, http://www.kadena.af.mil/. 
 
                                                                                                                                136
As other “Little Americas” elsewhere do, military bases in Okinawa provide a variety 
of services and facilities ranging from U.S. fast food and family restaurants, shopping 
centers, PX/BX, bars and clubs, banks, post offices, movie theaters, schools, libraries,  
hospitals, private beaches, marinas, and recreational facilities such as golf courses, 
tennis courts, to swimming pools.95  High rise apartments and U.S.-style military 
housing with well maintained “green lawns” provide spacious American style floor 
plans equipped with central air conditioning.96  U.S. cultural and social icons familiar 
to U.S. soldiers and their families make them feel at home and offer a particular 
quality of life in a foreign country.  
Some military bases occupy populated areas and stretch out like a gigantic 
doughnut: a center hole symbolizes the U.S. military base and the ring represents 
fences.  There are also small and middle-sized “American doughnuts” that scatter
over the island, and some of them lay across two or three towns.  Because local 
Okinawans are prohibited from crossing the center hole, they are forced to take a long 
way around the ring in order to move from one side to the opposite side.  To local 
Okinawans, especially those commuters who are affected by this inconvenient 
arrangement on a daily basis, U.S. military bases are not merely physical obstacles 
but also a daily reminder of U.S. domination and power over Okinawan people and 
their lands.   
                                                
95 PX stands for Post Exchange, where military personnel and eligible family members purchase a 
variety of merchandise at reasonable prices.  The term, BX or Base Exchange, is also used to refer to 
an exchange facility in Air bases. For military pay and benefits, see Rush (2003). 
96 To Japanese, a spacious front yard covered with green lawns symbolizes American homes as they 
see in American movies and TV dramas.  In Japan, green lawns are rarely used to cover the front yard 
of individual homes.  Central air conditioning is not common especially in Japanese style houses 
primarily due to high cost of electricity in Japan.    
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To people like Okinawans, who have been forced to “co-exist” with multiple 
U.S. military bases in their lands for more than half a century, military bases re an 
unavoidable reality.   However, what U.S. military bases mean to them differs 
depending on their relationships with U.S. military in Okinawa.  Indeed, many 
Okinawan people have some connections to U.S. bases through different channels 
including base employment.  Okinawa Taimusu (2003), one of the major Okinawan 
newspapers, reported that there were more than 20,000 applicants for 550 full-time 
base jobs in 2002.  This is another ironic fact but military bases employment attract 
Okinawans because they offer wages, benefits, and working conditions better than in
most local companies do in Okinawa.97  
Part-time and temporary jobs on base such as waitresses at restaurants, sales 
clerks at on-base stores, and cashiers at food courts are also available to local people. 
These jobs are popular, particularly among young Okinawan women.  Many of them 
consider this job opportunity as a way to practice their English, to experience an 
“American atmosphere,” and most importantly, to gain access to “Little America.”  
Some people also expressed their optimistic hopes to move up to fulltime positions 
once they are hired as part-time employees.  Regardless of these base employ s’ 
work status, full-time or part-time, their activities on base are restricted to minimal 
use of certain services and facilities such as a food court and movie theater. 
                                                
97 There are more than 8,000 local people working on U.S. military bases as fulltime employees in 
Okinawa alone.  These Japanese base employees are hired and paid by Japanese government, Defense 
Facilities Administration Agency.  They receive wages and work conditions similar to those of civil 
servants in Japan while they follow American rules such as holidays (see Okinawa Taimusu 2003). 
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Unlike Okinawan base-employees, Okinawans who have personal connections 
to military members (e.g., family members or close friends of military wives; 
girlfriends of GIs or U.S. civilian employees) cannot go into military bases without 
being accompanied by their “connections.”  However, they may enjoy some 
privileges that are not available for the majority of Okinawan base-employees.  For 
example, it is prohibited for base workers to shop or even to enter such places as 
commissaries and BX/PX; however, GIs’ girlfriends may be able to buy products 
from these prohibited stores through their GI boyfriends.  Similarly, family members 
of military wives could enjoy lunch at a NCOs’ (Non Commissioned Officers) club or 
an Officers’ club, depending on their GI husbands’ military ranks.  It is important to 
note that only U.S. military personnel and DoD civilian employees whose legal status
in Japan is governed by the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) could 
fully enjoy military benefits and extend them to their spouses. 
 
Military Wives and SOFA in Okinawa 
 The term SOFA, which is less likely known to most of the mainland 
Japanese, was mentioned by almost every military wife with whom I interviewed in 
Okinawa. The SOFA is a key element to understanding military wives’ dual identities 
and positions in Okinawa.  The SOFA is a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and a 
host country regarding use of U.S. military bases and the status of United States 
Armed Forces in the host country (Kirk, Cornwell, and Okazawa-Ray 2000; Ryūkyū 
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Shinpōsha and Chii Kyōtei Shuzaihan 2004).98  Japan and the U.S. signed the SOFA 
in 1960 but Japanese civil groups and activists have since criticized it as an unequal 
treaty in favor for the legal protection for U.S. bases and military personnel stationed 
in Japan while it does not adequately address protection of local communities from 
military related accidents or crimes committed by U.S. troops (Jonson 2004; Kirk et 
al. 2000).  Johnson (2004:1-2) argues that the SOFA could be used by American 
authorities in civil and criminal jurisdiction to “shield military felons from the 
application of Japanese law” and let them “fly out of the country before local 
authorities can bring him to trial.”  Whether the SOFA is viewed as an unequal or 
unjust treaty by Okinawan people, certainly U.S. SOFA members stationed in Japan 
enjoy various benefits such a treaty offers.99  
Because the SOFA applies only to U.S. citizens, it does not cover Okinawan 
spouses of U.S. military personnel.100  However, through their marriage to U.S. GIs 
or DoD civilian employees, Okinawan women are integrated into the military 
institution and entitled to various benefits as “dependents” of their husbands.  For 
example, military wives are granted the I.D. card and a special car license plate, 
                                                
98 The content of the SOFA varies depending on the host c untry laws, power relations between the 
two governments, and their willingness to negotiate terms (Kirk, Cornwell, and Okazawa-Ray 2000).  
For the complete documents of the SOFA, see the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/sfa/pdfs/fulltext.pdf.   
99 Under the SOFA, Japanese government has been offering inancial support for the maintenance of 
the U.S. military bases in Japan.  This financial support, the so-called “omoiyari yosan” (sympathy 
budget) is used to pay such expenditures as construction of military housing and entertainment 
facilities, wages of Japanese employees working at the U.S. bases, and the military’s utility bills. 
Consequently, Japanese tax payers shoulder the financial burden of U.S. military.  See Ryūkyū 
Shinpōsha and Chii Kyōtei Shuzaihan (2004).  
100 Even though a Japanese spouse is not granted the SOFA status, their bi-racial children, who 
normally possess both U.S. citizenship and Japanese nationality, are classified as SOFA members as 
long as they possess U.S. citizenship (see Sullivan 2001). 
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known as “Y-number” by the military authority, which enable them to cross the 
boundary between Japan (Okinawan civilian areas) and the U.S. freely.  The free pass 
to “little America” is one of the various benefits that are granted to authorized 
members of the U.S. military community under the SOFA.  
The I.D. card granted to Okinawan military wives also enables them to escort
non-SOFA visitors such as their family and friends to take a tour of some facilities on 
the military bases.  For the majority of Okinawans, the life inside the military fences 
is not accessible except for special occasions such as a military open house and 
holiday events (e.g., Halloween).101  Having an opportunity to visit military bases 
becomes something special for local Okinawans because it offers a unique “American 
experience” without leaving Okinawa and traveling to the U.S.  Granted a free acc ss 
to the military bases and facilities through their marriage to U.S. servicemen, military 
wives are often perceived as “privileged,” and as Enloe (2000:156) points out, they 
are “defined by society not only by [their] relationship to man but by [their] 
membership to a powerful state institution.”   
It is ironic, but on the one hand, many Okinawans are explicitly against the 
persistence of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa and actively participate in nti-base 
movements from time to time.  On the other hand, U.S. bases are popular destinations 
for local Okinawan who want to experience a “real” American atmosphere.  
Okinawan people, especially older generations, have longer and more intensive 
associations with Americans and American culture than the mainland Japanese have.  
                                                
101 American Fest at Kadena Air base is the biggest U.S. military open house in Japan, which attracts 
not only Okinawans but also tourists from mainland Japan.     
 
                                                                                                                                141
Certain American material cultures, diet, and lifestyles are deeply embedded in 
Okinawan lives as a result of the long-term impact of the U.S. military occupation 
(see Kinjyo 1995; Miyagi 1995).  For instance, certain American products are still 
valued, favored, and consumed by many Okinawans even though they are generally 
more expensive than domestic products.  I saw a variety of U.S. brand name imports
(e.g., canned food, instant coffee, toothpaste, detergent, etc.) sold at Okinawan local 
supermarkets as well as at street stands.  It is common knowledge among Okinawans 
that the same imported items are sold at base stores cheaper than local stores because 
of tax exemption eligible for U.S. SOFA members and their families.   
During interviews with military wives, many of them, particularly Okinawans, 
said that they often felt pressured to escort their Okinawan friends and relatives eager 
for the unique American experiences.  Military wives also reluctantly purchased 
American products such as imported beer, brand name cosmetics, and even food 
items (e.g., meat, rice) on base stores for their friends when they found it difficult to 
refuse.  Such activities are considered illegal as the military authority restricted 
purchases at base stores to personal use and consumption by eligible members.  
However, many Okinawan military wives told me they routinely practice “illga  
purchases” on behalf of their friends, family, relatives, and neighbors.   
Black marketing has also been a persistent problem among U.S. GIs who 
resell various items purchased at on-base stores to local venders.  The military radio 
and TV channels routinely broadcast a warning to such illegal activities.  D pite 
military authority’s consistent efforts to discipline their servicemenbers, military 
 
                                                                                                                                142
bases continue to function as the distribution center where American material culture 
informally flows into local markets and into the hands of some Okinawans.  With 
persistent popularity of certain American material culture, some Okinawans envy 
military wives for their “privileges” to enjoy various military benefits under their GI 
husbands’ SOFA status.  Their privileges can also become a source of tension that 
reinforces the negative views toward military wives in Okinawa.   
While various military benefits are apparently positive assets associated with 
marriages to military personnel in Okinawa, being wives of U.S. servicemen adds 
another dimension to such relationships, which make their experience quite different 
from intermarried civilian couples.  In addition to dealing with the language and 
cultural differences with their spouses, Okinawan military wives also face completely 
new lifestyles in a hierarchical masculine world organized around training, 
deployment, cultures and languages shaped by the military institution.  Because the 
military structure is complicated, understanding the military rules and system is 
challenging for any outsiders but especially for foreign wives. 
 
R & R (Rest and Recreation) Districts  
 Many women I interviewed mentioned there are particular nightspots such as 
bars, clubs, and live music houses carting to GIs in the base town and its vicinity.  
These nightspots are popular “intimate sites” where Japanese women and GIs meet, 
interact, and possibly develop intimate relationships.  Some of these intimate sites 
located in the base town overlap with former entertainment districts known as “rest-
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and recreation” (R & R), which crystallize a sexualized landscape of U.S. occupation 
in Okinawa where women were particularly affected by militarized masculinities.  
During the Vietnam War, for example, Okinawa’s R & R districts offered various sex 
businesses for countless U.S. soldiers returning from the battlefields and those going 
back to Vietnam.  These R & R business such as bars, strip clubs, and brothels 
flourished and experienced economic booms as U.S. soldiers spent U.S. dollars “like 
water” into the R & R districts (Okinawa Kokusai Daigaku, Ishihara Zemi 1994; 
Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 1992; Okinawashi Heiwa Bunka Shinkōka 2000).102 
The short-term R & R economic prosperity generated by the Vietnam War 
depended heavily on women’s various kinds of labors, but particularly, sexual and 
emotional works for U.S. soldiers.103  While these Okinawan women tremendously 
contributed to the local economy, they also faced greater risk of being victimized by 
militarized masculinity that involved violence, sexual assaults, and in the worst case, 
murder by U.S. servicemen who were professionally trained for combat (see Takazato 
2003).  However, the victims of militarized masculinity are not exclusively women 
working at sex businesses.  Indeed, as I show in Chapter 6, several military wives 
                                                
102 There are many local publications that vividly portray the R & R era in Okinawa.  For example, in 
Okinawa Kokusai Daigaku, Ishihara Zemi (1994), a group of college students at Okinawa International 
University explored a history of base town by conducting oral history interviews with Okinawan 
business owners engaged in R & R business during the Vietnam War.  Their interviewees’ narratives 
provide valuable information about the rise and fall of entertainment districts and R & R business in 
Okinawa. 
103 According to Takazato (2001), Okinawa had more than 1,200 A-sign bars serving as R & R 
locations for U.S. soldiers in the late 1960s.  Theofficial report compiled by the police department 
estimated there were 7,362 prostitutes in 1969, but Takazato argues that the official account 
underestimated the real number, which was estimated more than twice as much as the police estimate. 
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shared their personal stories of a date rape and domestic violence that involves both 
verbal and physical abuses by their own GI husbands or GI boyfriends.  
 
Surviving Entertainment Districts: Gate-2 district  
Today, Okinawa’s R & R districts and countless small R & R businesses that 
flourished during the Vietnam War era declined, transformed, abandoned or vanished 
as a result of the reduction of U.S. forces associated with U.S. withdrawal from 
Vietnam.104  When I visited some surviving former R & R districts, the chaotic 
enthusiasm and crowds of GIs I saw in the old photographs taken in the 1960s and 
early 1970s have disappeared.  The run-down old bars and stage-show clubs with 
faded signs are common scenes.  Although the atmosphere of the surviving 
entertainment districts today is not the same as in the past, they continue to provide a 
variety of paid sexual services to GIs, while at the same time, serving as popular 
intimate sites where GI-Japanese intimacy emerges, develops, and/or vanishes.105  
A base town Koza, located just outside the gigantic Kadena Air base in central
part of Okinawa, is my primary fieldwork site that houses some surviving 
entertainment districts including a bar strip known as “Gate-2 Street” to Okinawans 
                                                
104 Development of new local businesses such as multi-p rpose shopping centers outside the base town 
increased choices in off-duty activities for American GIs other than exploring nightlife in the 
entertainment districts.  These new businesses attract a wide range of customers, from local 
Okinawans, tourists from mainland Japan, both male and female military personnel, married couples, 
to military families. 
105 Koza is located in the old part of Okinawa city in the central Okinawa. 36% of the total land area of 
Okinawa city is occupied by U.S. military facilities which is ranked in the seventh highest in terms of 
the proportion of land sacrificed to the U.S. military (Okinawa Shiyakusho 2003a). 
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and GIs stationed in Okinawa.106  The Gate-2 Street bar strip and surrounding areas 
offer a variety of establishments such as American-style bars, live music houses, hip-
hop clubs, restaurants, souvenir shops, clothing shops, pawn shops, tattoo parlors, 
hotels, along with Filipina bars and clubs, massage parlors, and red-light alleys 
behind the main street.  Even though the Gate-2 Street and nearby areas has little
vestige of the past prosperity in the 1960s and early 1970s, it remains as one of the 
most popular and notorious entertainment districts among U.S. GIs but especially 
young servicemen.      
The majority of GIs who come to the Gate-2 area on weekends, especially 
payday weekends, are young enlisted servicemen.  Many of them live on base and 
come out for shopping, dining, bar hopping, dancing at clubs, enjoying live music, or 
searching forlocal women.  Even though the Gate-2 Street bar strip functions as a 
shopping district during the day, it does not come to full life until the nightlife begins.  
When the Gate-2 and nearby area are lit up with various English neon signs such as 
“First Chance,” “Key Stones,” “JET,” “Hawaiian Night,” “Palm 29,” “Good Times,” 
“Honey Bee,” “The Shooter’s,” “Dragon,” “Seventh Heaven,” “Fujiyama,” and “Gate 
2 Garage,” the whole area create a peculiar atmosphere and lure young servicem n 
into a world of temptation and adventure.107  Though the majority of Americans 
coming out to the Gate-2 area are male servicemen, I saw quite a few female 
servicemenbers strolling along the bar strip with their fellow GIs.    
                                                
106 The street name, “Gate-2,” is named after one of Kadena Air Base’s checking points commonly 
known as “Gate 2,” because the street stretches from just outside the checkpoint. 
107 While most of the bars, clubs, and live houses, including Filipina nightclubs, are owned by 
Okinawans, some bars are run by mainland Japanese ad retired American servicemen.   
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Bars and nightclubs in the Gate-2 district are unique in their own ways.  Some 
of these establishments are owned by U.S. veterans and provide authentic American 
styles, which create a “little U.S. world” within.  For example, in these Am rican 
style bars, almost everything one could find in these bars, from the drinks, menus, 
décor, to music, and in some establishments, pool tables and dart boards, create 
American atmospheres and tastes.  Bartenders, who are mostly Okinawan wome , 
take orders in English and chat with U.S. customers.  Conversations in English are 
taking place at almost every table.  The U.S. dollar, common currency on the Gate-2
bar strip, makes money transactions easy for U.S. customers, thus encourages them to 
spend more money.  
 
Women in Base Towns: Under American GIs’ Gaze  
American GIs’ opinions about the Gate-2 Street area and women coming to 
the base town vary, but to most GIs, the Gate-2 Street is a “party town” that offers 
various nightspots catering specifically to U.S. servicemen.  A representativ  example 
comes from an anonymous GI who posted nightlife information on an Internet 
message board site to share with his fellow GIs.  He wrote:   
Outside Gate 2 of Kadena Air Base in Okinawa lays a string of streets lined 
with bars and strip joints.  It offers anywhere from a sit down and drink to a sit 
down “buy me drinkie [sic] while my friend strips onstage for you” bar.  It is 
sin city out there my friends.  SIN city.  But if your [sic] single, not an avid 
church goer, then I suggest you go and indulge yourself on a payday or 
weekend.  You can dress like a homeless bumb [sic] with just a towel around 
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your waist to a high class business man [sic] the “mama-sans” out there are 
there just for you [sic] money.108   
 
The anonymous GI also mentioned the specific name of a “bar/brothel” in the Gate-2 
Street area where GIs can “get attention from hot Filippina [sic] women and maybe 
some sex too” if they want.  One of my GI informants, Kyle who has been living in 
Okinawa nearly for three years, said there are two dozen or more Filipina 
“bars/brothel” around the Gate-2 Street.  These establishments are commonly known 
as “Juicy Bars” or “Buy Me Drinks Bars” that often function as “brothels” in a 
concealed area behind the bar counter.109 
Because Filipinas are overrepresented in the sex business in base towns today, 
most GIs with whom I talked mentioned that they look at Filipinas in Okinawa 
instantly as “bar girls” and identify their relationships with these women based on 
money.110  They believe that Filipinas view U.S. GIs as economic resources and that 
many of Filipinas have economic motivations to marry Americans.  GIs make a clear 
distinction between Filipinas and Okinawan or Japanese women they see in base 
towns.  Kyle said,  
                                                
108 “Anywhere outside Gate 2 Street Kadena, AB: Drunken U.S. Military personnel hangouts” and 
“Yakiniku: Drink, Sing, and then have sex!” posted on December 31 2003 by Drunken local69. 
http://www.virtualtourist.com/travel/Asia/Japan/Okinawa/Okinawa-971699/Nightlife-Okinawa-BR-
1.html#tips. 
109 Kyle explained how Filipina juicy bars work.  At these Filipina bars, customers are expected to buy 
“drinks” not only for themselves but also for Filipna hostesses who sit with them.  As a rule, the 
customers are expected to buy alcoholic drinks that the hostesses ask for.  Alcoholic drinks are 
overpriced ($10-20 per glass) compared to non-alcoholic beverages.  The “alcoholic” drinks the 
hostesses receive are actually non-alcoholic such as an apple juice in a cocktail glass, so the hostesses 
are able to keep asking for another drinks and the customers accumulate a big bill quickly.   
110 The majority of women working for sex businesses, especially catering to U.S. servicemen are the 
Filipina immigrants.  Japan’s economic growth associated with improved living standards for 
Okinawans demand cheap sex workers from outside the country who are willing to take Okinawan 
women’s place.    
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when GIs bring local women to their barracks for overnight relationships, 
Filipinas are mostly ‘juicy girls’ who are picked up at a juicy bar as a 
‘takeout.’  Japanese women are not sex workers.   They are mostly bar and 
club hoppers and come to the Gate-2 Street to look for the right GIs.  So they 
could be easily picked up at any bars and nightclubs frequented by GIs.  
 
Both Filipina and Japanese women are sexualized and objectified, but the former are 
more likely to be seen as “commodities” to be purchased, while the latter are seen as 
promiscuous women who are sexually available without monetary compensation. 
James, who was recently discharged from the military, told me that many GIs 
in Okinawa view Japanese and Okinawan women in the base town as objects or 
potential sex partners.  He said, “Younger American guys have an attitude, like ‘Let’s 
get a woman tonight’ and go to a place like the Gate-2 Street to look for a woman.”   
According to James, Japanese women coming to base towns are not perceived as 
professional sex workers, but they look too “Westernized” in their provocative 
dresses and behaviors, which include speaking “broken” English and using slang 
learned from GIs.  In James’ view, “Young Japanese girls hanging out in the Gate-2 
Street dress and behave based on what they believe American men like to see, so they 
can get attention from American guys.”   
In some Orientalist eyes, these Japanese women, who come to the base town 
in provocative clothes make themselves look “slutty” and sexually available for U.S. 
men to pick up.  Japanese women in base towns not only are perceived to be picked 
up easily, but also to be discarded easily when they are no longer wanted.  Bruce, 
another young enlisted GI said: “Some GIs don’t take local women seriously at all. 
They just see a Japanese woman as a temporary girlfriend in Okinawa and throw her 
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away as if she did not exist when they go back to the U.S.”  Dehumanizing Asian 
women as disposable objects has been routinely repeated.  Hundreds of thousands of 
deserted Asian “girlfriends” became merely part of the overseas experi nc  for U.S. 
GIs since the postwar era.  
Aside from perceptions of Asian women as temporary sexual objects, many 
GIs I interviewed also looked at Asian women from the other end of the spectrum of 
Asian stereotypes, constructing Asian as demure and submissive in contrast to 
American women.  Some GIs mentioned faithfulness and a domesticated nature as 
Asian women’s qualities that American women lack.  Scott, who plans to marry his 
Okinawan girlfriend in the near future, thinks 
Japanese (Okinawan) women are nicer than American women because they 
know how to take care of their boyfriends and husbands.  They care about 
men more (than American women do), you know?  Like, they want to cook 
for men.  They are faithful and don’t cheat on their husbands during a 
deployment, too. 
 
Similarly, Dave, who used to have an Okinawan girlfriend, told me that Japanese 
women are not only faithful to the relationship but also “prepared to stay at home and 
take care of the home and children” when they marry.   
GIs tend to idealize Asian women as “good wives and good mothers” who are 
giving, caring, submissive, soft, quiet, respectful, polite, shy, and agreeable, 
especially in comparison to American women.  Tony, who has a Filipina wife, seems 
to have antipathy toward American women and views them as up tight, self-oriented, 
materialistic, and status conscious, in contrast to Asian women who have strong 
family bonds and values and respect for their traditions and cultures.  Andy, who 
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recently divorced his Okinawan wife, believes that Asian women in general possess 
“natural beauty” and they are caring and emotionally attached.  He also thinks 
Japanese women are passive in a good way: they are easier to communicate with 
because they are less aggressive and more easygoing than American women. 
Some GIs relate Japanese women’s images to Japanese pop culture, the global 
phenomenon of Anime.  Peter, an unmarried enlisted GI, points out the influence of 
popular Japanese female Anime figures on young GIs.  Some Japanese female Anime 
figures, such as schoolgirls, are portrayed as innocent and childlike.  GI Anime fans 
may have fantasies about these figures and look at Japanese girls through imaginary 
lenses.  Bruce calls himself an A ime fan and describes images of young Japanese 
women as “pink and bubbly.”  He said,  
it seems to me Japanese girls show off their femininity.  I mean they wear 
short skirts, some pink color and cute things on them…  They have tons of 
cute straps on their cellular phone too, you know?   They wear some cute little 
things on their hair too…  
 
His images of “pink and bubbly” Japanese women overlap with hyperfeminine A me
figures fantasized in the Anime world.  The “pink and bubbly” Japanese woman can 
also be a contemporary version of the overly feminized tiny “China dolls.”  Bruce 
views feminine women as more attractive, and such a view is reinforced by his 
contrasting image of American women as strong and aggressive. 
Some GIs shared their views of peers who have Japanese girlfriends or wives.  
Roger, who recently divorced from his Okinawan wife, told me that getting women in 
the U.S. is difficult and competitive, but easier overseas.  For American men, it is 
understood as common knowledge that they can find women easily in Asian countries 
 
                                                                                                                                151
and take them back home if they want.  Roger said, “Lower rank GIs who come to 
Okinawa get local women with full nice things.  But they ended up mistreating their 
women.  These guys don't provide what they (women) want.  This is a reality and 
makes American men look bad.”  Jessie, who has a Filipina wife, cynically said 
“American men who are in relationships with Asian women think they can’t be 
hooked up [with women] other than those [Asian] women.”  From some GIs’ point of 
views, GI-Japanese intimacy is a form of compensation or “welfare,” as a last resort 
for American men who failed to find partners in the U.S.    
 
Economy of U.S. GIs in Okinawa 
Whether GIs come to the base town to objectify Japanese women as short-
term sexual partners or not, Okinawans whose livelihood depends on GI patrons 
welcome them.  Various factors such as military curfews imposed on GIs, 
deployment of a large number of GIs outside Okinawa, and GIs’ financial situations 
affect their businesses.  I became acquainted with Jun-mama, an Okinawan wom , 
who works for a “buy me drinks bar” featuring Filipina “dance shows” for several 
years.111  The owners of Filipina “buy me drinks bars” often hire elderly local 
women, like Jun-mama, to stand in front of their establishments to solicit GIs who 
pass by.  
                                                
111 Few months after I started exchanging greetings with her, we became more like friends than 
strangers.  She let me in the stage-show club where she works a few times.  There was a Filipina 
“dancer” in a bikini swinging her body with music at the center of the small stage.  There was only one 
middle-aged American customer at the table with several Filipina hostesses.  As Kyle, my GI 
informant told me, these hostesses were constantly sking for drinks until the customer was ready to 
leave.   
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Jun-mama spoke to GIs passers-by in English, “Hello, do you have free 
time?” or “Do you want to see the show?” while pointing to pictures of Filipina 
dancers in the display showcase at the entrance.  Most GIs either ignore Jun-mama or 
make jokes in response to her as they kept walking.  Jun-mama complained: 
“Americans used to have a lot of money and spent a lot too.  But today’s young 
soldiers don’t have much money…and they are tight-fisted.”  I heard similar 
comments on financial situations of young GIs from other people who have business 
in the base town.  
An owner of a small bar whom I interviewed grumbled about young GI 
customers who occupy the counter stools for hours with few orders of drinks.  She 
said, “Young poor GIs try to stay at the counter stools with just one drink they’ve 
ordered.  These guys take as much time as possible to finish the drink, you see?  It’s 
their ‘tactics,’ you know?”112  When I visit her bar, I often see her encouraging 
“slow” GI customers to buy more drinks for themselves or to buy one for her.  Her 
voice is soft and polite, but her message to GIs customers is clear: buy drinks or 
leave.   
Lower rank GIs who could barely make their money last until the next 
paychecks are not uncommon.  Although their personal problems might be attributed 
to their poor financial managements, their financial situations are also connected to 
political and economic circumstances.  For example, Japan’s economic growth, 
                                                
112 Throughout my stay in Okinawa, the exchange rate be ween the U.S. dollar and Japanese yen was 
consistent.  1USD was approximately 100YEN.  A bottle of beer (e.g., Budweiser, Heineken) at bars in 
the Gate-2 area normally costs $5 to $6 while the same beer costs less than $2 on base. 
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especially since the 1980s into early 1990s, strengthened Japan’s position in the 
global market.   The shifts in power relations in a global economy over the past 
decades have changed political and economic power relations between the U.S. and 
Japan (McDougall 2007).  The changes of U.S.-Japan power relations from time to 
time since the end of the World War II consequently affect personal finances of U.S. 
servicemen stationed in Japan.   
In postwar Japan, for example, the U.S. victor fixed the exchange rate 
between the U.S. dollar and Japanese yen in favor of the U.S. currency.113  The U.S. 
dollar with a high value relative to the Japanese currency made it possible even for 
lower ranked U.S. soldiers in Japan to lead a “luxurious” lifestyle, the kind such as 
hiring a housemaid[s], that would not be possible if they were in the U.S.  One war 
bride informants told me that her husband hired a Japanese housemaid largely 
because his fellow GIs had one.  More recently, GIs stationed in Okinawa during the 
Vietnam War era continued to benefit from strong U.S. dollar against Japanese 
currency and they also “had enormous economic advantages over Okinawans, 
because women and other forms of ‘entertainment’ had been ‘cheap’” (Inoue 2007: 
122).  
In contrast, contemporary U.S. GIs, especially junior servicemen, are affected 
not only by the overall increases in prices and services in Japan but also by fluctuated 
                                                
113 In the postwar era, the value of Japanese yen (YEN) per one USD was fixed at 360YEN until the 
U.S. allowed Japanese yen to float in 1972.  See Nomura Shōken (Nomura Securities Company, Ltd.) 
web site: http://www.nomura.co.jp/terms/japan/ka/exchange_r360.html.     
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exchange rates with diminished values of U.S. dollar to Japanese yen.114  For 
example, throughout my stay in Okinawa, the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar 
(USD) and Japanese yen (JPY) was consistent: 1USD was approximately 100YEN.  
A bottle of beer (e.g., Budweiser, Colona) costs less than $2 per bottle on base while 
the same beer normally costs $5 to $6 at bars in the Gate-2 area.  The shifts in 
political and economic power dynamics between the U.S. and Japan over years 
affected GIs’ consumption power and social life in Japan.   
While Japan’s strong economy negatively affected U.S. GIs stationed in 
Japan, it helped Japanese women improve their economic and social status 
domestically and internationally.  The new economic power relation between the U.S. 
and Japan also reshaped GI-Japanese women relationships.  Women’s economic 
power helped to reduce or even overcome an economic gap that had previously 
existed between Japanese women and U.S. GIs.  Japanese women’s strong financial 
situations challenge the traditional gender roles where men are essentially “givers” 
and women are “receivers.”  Therefore, the current economic order gives some power 
to new generations of Okinawan and Japanese women in their relationships with U.S. 
GIs, which was not available for the war brides in the postwar era.  
Despite the reality that most of the rank-and-file servicemen were forc d to 
live on the tight budget from one payday to the next, these young GIs still make up 
                                                
114 The devaluation of the U. S. dollar was agreed to in he Plaza Accord signed by the five leading 
industrialized nations in 1985.  As a result, the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar to the yen declined 
dramatically.  For instance, 238YEN per one U.S. dollar in 1985 decreased to 168YEN per one U.S. 
dollar in 1986, which consequently discouraged U.S. dollar holders to purchase Japanese products and 
services. Kikumura and Kinjo (1990) detail the impact of the decline of value of the U.S. dollar on the
Okinawan base economy in their Dokoe Iku Kichi Okinawa (1990).  
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the majority of customers who contribute to the survival of night businesses on the 
Gate-2 district and nearby areas.  These nightspots, ranging from small karaoke bars, 
American style bars, Filipina “Buy me Drinks” bars, live music houses, to hip-hop 
clubs, welcome and entertain U.S. servicemen in their own ways.  Women 
predominantly occupy the  workforce in night businesses as in the past: they are 
young female Okinawan bartenders (occasionally female mainlanders or Americans), 
Filipina dancers and hostesses, elderly Okinawan women such as “mama-sans” at old 
karaoke bars and Jun-mama who solicit GI passersby for Filipina bars.  Whether the 
workers are young Okinawans, mainlanders, Filipinas, or mama-sans, all play their 
own roles in encouraging GIs clients to return to the bar districts.  
Although many night businesses in base towns cater primarily to U.S. 
servicemen, they also attract local customers including new generations of young 
women who seek first hand “U.S. experiences.”  Some establishments frequented by 
GI customers such as clubs (e.g., hip-hop clubs), live music houses, and American 
style bars offer gate-ways to the initial contact with American cultures and U.S. 
men.115   These nightspots also often turn into “intimate spaces” for local women and 
GIs to meet potential partners.  In the following chapter, I focus on the relatively 
recent trend of hip-hop music in Japan that has influenced Japanese women’s views 
of American men along the racial lines of white and black.  Second, I discuss how 
women perceive American men based on idealized images of “American men” that 
                                                
115 “Club” generally refers to off-base discos that are distinguished from on-base clubs such as 
Officers’ clubs, NCO’s (Non Commissioned Officers’) clubs, and E (Enlisted men’s) clubs. While 
majority of my informants used the term “club,” women who are in their 40s and older tended to use 
“disco” instead of “club.”  
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transcend racial divisions, while military institutions and militarized masculinity 
complicate Japanese women’s perceptions of American men.  In the last section, I 
show how socioeconomic improvement of Japanese women enables them to gain 
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Chapter 5 
Reversing the Gaze: Redefining Racial, Gender, and Sexual Boundaries 
 
The preceding chapter provided historical, social, and economic contexts of 
U.S. military bases and base towns in Okinawa and their impact on Okinawan people, 
especially on women.  I described the Gate-2 Street and surrounding entertainmen  
areas in detail as important sites for understanding the pattern of GI-Japanese 
intimacy in contemporary Okinawa.  The entertainment districts offer various 
intimate sites such as bars and clubs where U.S. GIs and Japanese women meet, 
interact, and sometimes develop romantic relationships.  These spaces also contribute 
to production, reproduction, and perpetuation of Orientalist images and stereotypes of 
Asian women.  While these women are objectified and sexualized under the 
Orientalist gaze, these contemporary women are more active, assertive, expressive, 
and resourceful in their relationships with GIs.   By shifting the positions of those 
who gaze and those who are objects of the gaze, I expose American men to the gazes 
of Japanese women, which enables new generations of Japanese women to express 
subjective views of American men and to represent themselves in their own voices.   
 
Clubs as Intimate Sites: Hip-hop Fever in Okinawa  
One remarkable feature of contemporary GI-Japanese intimacy is that many 
relationships started in base towns where Japanese women come as consumers to 
enjoy the nightlife.  Unlike previous generations of women working at R & R 
districts, and Filipina migrant workers more recently, contemporary Japanese women 
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are more likely to establish personal relationships with GIs for enjoyment and not for 
money.  Table 2.3 shows that a high proportion of military wives and military 
girlfriends I interviewed met GI boyfriends or future husbands at nightspots such as 
clubs (e.g., hip-hop, disco), bars, and live-music houses that American servicemen 
frequent.   
Table 2.3  Where did you meet your GI husband or boyfriend? 
 Military Wives  
N 




                     
% 
Total    
N 
                     
% 
Base town (clubs, 
bars, etc)  
25a 58 6 67 31 60 
Through friends 9 21 2 22 11 21 
At  work 2 5 0 0 2 4 
Other 7 16 1 11 8 15 
 43 100 9 100 52 100 
a One woman met her GI husband at an on-base bar.  
  
Nearly every military wife I interviewed (one out of three women) told me she 
regularly went to clubs near the Gate-2 Street in the 1990s and identified herself as a 
former “clubber.”  These women often talked about their “club debut,” referring to 
the first time they experienced clubs popular with U.S. GIs.116  The majority of ex-
clubbers, now in their thirties, started going to “American” clubs when they were in 
their late teens and early twenties.  These women often started going to clubs out of 
curiosity, but many ended up becoming regular club-goers.  The trend of hip-hop 
music and culture in Japan added a new dimension to GI-Japanese relationships, 
especially those involving black GIs and Japanese women.   
                                                
116There are also clubs in Okinawa where the majority f male and female patrons are Okinawan and 
Japanese.  Some of my informants told me that they initially went to these “Japanese” clubs but they 
switched to “American” style clubs after a while.  They believed that the type of music played in 
Japanese clubs was not as good or cool as it was in clubs frequented by U.S. GIs.   
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 In Japan, U.S. hip-hop culture emerged in the mid-1980s as “underground” 
music and became part of the mainstream culture for Japanese teens and young adults 
in the 1990s.  According to Broder (2006:40), musical components such as the lyrics 
and cadence of rap are crucial in the U.S., but hip-hop in Japan is “visceral, sensual, 
and based in images: its highest articulation is found in high-priced clubs rather than 
on recorded albums” (Broder 2006:40).  Condray (2004) also contends that the 
striking feature of hip-hop in Japan is the way young Japanese express devotion to 
hip-hop through imitation of black rappers, not just by wearing dreadlocks and hip-
hop fashion, but also by fetishizing black skin.   
Since Japanese hip-hop emphasizes visual interpretation and presentation of 
“black music” with strong connotations of “blackness,” nightclubs and discos become 
sites for performing and consuming blackness (Condray 2004).  Cornyetz (2006) 
points out that for female hip-hop lovers, hip-hop style includes not only music and 
fashion but also “acquisition” of male African American lovers.  However, the high 
visibility of intermarriage between Japanese women and black GIs in today’s 
Okinawa suggests that these women view blackness as more than a “solely erotic 
fetish” (Kelsky 2001), or black men as more than merely “desired” sexual objects for 
consumption (Russell 1998).   
Women I interviewed also look at blackness as the reality that shapes their 
lives and identities as wives of black U.S. servicemen.  Similar to the mainland, hip-
hop clubs in Okinawa attract Japanese clubbers who seek “authentic” black hip-hop 
experiences.  While the “black fetish” is a major part of hip-hop trends in Japan and 
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elsewhere, blackness in the context of Okinawa’s hip-hop clubs around U.S. military 
bases is inseparable from and enhanced by militarized masculinity.  As I discuss later, 
many military wives complimented GIs’ well-built bodies, especially those of 
Marines whose physical training (PT) maintains their masculinity and physical 
strength.  Since young black GIs in Okinawa are mostly Marines, their bodies add 
masculine attractiveness to the hip-hop styles in Okinawa. 
Interviews with women who are associated with black GIs in Okinawa 
revealed that the trend of hip-hop music was an influential factor that in the 
popularity of young black GIs.  Many wives of black GIs mentioned the connections 
between their interests in “black music,” or hip-hop, and their preferences for black 
men.  Mariko, the Okinawan military wife, explained how her fascination with hip-
hop music stimulated racial desire for black men:  
Oh, yes, I loved them [black men]!  They were definitely my type [laughter].  
When I was a high school student, I became interested in black men.  Well, 
black music sparked me.  First, I started liking music by Janet Jackson.  She 
was so cool when I first saw her dancing in the TV commercial for an airline 
company.  I liked rap music by MC Hammer too.  But anyway, ever since I 
saw Janet Jackson on TV, I was always looking for that type of music…  I 
wanted to have a black boyfriend.  I wasn’t interested in white men.  
 
Since Mariko’s musical preferences value blackness, she said her attraction for the 
opposite sex always centered on black men.  She also told me that she frequented a 
hip-hop club near a military base where she eventually met her future husband.  
While hip-hop clubs have become visible representations of blackness, they rarely a e 
associated with white maleness, which manifests persistence of racial divisions 
between black and white GIs in the entertainment districts around U.S. military bases. 
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Racial Dynamics among Japanese Female Clubbers in a Base Town   
Historically, U.S. race relations based on the black-white binary shaped sexual 
territories in entertainment districts during the U.S. occupation of postwar Jap n, 
while such racialized sex territories existed until the mid-1970s in Okinawa (see 
Hiroyama 2000; Ishikawa 2004; Okinawa Kokusai Daigaku, Ishihara Zemi 1994; 
Onga 1998).  Local women who worked as bar hostesses and prostitutes reinforced 
the racialized sexual division in the entertainment districts.  These women serv d
either white GIs or black soldiers, but not both.  Violations of the sexual boundaries 
along the racial line created tension and often led to fighting between white and black 
soldiers (Hiroyama 2000; Okinawa Kokusai Daigaku, Ishihara Zemi 1994:275).  
 Today, the racial boundary in entertainment districts in Okinawa is not as 
explicitly or rigidly maintained as it was in the 1950s and into the early 1970s 
(Hiroyama 2000).  However, “voluntary” racial divisions persist in some bars,clubs, 
and live-music houses catering to GIs in the entertainment areas.  Sturdevant and 
Stoltzfus (1992), who conducted research in the Kin bar area near Camp Hansen in 
the northern part of Okinawa, noted: 
The Kin bar area is not racially segregated to the extent that bar areas in the 
Philippines and Korea are.  However, there are some clubs that are 
predominantly Euro-American, which usually play hard-rock music; clubs 
favored by African-American play more rap and may have a dance floor  
(P. 256).  
 
I observed a similar pattern in nightspots in the Gate-2 Street area that were racially 
divided between white and black GIs, depending on the types of music they played 
and the atmospheres they offered.   
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While GI patrons themselves are largely responsible for the continuing U.S. 
racial divisions in bar areas, Okinawan and Japanese women who frequented the 
entertainment districts also reinforced these divisions.  Mina, an Okinawan military 
wife who frequented “white” clubs in the 1990s, explained the racial divisions 
between clubs: 
I started going out with my friends who love gaijin (foreigners).  Well, there 
were some well-known clubs near the Gate-2 Street where gaijin hang out.  
We went to clubs together almost every weekend….  We used to go to [club] 
“Manhattan.”  Only locals knew about this situation, but at that time, clubs 
were divided into two depending on who went there, I mean, blacks or whites.  
Blacks went to [club] “Pyramid” and whites usually went to [club] 
“Manhattan”.... 
 
Other former clubbers I interviewed stated that female clubgoers were divid d 
roughly into two groups along the white-black color line.  These women often 
expressed their racial affiliations explicitly, through choices of “black” or “white” 
clubs, depending on their racial and musical preferences. 
Masami, an Okinawan military wife, also frequented “white” clubs with her 
friends when she was a college student.  During the interview, she identified herself 
in a self-deprecating way as mejo, but distinguished herself from women associated 
with black GIs, who sometimes receive the derogatory labels  kokujo (koku = black; 
jo = woman) or blapan (bla = black; pan = panpan).  While amejo is the more 
generic term, referring to women perceived as loving only U.S. men, kokujo or 
blapan specifies amejo who pursue only black men. According to Masami,  
There weren’t many Japanese women who liked both (black and white men) 
but usually they were divided into “black” or “white”.…  I had no connection 
to women who hung out with black men because they were in a different 
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group…  It was like…I simply drew the line between “us” (whites) and 
“them” (blacks).  It’s like “we are not kokujo!”….  Do you know [the club] 
“Pyramid”?...  In my time, it was a place for blacks to hang out and kokujo 
followed them.  I occasionally went there, but it wasn’t fun because I didn’t 
care for their music. 
 
Masami refused to be included in the category of Japanese women associated with 
black GIs (kokujo) and drew a line between herself and these women.  Many Japanese 
ex-clubbers I interviewed distinguished themselves from each other based on racial 
affiliations in choices of music, fashion, and men.  Despite their self-identification 
and racial preferences, women in the base towns were lumped together, and often 
labeled as amejo collectively, by media and society because of their associations with 
U.S. servicemen.     
During interviews, all ex-clubbers told me that black GIs outnumbered GIs of 
other racial groups in clubs that offered what they called “black music,” such as hip-
hop and R & B.  Consequently, women with strong interests in black music and/or 
black men sought out these clubs.  According to ex-clubber informants, clubbers who 
disliked black music were more likely to go to clubs that played mostly “white 
music,” such as rock, punk, pop, and alternative, and which attracted white GI 
patrons.  Live-music houses in the Gate-2 Street area also attract white GI audiences 
because they play heavy metal, punk, and hard rock.  When I visited these live-music 
houses, I found that the majority of American patrons were indeed white GIs.  On the 
other hand, the hip-hop clubs I visited were filled mostly with black GIs and Jpanese 
female clubbers.   
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Club Scene: Hip-hop Clubs and Japanese Female Clubbers 
I conducted ethnographic observations at two hip-hop clubs and became 
acquainted with a young Japanese woman, Akemi, who moved to Okinawa from the 
mainland several years ago.117  She identified herself as a clubber and agreed to take 
me to one of the popular hip-hop clubs that black GIs frequent.  Once inside the club, 
I immediately noticed a pattern of gender and racial composition of the crowds: the 
majority of male patrons were black GIs and most female clubbers were young
Japanese and Okinawans.  Even though it was a weeknight, black men and Japanese 
women packed the small dance floor as the night went on.118  
All hip-hop clubs have some unique characteristics, but each provides an 
exotic ambience that encourages erotic adventures between black GIs and Japanese 
women.  The popularity of hip-hop clubs depends on a total package of the hip-hop 
style that includes DJs, colorfully illuminated mirror balls suspended from the 
ceilings, dimly lit rooms, cash bars, and most important, black GIs or “brothers” who 
take leading roles on the dance floor.  Black GIs accompanied some Japanese women 
in the clubs I visited, but most women seemed to arrive in small groups without male 
partners, which made it easier for the GIs to approach the women.  Not all of the 
                                                
117 Okinawa has been a popular beach resort destination for mainland Japanese tourists.  More recently, 
Okinawa also attracts young mainlanders who intend o live in Okinawa for longer periods or semi-
permanently.  In one account, about 20,000 mainlanders move to Okinawa every year while about the 
same number of people returns to mainland after living few years in Okinawa.  “Okinawa Immigration 
Boom: A pitfall of Paradise,” JCAST News, March 04, 2007. http://www.j-
cast.com/2007/03/04005921.html 
118 Akemi suggested that we go to a club on Lady’s Night when the admission for women was free so 
that we might see more Japanese female clubbers, which in turn attract GIs.  We went there around 
midnight and stayed for three hours.  When we left the club, it was still filled up and there was no 
indication that the crowds were getting ready to leave.   
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women in the clubs wore hip-hop styles, but many dressed in miniskirts, hip-hugging 
jeans, and other tight-fitting outfits that emphasized their bodylines.  Others dressed 
in skimpy outfits that revealed a great deal of skin.   
Kiko, an Okinawan military wife, pointed out that the total fashion style (e.g., 
clothes, makeup, hairstyles, languages) of female clubbers often reveals their racial 
affiliations.   According to Kiko, Okinawan and Japanese women who were dating 
black GIs dressed to match their boyfriends, who tended to be more conscious about 
fashion than did white men.  Some military wives also mentioned that these 
Okinawan and Japanese “sisters” consulted U.S. fashion magazines to learn how 
“ real black sisters” dress.  These “wannabe black” women often have access to 
American products, including fashion magazines and cosmetics at on-base stores, 
through connections to their GI boyfriends.  By contrast, Kiko and other informants 
said that women associated with white GIs dress more casually because white GIs 
usually wore casual outfits, such as jeans and T-shirts, while off-duty.119   
As hip-hop music, formerly known as underground music, entered the 
Japanese mainstream, it challenged stigmatized post-war GI-Japanese romances, 
specifically those between black GIs and Japanese women.  Kelsky (2001) points out 
that Japanese women began to challenge the whiteness that has signified U.S. 
economic power and racial superiority in Japan since the U. S. military occupation. 
Pursuing black men rather than whites enabled younger generations of Japanese 
                                                
119 Military wives also mentioned that there are informal dress codes for GIs in the Marine Corps 
during the off duty time.  For instance, they are suggested to wear a button down shirt rather than T-
shirt when going out privately even though their dress codes are not mandatory.   
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people to reconstruct negative perceptions of blackness positively, within a global 
context of hip-hop music and culture.  In many respects, this reconstruction counters 
the hegemony of whiteness and white culture, which in turn enables women 
associated with black GIs to empower themselves and openly express their racialized 
desires.   
 Some of my interviewees associated with black GIs also mentioned that a 
Japanese novelist, Yamada Eimi, gave them new perspectives on black-Japanese 
intimate relationships.  Yamada’s Bedtime Eyes (1985), for example, boldly depicts a 
sexual and erotic relationship between a Japanese nightclub singer and a black GI, 
which created a sensation among Japanese readers at that time.  As Kuwahara (1994) 
notes, the publication of Bedtime Eyes and her sequential pieces on a black-Japanese 
relationship, contributed to the increase in the numbers of Japanese women who 
viewed a black lover as cool and fashionable.  In Yamada’s books, Japanese female 
characters are depicted as rebellious, who reject the traditional gender ideology for 
young women (e.g., passive, virgin) and choose to become “independent in a sense 
that they are emotionally strong, bold, confident of themselves and in charge of their
own lives” including sexual relationships with men (Kuwahara 1994:108).   Japanese 
women, who see themselves as unfits or deviators from the Japanese traditional 
gender roles and expectations, relate themselves to Yamada’s female char cters in her 
books.  An Okinawan interviewee, who just began dating a black GI said, Yamada’s 
novels are inspiring and give her strength and encouragement to act and think 
positively in her relationship with her black boyfriend.  
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White Men Under the Gaze: Wives and Girlfriends of Minority GIs  
When I interviewed wives and girlfriends of black, Asian American, and 
Latino GIs, some discussed white GIs from the perspectives of women of color who 
are racialized and sexualized, primarily by white men.  These women view white GIs 
as arrogant, rude, and prejudiced, not only against black GIs but also against other 
racial groups, including Asian women.  For example, Yukie, a military girlfriend, 
shared her memory of the experience of working as a bartender at a “white bar” in the 
Gate-2 Street area.  Yukie said she felt that some white GI customers did nottake her 
seriously, and treated her disrespectfully because of her gender and her Asianness:  
White customers who came to the bar tend to look down on Asians.  I think 
they feel superior to Asian women and treated us in the way they think we 
deserve….  Many of them think it’s okay to touch Asian women’s bodies 
when they were drunk.  I mean, they touched our butts….  They were rude, 
haughty, and disrespectful. 
 
Most military wives or girlfriends of minority GIs talked about perceptions f white 
men that were based on their interpretations of occasions involving direct interactions 
with white GIs.  Some also view white GIs through the lenses of their partners’ 
perceptions.  For example, some wives of black GIs insisted there is racism in the 
military and complained that their husbands are treated unfairly in comparison to  
white peers.  One woman married to a black GI claimed her husband was denied a 
promotion at the same time his white colleague received one.  According to this 
interviewee, her husband was as qualified as the white serviceman was, but the white 
serviceman received preferential treatment from a white superior officer.   
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While military wives of minority GIs tend to focus on unfair treatment of 
racial minorities in the military, others found a racial dimension in unequal power 
relations between whites and other racial groups in the U.S.  Kanako, an Okinawan 
wife who identifies herself as a former hip-hop clubgoer, problematizes white men’s 
power in the U.S.: 
To me, America is attractive because it’s a country of racial diversity.  I think 
racial diversity is powerful.  But when you think ‘who rules America?’ I think 
it’s whites after all.  America is the country of white men who have power….  
But black people are trying to assert themselves in their own way, like through 
music.  This appeals to me….  I don’t think I have chemistry with a white 
man, anyway.  I don’t like Rock music.  I can’t stand country music, either 
[laughter].  I love hip-hop music and dancing at clubs….  I want to share and 
enjoy the same kind of music with my (black) partner. 
 
Although Kanako explicitly expresses a preference for black men and hip-hop 
music, she views hip-hop music not merely as a fashion and acknowledges it as a 
form of cultural expression and empowerment.  Kanako, like most women who 
addressed issues of power, racism, and sexism associated with white GIs, are milit ry 
wives of minority GIs.  By contrast, few military wives of white GIs perceived 
whiteness as a negative component of white men that might affect other racial goups, 
including Asian women.  
 
White Men Under the Gaze: Wives and Girlfriends of White GIs 
Similar to women who expressed preferences for black men, many military 
wives of white GIs openly talked about race as a factor that encouraged or 
discouraged them to pursue relationships with certain men.  Motoko, an Okinawan 
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wife, discussed her preference for white Americans.  She said she yearned to date a 
white man and eventually to marry him.  In search of the right man, Motoko 
frequented “white” clubs in the base town where she met her future husband.   
When I asked Motoko what influenced her to become interested in white Americans, 
she responded: 
The first time I started liking American men was when I read a love storyin a 
Japanese comic book.120  In that comic book, [white male] American 
characters were depicted so caring and sweet…since then, I became interested 
in [white] Americans….  I prefer white GIs.…  I like a man who looks truly 
gaijn who has blond hair…tall, and has white skin (generally, gaijin means 
foreigners but in this context it refers to Caucasians) [laughter].  I dated some 
GIs who were just like my ideal images of gaijin but only to find myself being 
dumped [laugher]….  I was serious about every relationship I had.  Marriage 
was always in my mind.   
 
Motoko fantasized about white male characters portrayed in idealistic 
manners in Japanese comic books.  Russell (1998: 153) notes that Japanese comic 
books designed to attract female readers tend to treat white males as representative of 
Western men, who are portrayed as “sensitive, refined, and without sexism,” and 
comparable to traditional images of Asian patriarchy.  Motoko said she particulrly 
likes Western male attributes such as “ladies-first” that American (white) GIs in 
Okinawa performed for her, just as her favorite white characters did for female 
characters in comic books.  
Sayaka, an Okinawan military wife, candidly spoke of her racial preferenc  
for whites and of frequenting “white” clubs until she married.  As these conversation  
                                                
120 Comic books are popular in Japan not only among children and youth but also young adults and 
middle-aged Japanese regardless of their gender.  Comic books that target female readership often use 
Caucasians but not racial minorities, especially for romantic stories taking place in Europe and 
America.    
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continued, I found a similarity between Sayaka’s and Motoko’s perceptions: media 
representation of Americans influenced Sayaka’s views of Americans and of whites:  
…I am not exactly sure what makes white men so attractive but I never looked 
at a black guy as my potential boyfriend.  It’s okay if he is just a friend….  My 
images of Americans were always whites ever since I started watching foreign 
soap operas when I was a child.  As far as I remember, I’ve never seen any 
American TV dramas that featured black families as main characters.  When it 
came to American [middle-class] families, to me, it was always whites.       
 
For Sayaka, whites represent the American middle-class family, but she thinks there 
is no black equivalent to the middle-class family in America.  Therefore, marriage to 
a white GI would mean starting an American middle-class family life that would 
provide her with the kinds of lifestyles Sayako saw on television.  Popular media, in 
the form of American TV dramas, movies, magazines, and Japanese comic books, 
contributed not only to creation of images of “Americans” but also to diffusion of 
these images to Japanese people.   
Media representations of whites as model middle-class U.S. citizens date back 
to the early post-World War II era in Japan.  As Chapter 3 mentioned, the comic strip 
Blondie and the movies selected by GHQ during the U.S. occupation shaped Japanese 
perceptions of Americans (Gekkan Akurosu 1989).  Even though contemporary 
Japanese mainstream media acknowledge racial diversity in American middle-class 
families, they continue to manifest the ideology of whiteness and portray white 
Americans as more desirable partners for Japanese people than men from othe racial 
groups.   
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Black Men Under the Gaze: Wives and Girlfriends of White GIs 
When I asked wives of white GIs about their perceptions of black men, some 
told me they feel black GIs are more promiscuous and more likely to "cheat on 
women" than white men are.  These women tend to look at black GIs under the 
influence of stereotypical images of black male as hypersexual and therefore 
dangerous to “respectable” women.121  Other prevalent images of black men in the 
U.S., which portray them as poor, as criminals, and as violent, contributed to negative 
perceptions of black GIs in Okinawa.  Some white GIs’ wives expressed fears of 
black GIs, whom they think may harm them, which contrasts sharply with their 
idealistic images of white men constructed around white heroism in American 
movies.     
Other military wives of white GIs mentioned that perceived cultural 
“differences” between blacks and Japanese discouraged them from developing close 
relationships with black GIs.  Most of these interviewees identified black GIs with 
hip-hop music and viewed hip-hop music as essential to and inseparable from black 
men’s lifestyles.  Kiriko, the Okinawan single mother of a bi-racial child from a 
previous marriage to a GI, said:  
Basically, I have no chemistry with black men at all….  I like some hip-hop 
hit songs, but I don’t think I want to play these songs all the time.  I can’t put 
up with their (black) language either, like when they say “hey yo.”  For people 
who like hip-hop music, this kind of language may sound cool and appealing, 
but it’s not my style….  I hate when they teasingly ask me if I like whites 
better than black guys.   
                                                
121 For black sexuality and masculinity, see Patricia Hill Collins (2004), Black sexual politics: African 
Americans, gender, and the new racism and bell hooks (2004), We real cool: Black men and 
masculinity.  
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Similar to Kiriko, other interviewees associated with white GIs refer to hip-hop music 
and styles as obstacles to developing intimate relationships with black GIs.  The e 
women consider their lifestyles and cultures to be closer to the American mainstream 
than to blacks, because they see black culture as too foreign.   
Michi, a Japanese military wife, emphasized “differences” and rejected any 
possibility of dating or marrying a black GI: 
I… (after a long pause)…I don’t think there was a possibility for me to marry 
a black man.  Well, it has nothing to do with his race.  I mean I am not 
prejudiced against black people.  But there are vast differences between us, 
you know?  That’s why I hesitated to date a black GI….  I mean, I am not that 
interested in black music and culture anyway.  So there is nothing attractive 
about black men to me.  
 
Similar to Michi, other wives of white GIs spoke carefully about race and were 
concerned about being seen as prejudiced against black GIs.  When I interviewed 
white GIs’ wives, many of them began with an “I am not prejudiced against blacks” 
disclaimer before talking about racial issues.  By contrast, as I mention d earlier, 
some wives of minority GIs accused white GIs of being prejudiced against Asian
women and other minority groups.   Military wives tend to identify themselves with 
their husbands’ race and quickly learn about race relations among GIs and “proper” 
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Persistence of Prejudice and Discrimination against Black GIs in Okinawa 
In addition to perceived “differences” between Japanese and blacks, some 
informants said that the likelihood of family opposition was a reason not to pursue a 
relationship with a black GI.  Above all else, these women excluded black GIs from a 
potential marriage avoid disputes with their families.  Sayo, an Okinawan military 
wife, pointed out that her family had a negative attitude about black GIs stationed in 
Okinawa and that this made her self-conscious about selecting a partner.    
…I don’t know [if there was a possibility for me to marry a black GI], but I 
would have to think about it carefully….  I don’t think my parents would 
accept him [if he were black]….  Well, personally, it’s just fine with me to 
date a black person, but I worry about what other people think about him.  
Many Okinawans are still prejudiced against blacks, you know?  I have a 
friend who married a black GI.  She told me that her parents don’t want their 
gossipy neighbors to see their black son-in-law.  So my friend hesitated to 
bring her husband to her parents’ house. Actually, her husband visited her 
parents’ house once or twice so far and only at night…because he would not 
stand out in the neighborhood if it’s dark, you see?   
 
Sayo also mentioned that prejudice against U.S. servicemen remains strong among 
older generations, particularly in the southern part of Okinawa.122  She was not the 
only  informant concerned negative reactions of parents, relatives, and even neighbors 
to their GI partners.  Many of the military wives I met in Okinawa revealed there was 
some parental opposition to their marriages regardless of their partners’ race, but 
especially when their partners were black.   
                                                
122 Wounds from the Battle of Okinawa remain deeper, especially among Okinawan in the South 
because their regions became the final fierce battlefield as the U.S forces advanced South to occupy 
Japanese Military Headquarters located at Shuri Castle.  Thousands of Okinawan civilian refugees 
from Central Okinawa and South who were moving toward the Southern shore were killed or commit 
suicide toward the end of the war.      
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Hatoko, an Okinawan military wife, faced severe parental disapproval and 
opposition from relatives.  Hatoko is from a small community where neighbors know 
each other as if they were a big extended family.  According to Hatoko, others 
accused her of creating a family disgrace because of her “selfish” decision to marry a 
black GI despite strong family opposition:  
People in my hometown have negative opinions about women who hang out 
with American GIs because there are many crimes committed by Americans.  
The rape case of 1995 [by three black Marines] particularly affected their 
views about black Americans, I think….  When I asked my mother to meet 
my GI boyfriend for the first time, she instantly asked me, “Is he white or 
black?”  Some Okinawans still call blacks uronbo (“nigger”).  When I said 
he is a black man, my mother refused to meet him….  I was accused [by my 
mother]: “Why isn’t he a white GI?  What is good about that black man?”    
 
Similar to Hatoko, Minako, an Okinawan military wife, also faced severe 
family opposition.  When Minako became pregnant, she told her family she wanted to 
marry her black boyfriend, who is the baby’s father.  All of Minako’s family 
members were outraged; her grandmother came close to suicide because she was 
ashamed that Minako was pregnant by a black man; Minako’s mother was so furious 
that she told Minako to abort her baby: 
There was strong prejudice against blacks.  My mother angrily said to me, 
“even an Okinawan boozer would be better than a black man.  If you really 
want to marry a GI, why don’t you choose a white man?”  They think black 
GIs are worthless just because they are black, and they also believe that a half-
black child is destined for an unhappy life because of prejudice and 
discrimination by society. 
 
In Minako’s case, premarital pregnancy with an American GI, and particulaly with a 
black man, made it even more difficult for her to obtain family approval.   
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When I began interviewing military wives in Okinawa, I expected that fewer 
women faced parental disapproval because the majority of their parents are from the 
post-World War II generations, who did not directly experience the war.  I assumed 
these middle-aged parents are more tolerant of intermarriages with U.S. servicemen.  
However, the more military wives I interviewed in Okinawa, the more I realized that 
these young women encountered as much family opposition as war brides did half a 
century ago.  Many young informants in Okinawa told me that they endured severe
emotional stresses because of their negative family reactions to their marriages, 
particularly marriages to black GIs.   
Persistence of family opposition among younger generations is supported in 
Takushi’s (2000) survey on Okinawan military wives living in the U.S.  According to 
Takushi, the younger generation of military wives often experience more family 
opposition than did older generations.  Among her sample population of Okinawan 
wives of U.S. servicemen, 86% of the younger generations of Okinawan women (26-
39 years-old) experienced family opposition, while only 40% of older generations 
(60-72 years-old) had faced family disapprovals of their marriages to U.S. GIs.  
 As I discussed in Chapter 3, women who married GIs in early post-World 
War II Japan, often found that their marriages to “wealthy” Americans meant not only 
relief from extreme economic hardships, but also survival. 123  In many cases, these 
women’s families benefited from resourceful American GIs for securing basic needs 
and obtaining material items that were not available to the majority of Japanese at that 
                                                
123 According to Takushi (2000), many of these women married to GIs include Okinawans who had 
lost their parents during the war as well as Okinawan ar widows with children.     
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time.  Consequently, families of war brides found that material benefits compensated 
for the psychological burdens they associated with the disgrace of their daughters’ 
marriages to American GIs.   
By contrast, many middle-class parents of young Okinawans find their 
daughters’ marriages to young GIs both disgraceful and socioeconomically 
degrading.  Their reactions are especially prominent in this study because more than 
two-thirds of military wives were college educated, whereas most of their husbands 
had only high school educations.  Moreover, their daughters’ GI partners were likely 
to be low-ranking enlisted men at the time of marriage, who would need to wait a 
long time before promotion before quitting or retiring from the military.  In addition 
to perceived socioeconomic degradation, marriages to U.S. GIs continue to be sources 
of humiliation in a society where prejudice against all women associated with GIs, 
and particularly against women in relationships with black GIs, persists.  
Although parental reactions to intermarriages varied, interviews with 
contemporary Okinawan military wives revealed that their families’ reactions to U.S. 
GIs were racialized and especially harsh where black men were involved: “Why do 
you choose a black man but not a white GI?” is a common question that some women 
must answer.  No matter how popular blackness has become among the young 
generations in a global context of hip-hop music and culture that influences 
contemporary Okinawa, the stigma attached to blackness remains too strong for many 
Okinawans’ perceptions of black servicemen to change.  Intermarriages of black GIs 
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and Okinawan women are less likely to be accepted by family or by society, while 
white GI-Japanese intimacy is often tolerable and even desirable.   
Military wives I interviewed in Okinawa have race-specific views of U.S. men 
depending on racial affiliations with their partners, but they also have general images 
of “Americans” that transcend, to some degree, the racial differences they discussed 
previously.  As the following section shows, these “raceless” images are of 
generalized and idealized American men, often created in comparison with Japanese 
men.  Japanese women interviewees also have share some views of American men in 
military uniforms stationed in Okinawa, views that may contradict their idealistic, 
general notions of Americans.  Japanese women’s images of American men shift, 
overlap, and contradict one another under their gaze, thus complicating their 
perceptions of U.S. men.  
 
“American Men” under the Gaze of Japanese Women 
What makes American men, and especially men in uniform, special and 
attractive to women in Okinawa?  There were variations in interviewee responses, but 
many women shared common views of “American men” regardless of the men’s 
racial differences.  The interviewees listed images of American men, which include 
ladies-first, kind, good-looking, tall, brawny, spontaneous, considerate, sweet, 
romantic, caring, friendly, fun, straightforward, affectionate, and expressive.  
Japanese war bride informants also cite these attributes when describing their 
perceptions of American men.  For both generations of Japanese women I 
 
                                                                                                                                178
interviewed, Western men are idealized in the sense that they treat women prop rly, 
as equals, and with respect based on Western democracy and gender ideals.  In these 
women’s views, male actions such as opening doors, carrying grocery bags, and 
giving up seats and chairs for women reflect a women-centered Western cul u e that 
is unique to Western men.   
As was the case for war brides in post-World War II Japan, “ladies-first” 
remains a common term among military wives in contemporary Okinawa when they 
describe American men.  Rinko, a Japanese military wife, identified a sharp contrast 
between American and Japanese men concerning the way they treat women: 
The main reason why I decided to marry my husband is…well, realistically, I 
got pregnant [laugher]….  But, of course, my husband is so caring, 
understanding, and has a sweet heart.  I think Japanese and American men are 
fundamentally different in this respect.  [Unlike Japanese men] Americans 
perform ladies-first spontaneously as their expressions of caring for women.  
They give women’s needs first priority before their own in every aspect.  
 
Yaeko, a Japanese wife, has views similar to Rinko’s: “I had been wanting to marry 
an American guy, but not a Japanese man….  Why?  Japanese men are not faithful to 
their wives.  They are not so caring for women and not ladies-first, either….  
Actually, I never thought about marrying a Japanese man.”  I heard similar voices 
repeatedly from other military wives.   The idealized images of Western men as 
practicing “ladies-first” were constructed, exaggerated, and reinforced particularly in 
contrasts to Japanese men. 
Erina, an Okinawan woman who recently divorced a GI, is a military wife 
who emphatically denies the possibility of marrying a Japanese man: 
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I had no desire to marry or even date a Japanese man….   My father 
represents a typical patriarchal Japanese man [laughter].  To him, women 
should remain a little bit behind the men….  I can’t stand it.  I have positive 
images of American people.  They have freedom to do what they want in 
America and they enjoy it.  Everyone is equal.  Men and women are equal too.  
I had these images about Americans before marrying my husband…. 
 
Erina and other Japanese women told me that they would not want to take on 
their expected Japanese gender roles as wives, mothers, and daughter-in-laws.  Other 
women, especially Okinawan women, complained that maintaining cultural and 
familial traditions as females bound by strong family ties is burdensome.  For these 
women, marriage to American GIs is seen as a way to liberate themselves from 
cultural and gender oppression.  American men appear to be rescuers who can take 
such women to the country of gender equality and freedom. 
Many Okinawan and Japanese military wives pointed out that Japanese (and 
Okinawan) men lack the communication skills they value in men.  For these women, 
Japanese men’s non-verbal communication styles and their implicit expressions when 
displaying feelings and emotions are not appealing.  Interviewees give hi h marks to 
American men for their direct, candid communication styles, in which they openly 
express affections for women verbally, and also physically, by touching, holding, 
hugging and kissing in public and private.  
 Mikage, an Okinawan military wife, blamed Japanese and Okinawan men for 
losing Japanese and Okinawan young women to American men.  In Mikage’s view, 
what makes Japanese men less attractive compared to American men is that Japanese 
men stop treating their wives as “women” (as lovers) once they get married:  
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I felt that, to American men, their wives are still their lovers no matter how 
old they become….  I think this is something Japanese women want from their 
husbands.  I think women today want their men to demonstrate affection more 
directly (verbally and physically).  They want to see that they are truly loved 
and cared for by their boyfriends or husbands.  American men do this for 
women so easily, you see?…even if their affection might be just a 
performance.  They are such big performers [laugher].  Anyway, this is why 
Japanese women are so easily attracted to American men.   
 
For Japanese women who grew up in a culture where men rarely express affections 
directly, affections that American men display for them are new, exciting 
experiences.  Whether American men’s performances are sincere or not, the Japanese 
women I interviewed in Okinawa seem more eager to adopt the Western style of 
communication than to preserve the Japanese style.   
Although women know American men often flirt with Japanese women 
casually, women still like this attention because it makes them feel they are attractive 
and that they deserve men’s attentions.  Yurine, the single mother of a bi-racial child 
fathered by a GI whom she divorced, explains:  
No matter what other people say, Americans are so sweet.  They compliment 
women a lot.  They say something like…“you are so cute” or “the color of 
your lipstick looks gorgeous on you.”  Japanese men never say things like 
these to women.   If you have a kid, you are viewed simply as a mother of the 
kid.  But American men treat us as ‘women’ whether we are young or older 
and married or not.  In response, I do my part to make them happy…like, I 
wear makeup and dress nicely for them.    
 
As Yurine noted, Japanese women with children are more likely to be identified as 
the children’s mothers than as women in Japanese society (Tanaka 1995).  
Furthermore, Sato, the Japanese wife of a civilian employee, claims that American 
men can give women more emotional fulfillment in their marriages than Japanese 
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men can.  Sato also believes that Japanese women who married Americans look 
younger, are happier, and are more confident compared with women who married 
Japanese men.  
In the same way that Japanese women build their images of American men 
around the ideal of ladies-first or Western chivalry, these women also have 
stereotypical views of Western men’s physical appearances.  They tend to view 
Western men through the images of movie stars whose body images are physically 
imposing (e.g., sturdy, brawny) and attractive (e.g., long legs, tall) compared to Asian 
men.  Such physical attributes make up the basis of western male body myths 
mentioned frequently by war bride informants and by contemporary Japanese women. 
Miyoko, an Okinawan military wife, said  
At first, my images of Americans were all white [laughter].  They somewhat 
looked attractive.  By saying attractive, I mean they are tall…[they have] long 
legs, blond hair, and blue eyes…different eye color….  I think these features 
make people somehow believe all Americans are good-looking guys 
[laughter]. 
 
Although Miyoko married a non-white GI, her images of American men are of white, 
tall, blond haired, blue-eyed men who have long legs.  Movie star images of 
Americans persist among contemporary Japanese women. 
To some young women, their associations with “Americans” have special 
values as if they carry brand-name bags.  Misuzu, a Japanese military wife, recalled 
when she was young and dated American GIs;  “It was like…I was showing off an 
American boyfriend as if he has a brand name….  I was proud because I was dating 
an American, not an Asian (American) guy.”  Women like Misuzu view American 
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boyfriends almost as fashion accessories.  Many informants stated that women with 
American GIs perceive themselves as envied by other women; this made them acut ly 
self-conscious about their appearances when they were in public with GIs.  
Another military wife, Hisae, noted that the particular value of the status 
attached to something or someone “American” makes many Japanese women want to 
marry U.S. GIs in Okinawa: 
I think it’s a matter of the status.  I mean, Americans have a high status than 
people in other countries.  I think America is a great country….  Women who 
like blacks are picky about Americans.  I don’t think they, my friends too, 
marry blacks if they are from Africa.  American blacks are popular because 
they are Americans but not Africans.  
 
Hisae’s remarks echo similar statements from wives of black GIs who corrected me 
when I used the term “African American” to refer to their husbands’ race.  Th se 
women said their husbands are not Africans, but Americans.   Their resistence to 
“African American” is due in part to unfamiliarity with racial terms used in the U.S., 
but also is shaped by their perceptions of black GIs in Okinawa as “authentic” 
Americans who have nothing to do with Africa or with people in Africa.     
Many of these women also use English for public display.  As I noted in 
Chapter 3, Japanese people who appear to have command of the English language 
were valued in postwar Japan because of the language’s associations with powerful 
people.  English remains popular in contemporary Japan; those with good English 
skills tend to be admired by other Japanese people.  Some informants mentioned that 
Japanese women associated with U.S. GIs often think of themselves as “cool” when 
they speak English.  They become self-conscious in a positive sense, especially when 
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they realize that other Japanese are looking at and listening to them speak in English 
while using cellular phones.   Moreover, their boyfriends’ military status sometimes 
adds more values to “Americans” in Okinawa because of access to military bases and 
benefits.  
Despite many positive assessments of American men, some women are 
cynical about GIs popularity among Japanese women in Okinawa.  These women 
complain that GIs exploit their status as “American.”  Tatsuko, an Okinawan military 
wife, explained:  
My friend married a GI.  My husband and his colleagues happened to know 
him.  They had no idea why my friend wanted to marry him because, in their 
opinions, the guy is one of those nerds who are less likely to get an attention 
from girls if he were in America…. 
  
Kumiko, another military wife, said, “Well, honestly, it is like, those geeks who can’t
find American girls back home suddenly become flattered by Japanese girls simply 
because they are Americans” [laughter].”  Reflecting on their relationships with GIs, 
many military wives (including Tatsuko and Kumiko) found themselves trapped by 
“American magic” as if they were hypnotized, and consequently pursued 
relationships with U.S. GIs despite reservations. 
 
American Men in Military Uniforms under the Gaze of Japanese Women 
Although idealistic perceptions of Americans are constructed on images of 
Western democracy, male chivalry, and handsome Hollywood stars, American men i
military uniforms are perceived differently.  When Japanese women view idealized 
American men as providers of emotional support in their relationships, they also see 
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the same men in military uniforms as providers of a stable economic life. 
Specifically, many contemporary Okinawan women find that marrying U.S. GIs 
brings a more financially secure and stable life than marrying Okinawan men does.  
Therefore, the GI’s military career is attractive factor to contemporary women, 
although it is not motivated by the same socioeconomic desperation that caused many 
Japanese women to marry U.S. GIs in the early post-World War II period.  
Aside from basic pay, military benefits associated with a GI’s SOFA status in 
Okinawa are attractive.  Yoshie, an Okinawan military girlfriend currently deployed 
in Kuwait, dated several GIs before meeting her partner.  Yoshie has been yearni g to 
marry a U.S. GI and hopes to marry her boyfriend, as they planned, when he returns:  
Once I started dating American men, I could no longer even think about 
Japanese men as potential boyfriends [laughter].  But among Americans, I was 
always interested in GIs, not civilians.  Well, GIs are financially stable nd 
have various benefits....  And the great thing is they can request Okinawa as a 
destination for PCS, so I can live close to my parents at least for 3 years.124  
Eventually I may have to move to the U.S, which I don’t mind because I don’t 
want to live in Okinawa for the rest of my life.  I want to see different parts of 
the world.  
 
From a financial viewpoint, numerous military wives and girlfriends I 
interviewed consider marrying U.S. GIs in Okinawa to be desirable.  Al though 
marriage to junior-ranked GIs does not necessarily improve women’s economic 
status, benefits such as subsidized military housing and utilities, schooling, and access 
to base stores contribute to images of GIs as economically stable and fulfilling.  Their 
status as military wives in Okinawa is particularly attractive because it allows them to 
                                                
124 PCS=Permanent Change of Station (see Glossary) 
 
                                                                                                                                185
travel freely between “Little America” and the Okinawan civilian community. This 
privileged position means that many of the women I interviewed, especially 
Okinawan women, hope their husbands will be granted extensions to stay in 
Okinawa.   
Saki, an Okinawan military girlfriend, is another informant with a strong 
desire to marry a U.S. GI and had several relationships with GIs in the past.  Unlike 
Yoshie, Saki’s search for a future husband has not been successful.125  Saki told me 
that her most recent relationship with a GI boyfriend lasted nearly three years, even 
after he returned to the U.S.  After going through a long-distance relationship, Saki 
gave up on marrying her boyfriend because he decided to quit the military wihout a 
clear goal for his future:  
When looking at American military life in Okinawa, base housing is spacious; 
utilities are free; and shopping at the PX is cheap and fun.  Because GIs 
receive an overseas station allowance, they can enjoy a middle-class like 
lifestyle even though their basic salary is low.  Many Japanese women tend to 
think that marriages to GIs would promise you an American middle-class life.  
But most of them only know GI’s life in Okinawa.  
 
For many Okinawans, living in spacious military housing equipped with 
American electronic appliances, shopping at base stores, and using recreation 
facilities in “Little America” represent American “middle-class lifestyles.”  I visited 
both on-base and off-base military housing.  On-base housing is uniform and 
reminded me of two- and three-bedroom apartments in the U.S.  For most Okinawans, 
however, “American style” floor plans in military housing appear spacious when 
                                                
125 When I first met Sara at a live music house in the base town, she told me that she recently met a 
new boyfriend, a white GI who could be possibly herfuture husband.   
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compared to standard Japanese apartments.  Some of the off-base private homes in 
which higher-ranking GIs and civilian employees’ families resided were even more 
impressive; moreover, the military subsidizes their rents.  However, as Saki noted, the 
middle-class life that some couples enjoy in Okinawa may end in disillusion whe
GIs return to the U.S. and lose eligibility for their overseas station all wances. 
I noted that Japanese military wives described the overseas station allowance, 
or the Cost-of-Living Allowance (COLA), as an attractive supplemental icome for 
their husbands’ basic pay.126  Shinobu, a Japanese military wife who recently moved 
to Okinawa from the U.S., mentioned that COLA is the best benefit that GIs stationed 
overseas can receive:    
In America, when my husband’s military rank was not as high as it is now, I 
worked to support family finances.  But later my husband got promoted, so we 
can live comfortably now without my financial contribution.  There is quite a 
large gap in income among GIs.  Many Japanese women who are married to 
young low-ranked GIs in Okinawa have not realized that their lives are still 
quite nice over here because of COLA.  They will feel a gap between the kind 
of lifestyle they have in Okinawa and the one waiting for them in the U. S. 
when they move to America.  Maybe, they don’t speak English well and don’t 
drive a car either.  So, they cannot find a job in America and no extra 
income... 
  
For most Japanese military wives in Okinawa, COLA and other military 
benefits make their lives more fulfilling.  Most military wives in this study did not 
work outside the home at the time of interviews, which suggests there was no 
financial necessity for them to work.  However, once they move to the U.S, many of 
these women find it hard to maintain a similar economic standard, especially when 
                                                
126 COLA is paid to members living in high cost of living areas in the U. S. as well as to military 
members stationed overseas. 
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their husbands’ military ranks are relatively low, or when their husbands decide to 
leave the military without having financial security.   
While marriage to GIs provides economic security for some Japanese military 
wives, reliance on their husbands for living and military benefits also makes these 
women vulnerable.  Enloe (2000) stresses that military wives live within “te 
economic system of a militarized state,” which is similar to the situations of women 
who rely on state welfare programs.  Resources for housing, schooling, and medical 
care, often food, and even recreation flows come from the government.  Eligibility for 
some family services and benefits are determined by the service members’ ranks 
rather than by the family’s needs (Kohen 1984; Moelker and Kloet 2003).  Moreover, 
access to these military benefits available only so long “as the military recognizes 
family members as dependents” (Kohen 1984:408).  Due to this economic 
dependency, several informants noted that they experienced tremendous economic 
difficulty and mental stress when they divorced or when their husbands left the 
military without job security.  
Emi, an Okinawan wife of a civilian with SOFA status, shared her experience 
of a “downfall” from the position of military wife to that of a civilian wife when her 
husband was discharged from the military due to physical injury.  Emi and her 
husband moved to Okinawa only after her husband found it difficult to find a civilian 
job in the U.S.:   
You don’t necessarily become rich just because you marry American GIs.  
But military wives are economically better off because of a stable income and 
various military benefits.  We lost everything.  Now, my husband works as a 
SOFA but not a GI anymore.  Because he is no longer in the military, we 
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cannot live in military housing; we have to pay utilities; we have to send our 
kids to a civilian school…and my husband has to pay an expensive premium 
for his insurance.  All of these were free when he was in the military….  I 
know many Japanese military wives whose husbands want to quit the 
military…well, but if they want to quit the military, what are they going to do 
next?  Can they support their family?  Can they find a decent civilian job?   
 
Emi stressed that the economic security the military offers to GIs should not be 
underestimated.  She encourages her Japanese friends to persuade their GI husbands
not to quit the military, especially without future prospects in civilian employment.  
Similarly, many military wives told me that they want their husbands to stay in the 
military, especially when they know their husbands are not likely to be assigned “life 
threatening” duties on the front lines in war zones.127 
 
Militarized Masculinity under Japanese Women’s Gaze 
Whether or not GIs are assigned combat duties in conflict regions, they are 
expected to bolster their masculinity and maintain physical fitness.  Soldiers’ 
masculinity is built up and enhanced through training designed to create warriors who 
are prepared to kill and die for the state (Dyer 1985; Whitworth 2004).  Such physical 
and mental preparation focuses on gendered practices such as violence, aggression, 
risk-taking, misogyny, stoicism, and heterosexuality within the military organizations 
(Hockey 2003; Higate 2003) and also in sexualized civilian contexts (Enloe 2000).  
Military masculinities are inseparable from ideological aspects such as self-discipline, 
                                                
127 There were some informants whose husbands or boyfriends were deployed to the Middle East at the 
time of interview.  They said the length of deployment often extended and the return date changes.  
There are other women whose husbands just came back from the conflict area.   They cope with the 
long separation and prepare for reunion in different ways but few of them are integrated into a social 
support network of military wives within the military organizations.     
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self-confidence, and self-respect that are essential for GIs to perform their duties as 
soldiers (Rush 2003).   
Although militarized masculinity is praised and celebrated when it 
accomplishes its purposes within military organizations, civilians also recognize and 
compliment those who achieve in this manner.   Michi, a Japanese military wife, is 
one of these outsiders who gives attention to military masculinity and compliments 
GIs’ bodies.  
…Their bodies are sturdy and strong.  Well, I don’t think my husband’s body 
looks exceptionally great but he is much more masculine than the majority of 
Japanese men [laughter].  I think their physical differences are not simply 
because Americans in Okinawa are military men.  It’s more related to their 
racial differences…I mean they are genetically different….  That’s why 
Japanese men are incompetent….  Of course, American men, I mean GIs do 
military trainings.  They run a lot too.  So, they earn great bodies by their 
efforts and deserve compliments. 
 
When Western male body myths are combined with masculine images of U.S. 
servicemen, contrasts between American GIs and Japanese men become even starker.   
In response to my bringing up the topic of masculinity and GIs in Okinawa, many 
military wives mentioned that PT (physical training) is an essential part of military 
life for GIs because physical fitness is an indicator of physical strength a d self-
discipline.  Hisae, an Okinawan military, told me that her husband is a “typical” 
Marine who has strong patriotism and loyalty to the country and the military.   
My husband is proud to be a Marine.…  He used to do PT all the time 
whenever possible until he married me.  It’s amazing to see some GIs 
devoting themselves so much to the physical training, even on off-duty 
days….  My husband thinks he would gain weight and look fat if he does not 
work hard on PT.  Well, I like GIs who maintain fit bodies.  They look great.    
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Although PT varies depending on the branches and units of military service, the 
Marine Corps carries out the strictest and most intensive training and Mrines have 
the most physically powerful bodies in the armed forces.  As some informants made 
clear, this makes the Marines the most popular GIs for some Japanese women. 
Marines’ wives are also conscientious about negative stereotypes of the 
Marines, such as being poorly educated, bloodthirsty, aggressive, troublemakers, and 
playboys.  I heard about these stereotypes from a young GI I became acquainted with 
in the Gate-2 Street area, and from military wives, especially from women whose 
husbands belong to the Air Force.  Marines’ wives do not always deny these negative 
perceptions, but they often use humorous comparisons between the Marines and other 
military servicemen to defend their husbands.   For example, Sakura, an Okinawan 
military wife said, 
GIs in the Air Force look at the Marines as a bunch of boneheads.  They said 
the Marines have muscles but no brains.   Seriously, they are saying this.  
Well, obviously, the body structures between Airmen and Marines are 
definitely different.  Airmen are feeble; I mean they have poor physiques 
compared with the Marines.  The Marines have to watch their weight all the 
time because they have strict weight-control regulations and physical tests.  If 
failed, they are humiliated.  Their salaries might be cut back, they are 
threatened to be discharged, and are ordered not go outside the base until they 
lose weight.  
 
The majority of GIs stationed in Okinawa belong to the Marin Corps (61%) followed 
by Air Force (27%), Navy (8.5%), and Army (3.5%) and Military wives adopt their
husbands’ views and attitudes toward other military branches.  Marine wives tend to 
perceive Airmen as physically weak, elitist, snobbish, quiet, undisciplined, lazy, and 
not manly compared with Marines.  Minako, an Okinawan military wife, asserted that 
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“Airmen’s wives seem to have a sense of superiority over us because their husbands 
work for the Air Force.”  Military wives tend to identify not only with their husbands’ 
races but also with their military branches.  Other informants echoed Minako’s 
observations. 
Some women characterized Japanese men of being effeminate in their 
physical appearance and behavior.  In fact, they used the word “effeminate” or 
“unmanly” to describe their general views of young Japanese men.  Fujiko, a 
Japanese military wife, strongly values the manliness and toughness of GIs and 
despises men that she considers effeminate:   
Young Japanese men today are becoming more effeminate and weak….  Once 
you date American men, you will see the clear difference between them.  I 
like the way Americans express their opinions and positions straightforwardly.  
American GIs are confident about themselves.   They are proud of their 
manliness and toughness, especially among the Marines….  Japanese men 
tend to lack self-confidence and pride.  To me, Japanese guys seem to be 
trying to become sensitive for everything.  I mean, they avoid taking a 
position and leave things ambiguous….  And, Japanese men are too skinny.  If 
I push them, they may fall down [laughter]….  My friends also agreed with 
me.  They are saying that even old Japanese patriarchy may be more attractive 
than these effeminate young men [laughter].  
 
Similar to Fujiko, numerous military wives choose men who are stronger and more 
powerful as their intimate allies and protectors, while looking at Japanese men as 
comparable to their biological family members.  Other informants explained that 
Japanese men lack sex appeal because they look more like their younger brothers than 
like their potential lovers.  Like their war bride counterparts, Japanese military wives 
in present-day Okinawa tend to justify their choices of marriage partners by 
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constructing dichotomous images of U.S. and Japanese men, which underscore what 
they see as Japanese men’s inferior qualities.   
 
Disadvantages of Militarized Masculinity  
Although military wives I interviewed view military benefits and masculinity 
as positive assets and motivations to pursue intimate relationships with U.S. GIs in 
Okinawa, there are also disadvantages.  Militarized masculinity is not constructed 
only in daily PT, in boot camp, and on the battlefield, but also in civilian bars and 
brothels (Enloe 1997).  Prostitution around military bases throughout the world is 
thought to provide soldiers with sexualized services that maintain their morale and 
discipline to prepare for long, lonely, fierce missions (Enloe 1997; Takazato 2003).  
Watanabe (1995) notes that local women living near military sites have been 
sexualized and commodified by global militarization: they are “involuntarily d afted 
in the sexual service of militaries as rape victims and sexual slaves” (Nagel, 2003).   
Military husbands and boyfriends bring gendered and sexualized practices to 
intimate relationships in various forms including domestic violence, sexual and child 
abuse, and verbal abuse.  Some military wives reported victimization by former 
boyfriends or husbands.  Misae, a Japanese military wife, told of being beaten and 
choked by her former GI boyfriend in his dormitory room.  As soon as she recovered 
consciousness, Misae ran away, but not to a hospital or a police station.  When I 
asked why she did not take any action, Misae hesitated and said, “Well, I was in his 
room alone at that time.  If I reported to the police…they would ask me many 
 
                                                                                                                                193
personal questions and say ‘He is your boyfriend after all, isn’t he?’”  Similar to cases 
in which women do not report date rape incidents, Misae remained silent about the 
attack because she anticipated intimidation from Japanese authorities and humiliation 
from the Japanese general public.  Misae also feels she is to blame for the trubl  
since she went to his room alone and of her own accord.  
Miri, an Okinawan military wife was assaulted by her GI ex-boyfriend in a 
club frequented by American GIs.  Miri said she was beaten, choked, and dragged to 
a staircase in the club, where she was beaten even more severely.  Since Miri’s ex-
boyfriend attacked her in a public place, the incident received public attention and 
police intervention, as she explained: 
Look at my nose.  Can you see a scar around here, the scar from the incident?  
A bone in the nose was cracked….  My ex was violent.  We repeatedly broke 
up and made up for 2 years….  He threw objects at me in my apartment.  He 
also knocked out things like a dining table….  I tried to break up with him 
many times but he insisted, “I will change my behavior.”  But it never 
happened [laughter]….  I heard that the military men can’t control their 
physical strength in offense or defense when it happens abruptly…. 
 
Harrison (2003) argues that military personnel who abuse their intimate partners are 
obsessed with control because the military values controlling behavior, which is an 
important aspect of the combat morale.  Whitworth (2004) notes that soldiers may try 
to reassert control through physical violence or psychological abuse when they are 
faced with a lack of control in their personal relationships.  In fact, both Misae and 
Kae’s incidents took place in similar situations where they were arguing with their GI 
boyfriends about breakups.  Several more military wives reported that their husbands 
vent their anger and frustration on objects in the homes when they cannot control 
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their tempers.  For example, these husbands pound their fists against walls; throw, 
break, or knock down objects; many shout, curse, and use the word “fuck” at home.  
Domestic violence is not unique to military men and their relationships with 
women.  What makes these incidents unusual is that domestic violence is not only 
gendered, but also militarized.  Women can easily become victims of militarized 
masculinity by men who are mentally and physically prepared to kill people 
professionally.  Takazato (2003) emphasizes the gendered aspects of militaris  and 
violence, claiming that when soldiers return home from being trained in violence, 
their skills on battlefields and in camps return with them, making wives and 
girlfriends potential targets.128  All too frequently, wives and girlfriends of military 
men are vulnerable to the risks of severe or fatal injury.   
 
Illusions of the “American Magic” 
Although most informants never imagined becoming victims of domestic 
violence and sexual abuse, many learned quickly about a pattern of GI-Japanese 
intimacy in Okinawa that often involves emotional trauma.  Specifically, their GI 
lovers could disappear anytime due to deployment or PCS.  My informants’ 
narratives taught me that for many women, developing relationships with GIs whose 
duty in Okinawa is as short as three months is common.  Many women agreed that 
GIs take advantage of short-term duty in Okinawa and view Asian women merely as 
                                                
128 Takazato (2003) also reports that Okinawan women, who worked in the sexual services for the 
American soldiers during the Vietnam War era constantly faced the physical and sexual violence by 
their clients.   
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playthings or as sex objects.  These women came to learn about illusions of fa tasized 
American men in general and GIs specifically from their own experiences. 
I heard the voices of numerous military wives who had several short-term love  
affairs with GIs who had no intention of committing to these relationships.  
Interviewees tend to blame themselves for being naïve and for taking such words as 
“I love you,” “Let’s marry,” and “Let’s go to America together” seriously.  In many 
cases, these women told similar stories.  Many of them became serious about their 
relationships with GIs only to find these men were “players” who went from one 
woman to another.  Some women realized that their boyfriends had left Okinawa only 
after losing contact with the men.  Others learned that their GI boyfriends had 
girlfriend or fiancées in the U.S.  Still other informants followed their boyfriends to 
the U.S. and discovered that their boyfriends were unfaithful to them.  One 
interviewee, Motokoko, an Okinawan  military wife, shared her stories of the 
disappointing relationships she had with several GIs before meeting her husband:   
Well, I dated several GIs but none of them turned out to be a marriage partner 
until I met my husband....  Some GIs simply stopped contacting me.  Others 
told me completely out of the blue that they were leaving Okinawa in the next 
few days. There was another GI who pretended to be a bachelor, but later I 
found he had a son from his previous marriage.  He daringly put his son’s 
picture in his room and said the boy is his older sister’s son!   There are a 
bunch of liars.  It’s not unusual for married GIs to make local girlfriends and 
manage to keep their secrets until leaving Okinawa permanently.   
 
Harumi, a Japanese military wife, also shared details of relationships she had 
with black GIs before meeting her husband: 
Well, until I met my husband, I was dumped by several black guys [laughter].  
….but I kind of got used to it, though.  I think my experiences with these slick 
guys made me stop worrying about whether the relationships last or not 
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[laughter].  I was telling myself, ‘relax, just have fun.’  After all, they just 
toyed with me.  But…at least I made good use of these guys to practice my 
English conversations [laugher]….  There were tons of silly Japanese girls 
who let GIs seduce them.  When I started hanging out with Americans, I was 
one of these silly girls.  I usually ended up having disappointing relationships, 
but I kept moving on to a new relationship until I met my husband.  
 
Similar to Motoko and Harumi, most women I interviewed had painful and 
disappointing experiences with GIs before they met their future husbands.  However, 
some women refused to be perceived as sexual objects who had little or no control 
over the relationships with GIs.  These women situated themselves in subject position 
where they pursued casual relationships with GIs by their own choice.  They are a 
small number of women in the study but said they celebrated their youth and sexual 
freedom by exploring casual, short-term relationships with GIs.   
 Each woman had her own motivations for pursuing GI-Japanese intimacy.  As 
carefree young women in their late teens and early twenties at the time, they were 
enjoying “American experiences” such as receiving attention from American men, 
gaining access to “Little America,” and feeling “cool” about having American 
boyfriends to show off.  What “American experiences” can offer to those women 
associated with GIs in Okinawa makes young women being trapped in a cycle of 
short-term relationships with GIs.  However, most of the women gave up on 
expecting mutually committed relationships with GIs after experiencing 
disappointments.  Notably, some informants said that when they started dating their 
future husbands, they were always skeptical about the men’s real intentions and 
doubted their future husbands’ fidelity until they married.  
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Numerous and often contradictory images of American men exist for Japanese 
women: chivalrous Western men practicing ladies-first and masculine self-di ciplined 
GIs who embody images of protection for women and their country; cruel Western 
men who treat Asian women as disposable objects.  Even though Japanese women 
acknowledge their illusions of “American magic” based on personal experienc s, they 
chose American GIs as their partners over Japanese men, just as war brides did.   
 
Shifts in Gender Relations between GIs and Japanese Women 
Although two generations of Japanese women, war brides and contemporary 
military wives, share similar perceptions of U.S. men and experiences in their 
relationships with U.S. GIs, there is also fundamental difference between th m.  As I 
stated earlier, economic aspects of gender relationships between GIs and Jap ese 
women have changed over the past half-century.  For the war bride generation, U.S. 
soldiers’ economic resources and power in occupied Japan established a gendered 
power relationship: U.S. GIs as providers and Japanese women as beneficiaries.  
Today, economic gaps between U.S. GIs and Japanese women are closing.  Young 
Japanese women are often in superior positions compared to young, lower ranking 
enlisted GIs because of Japanese women’s improved socioeconomic status in the 
context of more equal Japan’s economic and political relations to the U.S.(see 
Chapter 5).   
Many informants stated that some Japanese mainlanders who have economic 
freedom and purchasing power become “patrons” of their GI lovers, most of whom 
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are black GIs because of the hip-hop trend.  Japanese patrons provide GI lovers with 
incentives that include brand-name clothing and accessories, paying for leisure 
activities including restaurant dining, and in some cases, buying expensive watches 
and cars to make their men happy and help them look good in public.  These women 
are part of a global consumer phenomenon in which resourceful single Japanese 
office workers travel the world to fulfill their desires by buying brand-name products, 
enjoying gourmet restaurants, and sampling local men for casual sex.  The activities 
of Japanese global consumers enable some GIs to benefit from give-and-take 
relationships.  In some respects, these patronized GIs are inversions of Japanese only-
san in the post-World War II, era when women served U.S. soldiers as temporary 
wives to obtain a room, board and other resources.   
None of my informants’ economic situations resemble those of Japanese 
global consumers, but their improved socioeconomic status in contemporary Okinawa 
still has an impact on conventional gender relationships between GIs and Japanese 
women.129  Some informants said there were occasions when they unexpectedly 
ended up paying expenses during dates.  Yayoi told me, “Young and low-rank GIs 
made little money and had attitudes like ‘If we are going out, you will pay becaus  I 
don’t have money.’  I paid.  I don’t know why [I did]…but it wasn’t a big deal.  It 
didn’t bother me much back then.”  Many informants were aware that some young 
GIs who approached them for dates were not particularly interested in them as people, 
                                                
129 Okinawa’s average income is located at the bottom among 47 Prefectures in Japan.  When 
Okinawans talk about Japanese global consumers (e.g., patrons around U.S. military bases; Yellow 
Cabs overseas), they usually refer to mainland office ladies (OLs) who are assumed to have better 
careers and income than Okinawan women. 
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but more in what they could offer materially.  Getting free restaurant meals is one 
thing, but Akibayashi and Takazato (2009) note that young GIs with scant economic 
resources seek “free” sex with local women instead of soliciting prostitute .   
Many informants said they sometimes felt that low-rank young GIs used them 
as free cab drivers.  According to these women, young GIs were not permitted to own
cars in Okinawa and had to use either free military shuttle services or take taxis to 
reach their local destinations, such as Gate-2 Street.  Some GIs expect their Japanese 
girlfriends to offer free rides when they need them and rely on Japanese women for 
transportation.  From the perspectives of GIs who have little money and are unhappy 
about being stationed in Okinawa, Japanese girlfriends are there to make their lives 
easier and tolerable until they leave.  Matsuko, a Japanese military wife, does not like 
the ways some GIs take advantage of Japanese women.  However, Matsuko also 
blames “rich” Japanese mainlanders for spoiling young GIs with material favors and 
criticizes Japanese women in Okinawa for not being able to say “No” to American 
men.  Matsuko thinks Japanese women’s ambiguous responses are particularly 
problematic because they give U.S. GIs the impression that Japanese women are 
passive and will do whatever men want. 
Recalling some of her disappointing dating experiences with GIs before she 
met her husband, Matsuko said: 
…I dated some blacks and went out for dinner.  I was so disappointed.  I mean 
they were cheapskate, very stingy.  It was a big turn off [laughter]….  They 
were tying to make me buy dinner.  I was shocked.  Can you believe this?  
Why do I have to pay?  No way.  I am a woman.  Why do I, as a woman, have 
to pay money for dates? 
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These GIs probably expected Matsuko to buy dinner because they perceived her as a
rich Japanese woman willing to pay for things they wanted in exchange for dating or 
sex.  On one hand, Matsuko’s refusal to perform a patron’s role shows her 
assertiveness and strength.  On the other hand, it also shows resistance to changes in 
men’s traditional gender roles, which call for men to pay all expenses during dates.  
Matsuko advocates traditional gender relations, with men as givers and women as 
receivers, which could make her financially dependent on men.  Other informants, 
including Yayoi, said there was not much of a financial burden when they paid for 
expenses such as meals for their GI boyfriends.  These women found emotional costs 
of their relationships more hurtful than monetary costs.  Many Japanese women I 
interviewed said they constantly question their relationships with GI boyfriends and 
wonder whether the men are worth keeping, until they see a reason to make a decision
about the relationship’s future.     
Although Japanese women’s economic resources could lead to their economic 
exploitations by GIs in Okinawa, such resources also enabled Japanese women to 
assert some control in their relationships.  Mina shared details of her experience of 
visiting her GI boyfriend in the U.S.  Prior to leaving Okinawa, Mina’s boyfriend 
asked her to marry him and move to the U.S., but had no definite plans.  Mina 
traveled to the U.S. at her own expense and lived with her boyfriend to determine 
whether she would marry him or not.  The boyfriend quit the military after returning 
to the U.S. and began living with his parents.   
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I went to America and lived with my boyfriend in his parents’ house for three 
months as a “trial” [laughter].130  His family was very nice to me and treated 
me well.  But my boyfriend did not.  He was mean to me.  Well, when he was 
enjoying conversations with his family, I wanted to join them but I could not 
understand English well at that time.  My boyfriend did not care about me and 
I was often left out.  There were many occasions like this that made me upset 
during my trial trip in the U.S.   
 
The longer Mina lived with her boyfriend, the greater were the gaps in numerous 
aspects of their relationship.  At the end of her third month in the U.S, Mina decided 
not to marry him and she returned to Japan.   
Mina’s case is not unusual.  Several military wives I interviewed used their 
economic resources for “trial trips” to the U. S. and stayed with their boyfriends 
before making decisions.  This strategy was particularly effective when GI boyfriends 
left Okinawa with promises of marriage but without suggesting any plans for the 
future.  Some of these women went to the U.S. only to find out their boyfriends were 
committed to hometown girlfriends or were already married.  Although these trip  do 
not always yield positive outcomes, economic resources make it possible for Japanese 
women to take initiative and find clues that help them decide whether they should 
commit to marriage with their GI boyfriends or move on to new relationships.  When 
this option was available (which was not the case for war brides), contemporary 
Okinawan women could minimize risks of enduring unhappy marriages.    
 Where Mina and other women used their resources for trial trips to the U. S., 
another group of women used the money to return to Japan alone or with their bi-
                                                
130 There is a bilateral agreement between Japan and the U. S. in respect to a visa waiver program that 
allows Japanese citizens to visit the U. S. and stay for no longer 90days without obtaining a visa. The 
same stipulation applies to the U. S. citizens when visiting Japan.  
 
                                                                                                                                202
racial children after their marriages failed in the U.S.  Economic resources help 
contemporary Japanese women end their failed relationships with GIs and retur to 
Japan.  For most war brides, however, returning to Japan was more than a financil 
issue; it was an emotional burden not only on war brides but also on their families in 
Japan.  Many scholars on war brides support my research findings, which show that 
Japanese war brides lost the option of returning to Japan in when they left the country 
with their American husbands.  Some war bride informants said they still feel their 
surviving family members in Japan were unwelcoming or gave them some reasons 
not to visit, especially after their parents died.  Family reluctance disouraged some 
war brides from making even a short visit to Japan.   
By contrast, younger generations of Okinawan military wives whose 
marriages ended are likely to go back to Okinawa.  Several military wives in my 
study returned to Okinawa after separating from or divorcing GI husbands in the U.S.  
Many of these “returnees” said they decided to return to Okinawa mostly because 
their husbands quit the military, which made it difficult to sustain even a basic family
life in the U.S.  Factors such as limited English communication skills, racism, sexism, 
and cultural and social differences kept divorced Japanese women from finding good 
jobs, especially when these women were raising children.    
Japanese women’s economic power gave them some control over their 
relationships, but sometimes led to further sexual and financial exploitation by GIs.  
However, these women are not merely victims.  When Sakura told her mother that her 
GI boyfriend (her future husband), whom she had been dating for a couple of months 
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before he proposed, Sakura’s mother (who became pregnant in a relationship with a 
GI and gave birth to Sakura out of wedlock) was not supportive at first.  However, 
Sakura’s mother eventually became an advisor figure: 
My mother told me that I should be very careful and should ask my boyfriend 
his social security number.  My husband had no idea why he had to tell his 
social security number to me.  My mother said she would not trust GIs 
because of her own experience and familiar stories from other women.  
“When a GI said, ‘I am not like other jerks,’ he anyway turned to one of them 
at the end,” sad my mother.  My mother didn’t want me to get hurt.  She 
didn’t want to see me going through a similar kind of pain she had went 
through. 
 
In most situations, GIs would not give their girlfriends their Social Security numbers 
or military I.D. numbers.  However, Japanese women must be aware that they need to 
take the initiative in obtaining information about their GI boyfriends, and that such 
information includes more than just their first names and military branches.  Without 
contact information, reaching their boyfriends once they have gone is virtually 
impossible.  Many women experienced the sudden disappearance of their boyfriends, 
but these men sometimes left problems for their girlfriends.   
I met several single mothers with bi-racial children fathered by GIs who have 
legal issues to solve.  Some are mothers of out-of-wedlock children who seek 
paternity establishment from their ex-boyfriends, so that their children can obt in 
U.S. citizenship.  Other women, who divorced their GI husbands for various reasons, 
take legal action to obtain child support from their former husbands.  Some ex-
military wives do not explicitly demand child support from their former spouses. 
These women expressed fear that legal action might upset their ex-husbands, which 
might affect relationships between the children and their fathers.  For bi-racial 
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children living outside the U.S., connections to their American fathers and obtaining 
U.S. citizenship are essential to making sense of their Japanese identities, and the 





















                                                                                                                                205
Conclusion 
 This project explored GI-Japanese intimacy as it developed within specific 
historical, cultural, and socioeconomic contexts of post-World War II Japan, 
specifically in relation to the U.S. occupation and the continuing U.S. military 
presence in Okinawa.  The feminist concept of reversing the gaze provides a 
framework for my investigations of, and challenges to, the Orientalist gaze, which
objectifies Asian women as exotic in general, and as short-term sexual compani ns in 
the specific context of U.S. global militarization.  Reversing the gaze shifts the 
positions of Japanese women from objects to subjects, which enables these women to 
determine their own spaces for agency and to express subjective views of American 
men, as alternatives to their objectification under the Orientalist gaze.  Sensitive, 
emotional, complex, and empowering, reversing the gaze is a process in which each 
woman’s vibrant voice is central to analyzing a wide range of aspects of GI-Japanese 
intimacy.  
This study found that when American men are exposed to the gazes of 
Japanese women (i.e., war brides and younger generations of military wives), 
multiple and often contradictory images of American men coexist in these women’s 
perceptions.  For both groups of women, perceptions of American GIs include 
idealized and fantasized “Americans,” constructed around images of Western 
democracy and chivalrous Western men practicing “ladies-first” courtesies.  At the 
same time, Japanese women perceive these men as traditionally masculine, elf-
disciplined soldiers who embody values of protection for women and country.  These 
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idealistic images make up a large part of the “American magic” that has enraptured 
Japanese women from the postwar era to the present.   
Although American magic has similar effects on Japanese women from both 
generations, its positive images of Americans exist alongside negative representations 
of cruel, manipulative Orientalist men who treat women as disposable sex objects 
while temporarily stationed overseas.  Many interviewees, and especially the younger 
women, volunteered stories of bitter, painful, and often traumatic experiences from 
past relationships with American men.  In many cases, these experiences stem from 
the abrupt endings of relationships due to GIs receiving orders that assign them to 
new military destinations.  Short-term romances with local women have become part 
of gendered and sexualized military traditions practiced routinely by GIs stationed 
overseas.  These traditions overlap with Orientalist perceptions of Asian women, 
exemplified by images such as “Madame Butterfly,” which justify and sometimes 
encourage short-term GI-Japanese romances.   
Militarized masculinity is another attribute that creates contradicting images 
of American GIs under Japanese women’s gaze.  While many women praised GIs’ 
physical fitness and strength maintained by military training, some of these women 
were victimized by militarized masculinity, which took forms such as domestic 
violence, sexual and child abuse, and verbal abuse in intimate relationships.  As I 
noted in the preceding chapter, domestic violence is not unique to military men and 
their relationships with women.  However, unlike domestic violence committed by 
male civilians, this violence is not only gendered but also militarized, performed by 
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men who are professionally trained to prepare for the combat.  Militarized 
masculinity is not confined to the battlefields and training camps.  When it travels to 
intimate sites, wives and girlfriends of military men are vulnerable to severe or fatal 
injury.   
Older and younger generations of Japanese women acknowledged their 
disillusion with “American magic” through their own experiences and through similar 
stories that their friends told them.  However, many women also found themselves 
trapped by “American magic” and continued pursuing new relationships with GIs.  
Core elements of “American magic,” such as images of chivalrous, masculine, and 
strong Western men, did not emerge spontaneously.  Nor were fantasized Western 
men merely imaginary creations of Japanese women.  Instead, chivalrous and 
democratic Western men were constructed through contrasts with representations of 
Japanese domestic patriarchy in Japanese society, where male dominance is 
embodied in its cultural values and traditions.  Similarly, Japanese women’s 
perceptions of Western masculinity were constructed, exaggerated, and enhanced in 
contrast to “feminized” Japanese men, whom the West had castrated symbolically.  
Ironically, this means that Japanese women also contributed to the maintenance of 
American masculinity.  Furthermore, Western men reinforced their self-images as 
strong and masculine in contrast with Orientalist images of Asian women’s 
hyperfemininity and excessive sexuality that they created, since “‘masculinity’ does 
not exist except in contrast with ‘femininity.’” (Connell 2005: 68)  
 
                                                                                                                                208
As Japanese women construct polarized images of GIs and Japanese men, 
which highlight Japanese men’s inferiority to American men, these women justified 
their choice of American men as marriage partners.  The contrasts between Am rican 
and Japanese men became starker when the women addressed differences in what 
each group of men had to offer.  Conditions during the early post-World War II years 
compelled many Japanese women to see American men as victors in every aspect of 
their lives and to view Japanese men in opposite terms, as men who failed to offer 
even basic life’s necessities.  Japan’s economic and social circumstances during the 
postwar period intensified these gaps and made American GIs more attractive to 
Japanese women.  Economic desperation was a crucial factor in understanding early 
postwar GI-Japanese intimacy, especially among women who were severely 
victimized by the war.  While their choices were limited, I want to stres  that it was 
these women who ultimately made decisions whether or not to take the opportunity to 
marry American GIs. 
Even though economic rewards are no longer major factors for younger 
generations of Japanese women, many Okinawan military wives and girlfriends 
believe that marrying GIs will provide the means to a more financially secure and 
stable life than would be available through marriage to Okinawan men.  Focusing 
exclusively on the size of the paychecks that young enlisted GIs bring home would 
not necessarily suggest that their military careers are attractive.  However, the 
benefits associated with GIs’ SOFA status add a high value to relationships with 
American GIs in Okinawa.  When some younger Japanese and Okinawan women 
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perceive American men as status symbols to “carry” with them and see themselv s as 
the envy of other women, they know that such Americans are in military uniforms, 
but not civilians without SOFA status, in Okinawa.  To most Okinawan women, 
“Americans in Okinawa” refers to GIs, though such perceptions of American men are 
less likely to be shared by Japanese women on the mainland.  Therefore, for both 
generations of Japanese women, their perceptions and images of American men are 
constructed inseparably from the U.S. military, including military benefits, culture, 
practice, and masculinity.         
This study also found that war brides and military wives tend to identify 
themselves with their husbands’ race, by learning about American race relations and 
their husbands’ positions relative to other racial groups.  These women’s perceptions 
of race differ depending on their racial affiliations; their husbands' experienc s with 
and attitudes toward other races shape these women's perceptions.  Some women who 
married racial minority GIs perceive whiteness in relation to the power, inequality, 
racism, and sexism that affect racial minorities, including Asian women.  Women 
associated with white GIs, however, do not always view whiteness as a negative 
component of white men, though they were aware of the racial hierarchy in the 
military and in civilian life.  Some women associated with white GIs adopt cautious 
attitudes when referring to black GIs and deliberately choose “proper” language.     
Although race is a sensitive subject among Japanese women married to 
American GIs, women of the earlier generations seemed especially reluctant to talk 
about racial issues.  As I discussed earlier (see Chapter 3), the Japanese have 
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culturally and historically imbedded prejudices against some racial, ethnic, and status 
groups.  They also have a sense of superiority over people with darker skin 
complexions.  While Japanese people in the postwar era perceived black GIs through
their own prejudiced lenses, segregation and white racism practiced in the U.S. 
military intensified their contrasting views of white and black GIs.  Therefore, 
Japanese women associated with black GIs were compelled to accept the American 
racial hierarchy, in which black GIs were designated as inferior to white GIs.  This 
racialized white-black relation shaped personal relationships and interactions between 
Japanese women with whites and with black Americans.   
In contrast to older generations of Japanese women, younger generations of 
Okinawan and Japanese military wives talked about race more freely.  To some 
women, race was a major factor that encouraged them to, or discouraged them from, 
pursuing relationships with GIs of particular racial groups.  These women expressed 
their racial preferences such as white and black, for their boyfriends or future 
husbands.  Older, often negative perceptions of American GIs persist among the 
general public.  The stigma attached to blackness creates family disputes over 
marriages between black GIs and Okinawan women, placing psychological burdens 
on Okinawan women and their families.  However, perceptions of black GIs among 
some populations of Japanese are no longer associated with negative images.  Young 
generations of Japanese reconstructed blackness in response to the global trend of 
hip-hop music, which redefined blackness as “cool” and fashionable.   
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As I showed in Chapter 5, most military wives of black GIs I interviewed in 
Okinawa mentioned a connection between their musical tastes for hip-hop and their 
racial desires for black GIs.  These women’s preferences for black men over white 
GIs counter the conventional marriage pattern of an Asian female marrying a white 
man.  Reconstruction of negative images of blackness into new images, in the context 
of global trends of hip-hop music and culture, challenges the hegemony of whiteness 
and white mainstream culture.  Interviewees’ bold, positive statements about 
blackness contributed to empowering Japanese women as they made a claim for black 
men over white men as their intimate partners.   
Although this study focuses primarily on military wives of white GIs and 
black GIs, I noticed many Latino GIs in base towns in Okinawa.  The high visibility 
of the Latino population in the U.S. military could reflect recent increases in Lati o 
enlistment rates, as Kleykamp (2007) suggests.  I expect marriage rates between 
Japanese women and Latino GIs to increase if these enlistment rates continue t rise.  
The inclusion of men from other racial and ethnic groups would enrich future 
research, especially since the military is more racially diverse than ever.    
The economic aspects of GI-Japanese intimacy have changed tremendously 
over the past half-century.  This affected the gendered power relationships and 
Japanese women’s perceptions of American men.  In postwar Japan, Americans 
monopolized power and resources, which created a clear-cut gendered power 
relationship between GIs and Japanese women.  American GIs in present day 
Okinawa, of whom most are young enlisted servicemen, do not have the same kind of 
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economic advantages that American soldiers in the postwar era did, since power 
relations between the U.S. and Japan shifted in favor of Japan over the past three 
decades.  In contrast, Japanese and Okinawan women improved their socioeconomic 
status compared to their counterparts in postwar Japan, which enabled contemporary 
young women to become consumers with increased purchasing power.  While these 
young women with resources gained some control over relationships with GIs, teir 
economic resources could also lead to purposeful material exploitation by GIs.  Some 
young GIs perceive Japanese women as providers, not only of free sexual services, 
but also of material rewards (even if such rewards cover only petty expenses) whil  in 
Okinawa.   
The current study suggests that the Orientalist gaze is inseparable from 
militarized masculinity, and its impact on Japanese women is not limited to 
reproduction and persistence of Orientalist stereotypes.  As I stated earli r, militarized 
masculinity could victimize its gendered and sexualized objects through sexual 
assaults, physical violence, and verbal abuse.  Ironically, when reversing the gaze, it 
is militarized masculinity and military status that enhances American men’s other 
qualities (e.g., ladies-first) and motivates women to pursue relationships with GIs in 
Okinawa.  Merits and potential danger associated with militarized masculinity exist 
side-by-side, though most military wives and girlfriends I interviewed ten  to see 
danger only within military training and battlefields, but not in intimate spheres.  
Similar to militarized masculinity, militarized patriarchy in domestic pheres needs to 
be addressed in the future research. 
 
                                                                                                                                213
 The issue of single motherhood and biracial children fathered by American 
GIs is another vital research area.  At the end of Chapter 5, I recalled talking with 
several single mothers of biracial children dealing with problems such as paternity 
establishment and child support.  In my interview with Eddie Callagain, an African 
American lawyer working in Okinawa since 1995, Callagain stated that she has filed 
102 cases dealing with support for children parented by Japanese women and GIs.  
Sixty-nine of her cases collect checks from GI fathers using voluntary methods, while 
33 cases use the involuntary method of withholding fathers’ wages.  Callagain 
expects there are more women who have similar problems, but do not seek help. 
Although these single mothers’ situations may appear to be private issues or 
personal problems between Japanese or Okinawan women and their GI boyfriends or 
ex-husbands, these problems are also political issues.  Noiri (2000), an Okinawan 
scholar, argues that the problems of children abandoned by their servicemen fathers 
should not be blamed on individual women, since it is not Okinawan women or men 
who decided to turn Okinawa into a U.S. military colony and bring in thousands of 
American GIs.  Unfortunately, “victim-blaming” attitudes are prevalent among 
Japan’s policy makers, its media, and the general public, all of which have 
stigmatized Japanese women and biracial children deserted by American GIs si ce 
the occupation era.  Extensive research on contemporary single motherhood and 
deserted children in the context of U.S. global militarization is necessary for 
identifying patterns and effects of these problems on women and children and the 
urgency of solving them. 
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Appendix : Abbreviations and Military Terms 
 
 
BAH   Basic Allowance for Housing 
BX/PX  Base Exchange/Post Exchange 
COLA   Cost of Living Allowance 
 
Commissary  Grocery store on active installation where service members and 
families can purchase food, beverages, etc., at price usually 
lower than in civilian stores. 
Company  The basic administrative and tactical unit.  
GHQ   General Headquarters 
 
Liberty  Short periods of authorized absence 
Liberty Cards 
MCCS   Marine Corps Community Service 
 
NCO  Non-Commissioned Officer: An enlisted person with a 
                                    minimum rank of Corporal or Sergeant. 
PCS   Permanent Change of Station 
PT   Physical Training 
PX   Post Exchange 
SOFA   Status of Forces Agreement 
TDY   Temporary Duty 
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